Topics and emotions in Russian Twitter propaganda

First Monday ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Taninecz Miller

The increasing importance of social media to political communication means the study of government-sponsored social media activity deserves further exploration. In particular, text-as-data techniques like topic models and emotional lexicons provide potential for new types of content analysis of large collections of government-backed social media discourse. Applying text-as-data methods to a corpus of Russian-sponsored Twitter data generated before, during and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election shows tweets containing a diverse set of policy-related topics as well as levels of angry and fearful emotional language that peaks in close association to the election. Text-as-data techniques show Russian sponsored tweets mentioned candidate Clinton overwhelmingly negatively and referenced candidate Trump in a positive but less consistent manner. The tweets contained large minorities of apolitical topics, and also saw higher levels of conservative hashtags than progressive ones. Topics within the tweet data show a contradictory set of topics on all “sides” of the political spectrum alongside increases in fearful and angry language in temporal association with the U.S. election. The findings of this inquiry provide evidence that the tweets were sent to heighten existing tensions through topically heterogeneous propaganda. They also caution against an overly black and white interpretation of Russian disinformation efforts online.

SAGE Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 215824401983270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Eady ◽  
Jonathan Nagler ◽  
Andy Guess ◽  
Jan Zilinsky ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker

A major point of debate in the study of the Internet and politics is the extent to which social media platforms encourage citizens to inhabit online “bubbles” or “echo chambers,” exposed primarily to ideologically congenial political information. To investigate this question, we link a representative survey of Americans with data from respondents’ public Twitter accounts ( N = 1,496). We then quantify the ideological distributions of users’ online political and media environments by merging validated estimates of user ideology with the full set of accounts followed by our survey respondents ( N = 642,345) and the available tweets posted by those accounts ( N ~ 1.2 billion). We study the extent to which liberals and conservatives encounter counter-attitudinal messages in two distinct ways: (a) by the accounts they follow and (b) by the tweets they receive from those accounts, either directly or indirectly (via retweets). More than a third of respondents do not follow any media sources, but among those who do, we find a substantial amount of overlap (51%) in the ideological distributions of accounts followed by users on opposite ends of the political spectrum. At the same time, however, we find asymmetries in individuals’ willingness to venture into cross-cutting spaces, with conservatives more likely to follow media and political accounts classified as left-leaning than the reverse. Finally, we argue that such choices are likely tempered by online news watching behavior.


INFORMASI ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-122
Author(s):  
Nkiru Comfort Ezeh ◽  
Augustine Godwin Mboso

The Social Media has emerged as a new platform for discourses. It has no doubt provided people with easier and faster accessibility to information and has become an outlet for them to share their views on socio-political issues. It has also been observed that negative and hate comments seem to dominate on social networks used for social and political communication. Anchored on Public Sphere Theory, focus group discussions were conducted with undergraduate youths in South-east Nigeria examined on the issue of President Mohammadu Buhari’s referring to Nigerian youths as lazy, while speaking at the Commonwealth Business Forum in Westminster on 18th April 2018. This article, therefore, explored the opinions advanced in the discourse based on the principles of freedom of expression and responsibility. The study suggests that while Twitter platform was more objective in the discussion of the issue of the day because it allows the use of filters to ensure that contents posted on the platform adhere strictly to rules and fair usage; Facebook and Whatsapp trailed with abuses and hate comments. The study recommended that owners of blogs and media houses who now post their contents on the social media should coordinate comments on such platforms and continue developing mechanisms that work to regulate the quality of posted content.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-126
Author(s):  
Jill E. Hopke ◽  
Molly Simis

In 2015, Hopke & Simis published an analysis of social media discourse around hydraulic fracturing. Grubert (2016) offered a commentary on the research, highlighting the politicization of terminology used in the discourse on this topic. The present article is a response to Grubert (2016)’s commentary, in which we elaborate on the distinctions between terminology used in social media discourse around hydraulic fracturing (namely, ‘frack,’ ‘fracking,’ ‘frac,’ and ‘fracing’). Additionally preliminary analysis supports the claim that industry-preferred terminology is severely limited in its reach. When industry actors opt-out of the discourse, the conversation followed by the majority of lay audiences is dominated by activists. exacerbating the political schism on the issue.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-354
Author(s):  
Burçe Çelik

The majority of current political communication studies focuses on digital and social media, and overlooks the centrality of television for the production and endurance of strongman politics in the Global South. By focusing on the journalistic television productions aired during the June 2018 election period in Turkey, this article unpacks the televisual logic that is incarnated in different modalities of telling and narrating of televisual genres. I propose two main themes: the ‘political fear’ of physical and social security threats, and ‘post-truth communications’ as the main televisual idioms for a vision of the future that is either secure or chaotic, that is, with or without Erdoğan. By combining political economy, content and textual analysis, I scrutinise the production dynamics of the televisual economy and the control and content of factual segments.


Author(s):  
Mutlu UYGUN ◽  
Ayşe Kübra SARIKAYA

The main purpose of this study is to examine the political communication behaviors of the participants covering the individuals from all segments by taking into consideration the demographic and internet related usage characteristics, regardless of a special election campaign. In order to meet the main purpose of the study, based on the quantitative research method, data were collected from a total of 531 participants in Aksaray, using a questionnaire formed from appropriate scales and questions according to the convenience sampling technique. Data were analyzed by various statistical techniques such as descriptive statistics, Pearson Correlation Analysis, Factor Analysis, One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multi-way variance analysis (factorial ANOVA). The results revealed that the political communication behavior in social media consists of two sub-dimensions which include active and passive engagement behaviors. In addition, it has been determined that these political communication behaviors in social media do not differ according to demographic characteristics, but they differ according to some personal internet and social media usage characteristics. These results, in addition to their contribution to the conceptual literature, it is thought that political parties include clues about how they can effectively use social media as a tool in their communication efforts and marketing efforts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 94-105
Author(s):  
Ruslan Seitkazin

Politicians are now learning that along with advertising on conventional media, they need to invest in online applications in order to get the attention of voters, particularly the youths. Among various microblogging services, Twitter is an essential part of popular culture. Today, Twitter is widely utilised not only to distribute information, but also political views and opinions.Therefore, politicians have turned to social media, particularly to Twitter, as a new form of political communication. The article attempts to capture the ways of using the potential of Twitter in communication strategies. It argues that in some occasions, Twitter plays a specific role in allowing politicians to monitor current political affairs and to interact with people, but in others, it is often employed as a personal branding strategy and not only during the election campaigns. It concludes with an insight that sentiment may impact the political opinion-making process which may lead to electoral intervention.


Author(s):  
Yochai Benkler ◽  
Robert Farris ◽  
Hal Roberts

This book examines the shape, composition, and practices of the United States political media landscape. It explores the roots of the current epistemic crisis in political communication with a focus on the remarkable 2016 U.S. president election culminating in the victory of Donald Trump and the first year of his presidency. The authors present a detailed map of the American political media landscape based on the analysis of millions of stories and social media posts, revealing a highly polarized and asymmetric media ecosystem. Detailed case studies track the emergence and propagation of disinformation in the American public sphere that took advantage of structural weaknesses in the media institutions across the political spectrum. This book describes how the conservative faction led by Steve Bannon and funded by Robert Mercer was able to inject opposition research into the mainstream media agenda that left an unsubstantiated but indelible stain of corruption on the Clinton campaign. The authors also document how Fox News deflects negative coverage of President Trump and has promoted a series of exaggerated and fabricated counter narratives to defend the president against the damaging news coming out of the Mueller investigation. Based on an analysis of the actors that sought to influence political public discourse, this book argues that the current problems of media and democracy are not the result of Russian interference, behavioral microtargeting and algorithms on social media, political clickbait, hackers, sockpuppets, or trolls, but of asymmetric media structures decades in the making. The crisis is political, not technological.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loni Hagen ◽  
Ashley Fox ◽  
Heather O'Leary ◽  
Deaundre Dyson ◽  
Kimberly Walker ◽  
...  

UNSTRUCTURED Since COVID-19 vaccines became broadly available to the adult population, sharp divergences in uptake have emerged along partisan lines. Researchers have pointed to a polarized social media presence contributing to the spread of mis-/dis-information as being responsible for these growing partisan gaps in uptake. The major aim of this study was to identify and describe influential actors, topics, behaviors, and community structures related to COVID-19 vaccine conversations on Twitter prior to the vaccine roll-out to the general population and discuss implications for vaccine promotion and policy. Using Twitter data on COVID-19 vaccination during July 2020, we found that Twitter vaccine conversations were highly polarized with different actors occupying separate “clusters.” The anti-vaccine cluster was the most densely connected group. Among the 100 most influential actors, medical experts are outnumbered both by partisan actors and by activist vaccine skeptics/conspiracy theorists. Scientists and medical actors were largely absent from the conservative network, and anti-vaccine sentiment was especially salient among actors on the political right. Conversations related to COVID-19 vaccines are highly polarized along partisan lines with “trust” in vaccines being manipulated to the political advantage of partisan actors.


Author(s):  
Richard Rogers ◽  
Sal Hagen

The publication of the study elicited reactions, especially on Twitter, where questions arose about the use of the notion of junk news, rather than ‘pulp news’, among other points. The analogy to junk food is emphasised. There was also the question of symmetry, and the treatment of both ends of the political spectrum. Why is the new populist right identified as the purveyors of extreme content? We found a polarised Dutch media landscape where hyperpartisan (and to a lesser extent conspiracy) content from new populist right (rather than the left or other orientations) circulates well on social media. Unlike in the US during the initial Trump insurgency, mainstream news in the Netherlands still outperforms what was hitherto known as ‘fake news’, across all platforms.


2022 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Fin Bauer ◽  
Kimberly L. Wilson

Abstract China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations.


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