Polarization of COVID-19 Vaccine Discourse on Twitter: Implications for Vaccine Policy (Preprint)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loni Hagen ◽  
Ashley Fox ◽  
Heather O'Leary ◽  
Deaundre Dyson ◽  
Kimberly Walker ◽  
...  

UNSTRUCTURED Since COVID-19 vaccines became broadly available to the adult population, sharp divergences in uptake have emerged along partisan lines. Researchers have pointed to a polarized social media presence contributing to the spread of mis-/dis-information as being responsible for these growing partisan gaps in uptake. The major aim of this study was to identify and describe influential actors, topics, behaviors, and community structures related to COVID-19 vaccine conversations on Twitter prior to the vaccine roll-out to the general population and discuss implications for vaccine promotion and policy. Using Twitter data on COVID-19 vaccination during July 2020, we found that Twitter vaccine conversations were highly polarized with different actors occupying separate “clusters.” The anti-vaccine cluster was the most densely connected group. Among the 100 most influential actors, medical experts are outnumbered both by partisan actors and by activist vaccine skeptics/conspiracy theorists. Scientists and medical actors were largely absent from the conservative network, and anti-vaccine sentiment was especially salient among actors on the political right. Conversations related to COVID-19 vaccines are highly polarized along partisan lines with “trust” in vaccines being manipulated to the political advantage of partisan actors.

SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824401983270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Eady ◽  
Jonathan Nagler ◽  
Andy Guess ◽  
Jan Zilinsky ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker

A major point of debate in the study of the Internet and politics is the extent to which social media platforms encourage citizens to inhabit online “bubbles” or “echo chambers,” exposed primarily to ideologically congenial political information. To investigate this question, we link a representative survey of Americans with data from respondents’ public Twitter accounts ( N = 1,496). We then quantify the ideological distributions of users’ online political and media environments by merging validated estimates of user ideology with the full set of accounts followed by our survey respondents ( N = 642,345) and the available tweets posted by those accounts ( N ~ 1.2 billion). We study the extent to which liberals and conservatives encounter counter-attitudinal messages in two distinct ways: (a) by the accounts they follow and (b) by the tweets they receive from those accounts, either directly or indirectly (via retweets). More than a third of respondents do not follow any media sources, but among those who do, we find a substantial amount of overlap (51%) in the ideological distributions of accounts followed by users on opposite ends of the political spectrum. At the same time, however, we find asymmetries in individuals’ willingness to venture into cross-cutting spaces, with conservatives more likely to follow media and political accounts classified as left-leaning than the reverse. Finally, we argue that such choices are likely tempered by online news watching behavior.


First Monday ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Taninecz Miller

The increasing importance of social media to political communication means the study of government-sponsored social media activity deserves further exploration. In particular, text-as-data techniques like topic models and emotional lexicons provide potential for new types of content analysis of large collections of government-backed social media discourse. Applying text-as-data methods to a corpus of Russian-sponsored Twitter data generated before, during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election shows tweets containing a diverse set of policy-related topics as well as levels of angry and fearful emotional language that peaks in close association to the election. Text-as-data techniques show Russian sponsored tweets mentioned candidate Clinton overwhelmingly negatively and referenced candidate Trump in a positive but less consistent manner. The tweets contained large minorities of apolitical topics, and also saw higher levels of conservative hashtags than progressive ones. Topics within the tweet data show a contradictory set of topics on all “sides” of the political spectrum alongside increases in fearful and angry language in temporal association with the U.S. election. The findings of this inquiry provide evidence that the tweets were sent to heighten existing tensions through topically heterogeneous propaganda. They also caution against an overly black and white interpretation of Russian disinformation efforts online.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Dudi Rustandi

Social media presence allows every person to communicate with the others. It was not deterred by the problems of space and time. So that every person can communicate with anyone, anywhere. No exception for (candidate) leaders. As a leader, Prabowo open channels of communication through the medium of Facebook and Twitter. The problem of this study is how communication is done by Prabowo. Using narrative analysis research methods, the author examines the text Prabowo statement (August 17, 2014) ahead of the Presidential inauguration period 2014-2019. From the conclusion, that the way of communicating Prabowo analyzed based on the statements in response to the political situation always adheres to the 1945 Constitution and the integrity of the nation. While in narrating a national event Prabowo also emphasizes how the interests of the nation must take precedence over the interests of individuals and groups. Thus, the disappointment that comes from an emotional situation becomes a meaningless group than in the interests of preserving the integrity of the nation.


First Monday ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Boukes ◽  
Damian Trilling

Addressing the call to move beyond a simple genre classification of TV shows as either substantive (hard) news or non-substantive (soft) infotainment, we propose using social media reactions to determine a program’s political relevance. Such an approach provides information that goes beyond genre or content characteristics and reflects what really reaches an audience. Analyzing tweets about two Dutch talk shows and four U.S. primary debates, we show that audience responses to television programs differ considerably regarding their political relevance. Thereby, we demonstrate how examining online audience reactions can be employed as a sophisticated and valid way to assess the political relevance of TV programs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Perri R. Tutelman ◽  
Justine Dol ◽  
Michelle E. Tougas ◽  
Christine T. Chambers

Author(s):  
Andrew Atia ◽  
Hannah C. Langdell ◽  
Andrew Hollins ◽  
Ronnie L. Shammas ◽  
Adam Glener ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Microsurgery fellowship applicants make decisions for future training based on information obtained from colleagues, mentors, and microsurgery fellowship program Websites (MFWs). In this study, we sought to evaluate the accessibility and quality of available information by microsurgery programs by analyzing the most commonly used web resources and social media outlets for applicants. Methods The San Francisco (SF) Match and American Society of Reconstructive Microsurgery Websites were queried in April 2020 for microsurgery fellowship programs (MFPs) participating in the SF Match. Twenty-two independent variables of information were assessed on MFWs based on previously published data. Social media presence was also assessed by querying Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter for official hospital, plastic surgery residency, and microsurgery fellowship accounts. Results All 24 MFWs participating in the SF Match had a webpage. Program description, faculty listing, operative volume, and eligibility requirements were listed for all programs (100%). The majority of MFWs listed affiliated hospitals (75%), provided a link to the fellowship application (66.7%), listed interview dates (66.7%), and highlighted research interests (50%). A minority of MFWs provided information on conference schedule (37.5%), current fellow listing (25%), previous fellow listing (16.67%), and positions held by previous fellows (8.33%). No MFWs (0%) presented information on selection process, or rotation schedule.All hospitals with an MFP had a Facebook page and nearly all had Instagram (83.3%) and Twitter accounts (95.8%). Plastic surgery residency programs at the same institution of an MFP had social media presence on Facebook (38.9%), Twitter (38.9%), and Instagram (66.7%). Only three MFPs had Facebook accounts (12.5%) and none had Instagram or Twitter accounts. Conclusion As the field of microsurgery continues to grow, the need for effective recruitment and training of microsurgeons continues to be essential. Overall, we conclude that both the accessibility and quality of information available to applicants are limited, which is a missed opportunity for recruitment.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-24
Author(s):  
Matt Sheedy

The Occupy movement was an unprecedented social formation that spread to approximate 82 countries around the globe in the fall of 2011 via social media through the use of myths, symbols and rituals that were performed in public space and quickly drew widespread mainstream attention. In this paper I argue that the movement offers a unique instance of how discourse functions in the construction of society and I show how the shared discourses of Occupy were taken-up and shaped in relation to the political opportunity structures and interests of those involved based on my own fieldwork at Occupy Winnipeg. I also argue that the Occupy movement provides an example of how we might substantively attempt to classify “religion” by looking at how it embodied certain metaphysical claims while contrasting it with the beliefs and practices of more conventionally defined “religious” communities.


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