scholarly journals Climate Policies, Carbon Pricing, and Pollution Tax: Do Carbon Taxes Really Lead to a Reduction in Emissions?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 92 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Bento ◽  
Gianfranco Gianfrate ◽  
Joseph E. Aldy

Author(s):  
David Newbery

Concerns over future oil scarcity might not be so worrying but for the high carbon content of substitutes, and the limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb additional CO 2 from burning fuel. The paper argues that the tools of economics are helpful in understanding some of the key issues in pricing fossil fuels, the extent to which pricing can be left to markets, the need for, and design of, international agreements on corrective carbon pricing, and the potential Prisoners’ Dilemma in reaching such agreements, partly mitigated in the case of oil by current taxes and the probable incidence of carbon taxes on the oil price. The ‘Green Paradox’, in which carbon pricing exacerbates climate change, is theoretically possible, but empirically unlikely.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Goran Dominioni

Scholarly and policy interest in carbon pricing coalitions is growing. Existing research analyzes design features that can increase the environmental effectiveness and political resilience of coalitions centered around carbon taxes and carbon markets (i.e. explicit carbon pricing). This article is the first that analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of building carbon pricing coalitions around effective carbon pricing compared to the standard design that focuses on explicit carbon pricing. In this article, measures of effective carbon prices include carbon prices implemented via carbon taxes, carbon markets, fuel taxes, and fossil fuel subsidies reforms. The article describes four design options to build carbon pricing coalitions - three built on measures of effective carbon pricing and one that focuses exclusively on explicit carbon pricing - and benchmarks them against six criteria. The key results are that building carbon pricing coalitions around effective carbon prices has various advantages over the most common alternative discussed in the literature. These advantages include higher transparency, broader participation, higher legitimacy of the coalition, and more substantial involvement of Finance Ministries in climate change mitigation. These advantages might translate in comparable or even higher environmental effectiveness than coalitions that focuses exclusively on explicit carbon pricing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (7) ◽  
pp. 1861-1880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Lamperti ◽  
Mauro Napoletano ◽  
Andrea Roventini

The paper compares the effects of market-based (M-B) and command-and-control (C&C) climate policies on the direction of technical change and the prevention of environmental disasters. Drawing on a model of endogenous growth and directed technical change, we show that M-B policies (carbon taxes and subsidies toward clean sectors) suffer from path dependence and exhibit bounded window of opportunities: delays in their implementation make them ineffective both in redirecting technical change, (i.e. triggering a transition toward clean energy) and in avoiding environmental catastrophes. On the contrary, we find that C&C interventions are favored by path dependence and guarantee policy effectiveness irrespectively of the timing of their introduction. As the hypothesis of path dependence in technological change has received vast empirical support and it is a key feature of many models of growth, we argue that C&C policies should be seen as a valuable and non-equivalent alternative to M-B interventions.


2018 ◽  
pp. 205-246
Author(s):  
Barry G. Rabe

This chapter considers the future political viability of carbon pricing, given national and international developments since 2015. This includes a range of developments, including the Paris climate accord and major new initiatives in the United States and Canada on carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. It also revisits severance taxes and a mix of other efforts such as electricity fees and methane taxes that have emerged as possible counterparts to these carbon pricing mainstays, given their greater political feasibility.


Author(s):  
Jorge H. García ◽  
Thomas Sterner

Economists argue that carbon taxation (and more generally carbon pricing) is the single most powerful way to combat climate change. Since this is so controversial, we need to explain it better, and to be precise, the efficiency gains are largest when the costs of abatement are strongly heterogeneous. This is often—but not always—the case. When it is not, standards can fill much the same role. To internalize the climate externality, economic efficiency calls for a global carbon tax (or price) that is equal to the global damage or the so-called social cost of carbon. However, equity considerations as well as existing geographical and sectoral differences in the effectiveness of carbon taxation at reducing emissions, suggest earlier implementation of relatively high taxation levels in some sectors or countries—for instance, among richer economies followed by a more gradual phase-in among low-income countries. The number of national and subnational carbon pricing policies that have been implemented around the world during the first years following the Paris Agreement of 2015 is significant. By 2020, these programs covered 22% of global emissions with an average carbon price (weighted by the share of emissions covered) of USD15/tCO2 and a maximum price of USD120/tCO2. The share of emissions covered by carbon pricing as well as carbon prices themselves are expected to consistently rise throughout the decade 2021–2030 and beyond. Many experts agree that the social cost of carbon is in the range USD40–100/tCO2. Anti-climate lobbying, public opposition, and lack of understanding of the instrument are among the key challenges faced by carbon taxation. Opportunities for further expansion of carbon taxation lie in increased climate awareness, the communicative resources governments have to help citizens understand the logic behind carbon taxation, and earmarking of carbon tax revenues to address issues that are important to the public such as fairness.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Kohlscheen ◽  
Richhild Moessner ◽  
Elod Takats

2013 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 1350010 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE H. GOULDER ◽  
ANDREW R. SCHEIN

We examine the relative attractions of a carbon tax, a "pure" cap-and-trade system, and a "hybrid" option (a cap-and-trade system with a price ceiling and/or price floor). We show that the various options are equivalent along more dimensions than often are recognized. In addition, we bring out important dimensions along which the approaches have very different impacts, including some dimensions that have received little attention in prior literature. Although no option dominates the others, a key finding is that exogenous emissions pricing (whether through a carbon tax or through the hybrid option) has a number of important attractions over pure cap and trade. Beyond helping prevent price volatility and reducing expected policy errors in the face of uncertainties, exogenous pricing helps avoid problematic interactions with other climate policies and helps avoid potential wealth transfers to oil-exporting countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 30-44
Author(s):  
Aaqib Ahmad Bhat ◽  
Prajna Paramita Mishra

Carbon tax, being less costly in achieving a given abatement target, has been highly recommended by economists and international organisations. However, distributional concerns against the carbon tax has been a matter of concern in the domain of public policy. This article tries to analyse the distributional impact of Carbon tax in India by using National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) data. The results of the study indicate that carbon pricing seems to hit the lower-expenditure households by a greater proportion than the rich elites. The severity was found to be greater for the rural households than the urban households. Strong regressivity was found in the energy use for cooking and lighting. However, for transportation, the results indicate mild progressivity. Among the various energy fuels, households using coal, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, firewood and dung cake for cooking and lighting were found to be hit hard by carbon pricing. In contrast, electricity consumption was found to be distributionally neutral. Petrol and diesel use for transportation were found to be progressive. The study advocates that regressivity of carbon tax should be taken into account by way of targeted revenue recycling measures like lump-sum transfers among poor households and cut in other distortionary taxes.


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