Free Speech in the Balance: An Examination of Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme for its Bearing on Conflict of Laws, Global Free Speech, and the International Regulation of the Internet

Global Jurist ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Ziaja

The global proliferation of the Internet, given the ease with which it permits transnational communication, calls into question the applicability of traditional territorial legal systems in governing its use. Conflict-of-laws instruments and the regulation of speech are two thorny areas of concern in this vein that interrelate in a 2006 case before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme. Yahoo! offers an entry point, through its bearing on conflict-of-laws and freedom of speech jurisprudence, into examining the appropriateness of traditional legal schemes to the task of regulating Internet-enabled conduct. Focusing on the substantive issues in Yahoo!, this paper takes up the adequacy of traditional conflict-of-laws instruments as regards Internet-enabled conduct, possible alternatives to the use of conflict-of-laws instruments to regulate Internet-enabled conduct, the applicability and weight of the French law against the First Amendment in a United States court, and, finally, the possibility of developing a common core of global values regarding speech on the Internet.

1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-559
Author(s):  
William L. Rodgers

At the recent annual dinner of the American Society of International Law I listened with much interest to the eloquent and impassioned address of Judge Florence E. Allen, of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that the conservation of peace has not hitherto been, and should be made, the principal objective in the development of international law. I think that her views might be summarized not unfairly in the form of a syllogism. Undeniable is its major premise that war is cruel, costly in life and resources, full of horror—a terrible infliction on those who resort to it. The minor premise is that means exist and others may be discovered whereby disputes may always be settled and peace enforced without recourse to war. And so comes the conclusion that all these means should be sought for, discovered and used, after which war will be unnecessary and will disappear from the world, leaving us under the rule of perpetual physical peace, no matter what may be the mental and emotional differences between nations.


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris

There were two changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1949 term. Attorney General Tom C. Clark was sworn in as an Associate Justice to succeed the late Justice Frank Murphy on August 24, 1949, after his nomination by President Truman had been approved on August 19 by a vote of 73 to 8. Judge Sherman Minton of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was nominated to be an Associate Justice on September 15, 1949, to succeed Justice Wiley Rutledge. His nomination was approved by the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 48 to 16, and he was sworn in on October 12. During much of the term Justice Douglas was absent as the result of an accident incurred during the preceding summer recess. The loss of Justices Murphy and Rutledge greatly weakened the liberal alignment of the Court and very positively influenced the decision of a number of doubtful cases contrary to precedents of a recent date.


1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry B. Hazard

With nationality problems continuing to occupy a prominent place in both international and municipal practice, expressions of opinion of our highest tribunal upon the subject are received with peculiar interest. This is particularly true where the rule announced is one which governs the validity of naturalization judgments. In a recent sweeping naturalization decision which upholds the government’s views at every point, the United States Supreme Court has again stressed the rule that when doubt exists concerning a grant of citizenship, the statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the United States and against the alien. On October 22, 1928, the court handed down its opinion in the case of Anna Marie Maney, Petitioner, v. The United States of America, in which it affirmed, on writ of certiorari, the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The latter court had directed the cancellation of the applicant’s certificate of naturalization as having been “illegally procured” because of her failure to file, at the prescribed time and in the required manner, the certificate of her arrival in the United States.


Author(s):  
John Gregory Francis ◽  
Leslie Francis

Abstract Freedom of thought is not directly protected as a right in the United States. Instead, US First Amendment law protects a range of rights that may allow thoughts to be expressed. Freedom of speech has been granted especially robust protection. US courts have extended this protection to a wide range of commercial activities judged to have expressive content. In protecting these rights, US jurisprudence frequently relies on the image of the marketplace of ideas as furthering the search for truth. This commercial image, however, has increasingly detached expressive rights from the understanding of freedom of thought as a critical forum for individual autonomy. Indeed, the commercialisation of US free speech doctrine has drawn criticism for “weaponising” free speech to attack disfavoured economic and regulatory policies and thus potentially affecting freedom of thought adversely. The Internet complicates this picture. This paper argues that the Supreme Court’s expansion of the First Amendment for the benefit of commercial actors lies in the problematic tension with the justification for individual freedom of thought resting in personal self-direction and identity.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-396
Author(s):  
Thomas F. King

AbstractTwo court decisions highlight divergent opinions as to what constitutes a “substantial burden” on the practice of traditional indigenous religions in the United States. One decision, in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively defines the term in such a way as to discriminate against indigenous religious practices; the other, by a district court in the 10th Circuit based on other holdings by that circuit court, gives much more latitude for protecting such practices and the landscapes they often involve.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 137-138
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

The American Law Institute (ALI) has recently embarked on the project of elaborating a new Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Its first two Restatements on this subject have been enormously influential. The Ali began its work on the First Restatement in 1923, naming Joseph Beale of the Harvard Law School as its Reporter. Adopted in 1934, the First Restatement reflected the highly territorialist approach to the conflict of laws that had long prevailed in this country. Even before the First Restatement’s adoption, the First Restatement’s territorialist approach, and the “vested rights” theory on which it was based, was subjected to intense scholarly criticism. Nevertheless, the First Restatement’s approach continued to prevail in the United States until the New York Court of Appeals initiated a “choice-of-law revolution” in the early 1960’s with its decision inBabcock v. Jackson. Although most states have departed from the First Restatement’s approach, the First Restatement retains its adherents. Ten states continue to follow the First Restatement for tort cases and twelve states for contract cases.


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