Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suren Basov ◽  
Xiangkang Yin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Common Agency ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Hidden Information ◽  
Optimal Screening ◽  
Efficient Level ◽  
Monotonically Decrease ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

This paper studies the effects of principal's risk aversion on principal-agent relationship under hidden information. It finds that the agent's equilibrium effort increases and approaches the efficient level as the principal's risk aversion increases and tends to infinity. Allowing for random participation by the agent, his effort can be efficient even when the principal's risk aversion is finite. For the case of common agency with random participation, it is optimal for the principals to make the agent the residual claimant on profits and the principals' net profits monotonically decrease to zero when their risk aversion tends to infinity.

Eliciting Risk Preferences and Elasticity of Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-329
Author(s):  
Johan Burgaard ◽  
Mogens Steffensen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Discount Rate ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Recursive Utility ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Indirect Utility ◽  
Consistent Estimation ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Certainty Equivalents ◽  
Elasticity Of Intertemporal Substitution

Risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are separated via the celebrated recursive utility building on certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Based on an alternative separation method, we formulate a questionnaire for simultaneous and consistent estimation of risk aversion, subjective discount rate, and EIS. From a representative group of 1,153 respondents, we estimate parameters for these preferences and their variability within the population. Risk aversion and the subjective discount rate are found to be in the orders of 2 and 0, respectively, not diverging far away from results from other studies. Our estimate of EIS in the order of 10 is larger than often reported. Background variables like age and income have little predictive power for the three estimates. Only gender has a significant influence on risk aversion in the usually perceived direction that females are more risk-averse than males. Using individual estimates of preference parameters, we find covariance between preferences toward risk and EIS. We present the background reasoning on objectives, the questionnaire, a statistical analysis of the results, and economic interpretations of these, including relations to the literature.

scholarly journals Market-based instruments for risk-averse farmers: rubber agroforest conservation in Jambi Province, Indonesia

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Utkur Djanibekov ◽  
Grace B. Villamor
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Real Options ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Variance Model ◽  
Income Uncertainty ◽  
Real Options Approach ◽  
Pigovian Taxes ◽  
Rubber Agroforest ◽  
Mean Variance

AbstractThis paper investigates the effectiveness of different market-based instruments (MBIs), such as eco-certification premiums, carbon payments, Pigovian taxes and their combination, to address the conversion of agroforests to monoculture systems and subsequent effects on incomes of risk-averse farmers under income uncertainty in Indonesia. For these, the authors develop a farm-level dynamic mean-variance model combined with a real options approach. Findings show that the conservation of agroforest is responsive to the risk-aversion level of farmers: the greater the level of risk aversion, the greater is the conserved area of agroforest. However, for all risk-averse farmers, additional incentives in the form of MBIs are still needed to prevent conversion of agroforest over the years, and only the combination of MBIs can achieve this target. Implementing fixed MBIs also contributes to stabilizing farmers’ incomes and reducing income risks. Consequently, the combined MBIs increase incomes and reduce income inequality between hardly and extremely risk-averse farmers.

scholarly journals OPTIMAL OUTCOME SHARING WITH A CONSORTIUM OF CONTRACTORS

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Original Solution ◽  
Project Outcome ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Current Practices

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.

Do Migrants Think Differently? Evidence from Eastern European and Post-Soviet States

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 831-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxanda Berlinschi ◽  
Ani Harutyunyan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
International Migration ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Economic Liberalism ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Politically Active ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

This research investigates migrant self-selection on values, beliefs, and attitudes using data from Eastern European and former Soviet countries. We find that individuals who intend to emigrate are more politically active, more critical of governance and institutions, more tolerant toward other cultures, less tolerant of cheating, more optimistic, and less risk averse. With the exception of risk aversion, all selection patterns are heterogeneous across regions of origin. On the other hand, no self-selection pattern is detected on education, willingness to pay for public goods, and economic liberalism. These findings provide new insights into the determinants of international migration and reveal some of its less known consequences, such as a possible reduction of domestic pressure for political improvements in post-Soviet states due to politically active citizens’ higher propensity to emigrate.

scholarly journals Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 2193-2208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ola Kvaløy ◽  
Trond E. Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Relational Contracting ◽  
Strong Assumption ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Agent Relationship

Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that this probability is endogenously determined. We analyze a principal-agent relationship where the verifiability of the agent's output is determined by the principal's investment in drafting an explicit contract. The model is well suited for analyzing the relationship between explicit contracting, legal courts, trust, and relational contracting. In particular, we show how trust—established through repeated interaction—and legal courts may induce contractual incompleteness. (JEL D82, D86)

Cutoff Threshold Decisions for Classification Algorithms with Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Hupman
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Classification Algorithm ◽  
Classification Algorithms ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Cutoff ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Bayes Algorithm ◽  
Cutoff Threshold

Classification algorithms predict the class membership of an unknown record. Methods such as logistic regression or the naïve Bayes algorithm produce a score related to the likelihood that a record belongs to a particular class. A cutoff threshold is then defined to delineate the prediction of one class over another. This paper derives analytic results for the selection of an optimal cutoff threshold for a classification algorithm that is used to inform a two-action decision in the cases of risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results provide insight to how the optimal cutoff thresholds relate to the associated costs and the sensitivity and specificity of the algorithm for both the risk neutral and risk averse decision makers. The optimal risk averse threshold is not reliably above or below the optimal risk neutral threshold, but the relation depends on the parameters of a particular application. The results further show the risk averse optimal threshold is insensitive to the size of the data set or the magnitude of the costs, but instead is sensitive to the proportion of positive records in the data and the ratio of costs. Numeric examples and sensitivity analysis derive further insight. Results show the percent value gap from a misspecified risk attitude increases as the specificity of the classification algorithm decreases.

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