De budgettaire, financiële en monetaire politiek van België in 1977

Res Publica ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-218
Author(s):  
Vic Van Rompuy

For each topic the obiectives, instruments and performance of the policy concerned are expounded. In the field of fiscal policy special attention is drawn to the rather large deficit of the budget, its consequences and possible remedies. The section on monetary policy deals in particular with the discussion around the maintaining of the Belgian franc within the European small snake and with the argumentation of the Belgian central bank against the monetarist's contention in favour of the monetary rule.

2009 ◽  
pp. 9-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kudrin

The article examines the causes of origin and manifestation of the current global financial crisis and the policies adopted in developed countries in 2007—2008 to deal with it. It considers the effects of the financial crisis on Russia’s economy and monetary policy of the Central Bank in the current conditions as well as the main guidelines for the fiscal policy under different energy prices. The measures for fighting the crisis that the Russian government and the Central Bank use to support the real economy are described.


2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 563-584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Sims

Drastic changes in central bank operations and monetary institutions in recent years have made previously standard approaches to explaining the determination of the price level obsolete. Recent expansions of central bank balance sheets and of the levels of richcountry sovereign debt, as well as the evolving political economy of the European Monetary Union, have made it clear that fiscal policy and monetary policy are intertwined. Our thinking and teaching about inflation, monetary policy, and fiscal policy should be based on models that recognize fiscal-monetary policy interactions. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62, H63)


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 753-779
Author(s):  
Nana Kwame Akosah

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to appraise the stability of Ghana’s fiscal policy by assessing government’s reaction in the past to rising public debt over the last three decades. Design/methodology/approach – Using quarterly data spanning 1990Q1-2013Q2, the study evaluated the mean reverting properties of Ghana’s public debt and also estimate the fiscal policy reaction function. The complementary estimation techniques include Pesaran et al. (2001) bound testing cointegration test, differencing method and also Granger two-step cointegration methods. Findings – Using quarterly data from 1990Q1 to 2013Q2, the study found the fiscal policy to be unstable in the 1990s, necessitating the adoption of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ initiative in 2001. The fiscal situation however relatively stabilizes afterwards following the external debt relief in 2001. Nevertheless, the study reveals that the recent fiscal policy (since 2006) seems to be confronted with tremendous fiscal pressures, exacerbated by fiscal excesses during election cycles as well as excessive domestic and external borrowings. In addition, the economic growth-debt link was found to be weak, though debt appears to adversely affect economic growth. Research limitations/implications – The study does not thoroughly explore the possibility of non-linear relationship between public debt and primary balance. Also, the result could be different using different data frequencies. Practical implications – The state of government finance has implications on the monetary policy and economic growth prospects of an economy. As an inflation targeting central bank since 2002, a successful monetary policy implementation that reins in inflation requires fiscal policy that curtails fiscal volatilities originating from imprudent behaviour of government. Therefore, the looming fiscal pressures in recent times would impair the effective implementation of the inflation targeting framework by the central bank, and also retard economic growth as the bulk of these expenditures are usually recurrent in the case of Ghana. Originality/value – This is the first paper to employ complementary econometric techniques to empirically evaluate fiscal sustainability in Ghana.


Res Publica ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Alfons Verplaetse

This article on the evolution of economic and monetary policy in Belgium, which turned the "sick man of Europe" into one of the stronger European economies and allowed it to enter into EMU, stresses the role of the monetary authorities as a stabilising force in Belgium. It gives a detailed analysis of how these changes have allowed Belgium to regain the confidence of both monetary authorities and international investors after the devaluation of 1982.  The policy responses to the oil shock at the beginning of the seventies broke with the policy mix which had until then been practised. Both the wage formation process andf iscal policy clearly spiralled out of control, the chiefresult of which was a drastic loss in international competitiveness. As a consequence, the current account showed a large deficit, the traditional level at which public deficit had stood rose dramatically, unemployment exploded and the financial structure of most corporations became fragile.A drastic realignment of economic policy started with the devaluation of the Belgian franc in 1982. This devaluation was accompanied by a series of measures aimed at preventing the inflationary pressures from triggering further devaluations, and hence at restoring credibility. These measures included restrictive fiscal policies (tax increases and cuts inpublic spending) and real wage cuts. By 1987 this recovery policy had successfully restored Belgian competitiveness, reduced the government deficit and restored the balance ofpayments equilibrium.  Although public policies became less restrictive during the period 1988-1993, the central bank continued to gain international credibility. Significant stepsin this process were the abolition of the dual exchange rate system, the decision to peg the Belgian franc to the most stable currency in the ERM (i.e. the German mark) and the reform of the money markets in Belgium. The latter in particular helped to increase the central bank's independence, since this reform implied total control by the central bank over short term interest rates, it reduced significantly the automatic credit lines of the fiscal authorities with the central bank and it stipulated that revaluations of gold reserves should no langer be used to finance government budget deficits. By 1992 international credibility had been restored to such a degree that the Belgian franc became a strong currency during the 1992 crisis, obliging the central bank to come to the rescue of the weaker currencies under attack in September 1992 with a speculative inflow of capital of about 200 billion BEF. However this restored credibility continued to be fragile, as became evident during the 1993 exchange rate crisis when the Belgian franc was vigorously attacked by international speculation.The insufficient alignment of public and monetary policies proved to be at the heart of the financial problems of the 1993 crises. The Belgian government relaunched its policies of budgetary restriction and wage moderation, brought together in what was called the 'Global Plan'. This realignment of public policies to monetary policy swiftly restored the credibility of the Belgian franc, so that as early as January 1994 the Belgian franc converged to its central parity with an interest differential vis-à-vis the German mark of only about 2 %. This differential declined progressively. Indeed the global plan restored the confidence of the investors in Belgian economic policy. Financial markets now fully believed in the entry of Belgium into EMU and from then on no major difficulties were to arise.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 976-986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanos Papadamou ◽  
Eleftherios Spyromitros ◽  
Panagiotis Tsintzos

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the institutional setting of monetary policy making that mitigates the effects of productive public investment on inflation persistence. Design/methodology/approach In the theoretical approach, the authors consider a simple monetary game model à la Barro-Gordon introducing, apart from stochastic output shocks, indexed wage contracts and public investment effects. Then, the authors empirically produce inflation persistence and public investment persistence by estimating a first-order autoregressive model in a fixed rolling window of 36 months for the UK and also use a dummy in order to incorporate the regime switch in monetary policy since 1997, giving a clear increase in the level of central bank independence. Findings The theoretical framework suggests that an independent central banker could better manage inflation expectations and therefore inflation persistence despite the occurrence of persistent public investment shocks. From the perspective of fiscal policy, the appointment of a conservative and independent central banker could absorb adverse effects on inflation dynamics resulting from persistent expansionary fiscal policies. Empirical evidence in the UK indicates that the creation of an independent monetary policy committee reduces the positive link between public investment and inflation persistence. Practical implications From a monetary policy perspective view, the best response to public investment policies is to increase the degree of independence to alleviate effects on inflation dynamics. From the perspective of fiscal policy, an independent central banker can provide the necessary conditions to undertake a long-run public investment plan, since long-run growth will not be undermined by adverse inflation inertia. Originality/value The authors introduce, in the debate of inflation persistence, both theoretically and empirically, the role of public investment and monetary policy design.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Hughes Hallett ◽  
Diana N. Weymark

Abstract The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-216
Author(s):  
Stefano Gnocchi

We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E52, E58, E62)


1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Della Paolera ◽  
Alan M. Taylor

Did macroconomic interventions make any contribution to Argentina's revovery from the Great Depression? Macroeconomic policy deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. Fiscal policy was conservative. Monetary policy became unorthodox after 1931, when the Caja de conversión began rediscounting to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflation. This change predated the creation of the central bank in 1935. A wider literature links the interwar depression in the core to flaws in the gold standard, and active monetary policy to escape from defaltion and slump; our work extends this idea to the periphery.


2006 ◽  
pp. 4-27
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich

Specific requirements on macroeconomic policy, stemming from the impact of external volatility on trade balance and fiscal revenues are studied. Income gains or losses of the Russian economy due to variation in the commodity prices are found to range from -9 to +12% of GDP over the last decade. Contribution of the government and the Central Bank to neutralizing windfall revenues is evaluated, an approach to sharing their functions is suggested. It is demonstrated that monetary policy in the post-crisis period has been aimed rather at restraining ruble appreciation, than at smoothing the effect of external volatility. Expediency to formulate fiscal policy objectives and budget rules in terms of structural deficit (adjusted for windfall revenues) is argued.


1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (4II) ◽  
pp. 931-941
Author(s):  
M. Aynul Hasan ◽  
Qazi Masood Ahmed

Monetary policy, in general, refers to those steps taken by the Central Bank to achieve such broader objectives of the economy as growth, employment, external balance and price stability through changes in the money supply, interest rates and credit policies. The money supply thus created by the Central Bank should be in response to the changes in key macroeconomic target variables such as GNP, balance of payments, inflation, internal debt and unemployment. Indeed, a properly estimated monetary policy reaction function can provide useful information regarding such matters as to whether the Central Bank, in fact, has been systematically accommodating to the changes in the target variables. The reaction function can also provide insight into the question as to what should be the relevant indicators of the monetary policy. In addition, as argued by Havrilesky (1967), it may also play a crucial role in the formulation of long-term monetary policy strategy. The other important consideration in the development of a monetary policy reaction function pertains to the endogeneity of the monetary policy. As pointed out by Goldfeld and Blinder (1972), if a policy variable responds to the lagged (or expected) target values, then considering such a policy variable as exogenous would not only introduce the problem of misspecification but will also produce serious biases in the parameters estimated from those models. In particular, if the monetary policy variable happens to be strongly influenced by target variables, then the standard result of the relative effectiveness of the monetary policy vis-a-vis fiscal policy can be questionable on the grounds of reverse causation problem.


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