The Speculative Hopper: Toward a Geology of a Toxic Absolute

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 117-134

The paper examines the overall course of the so-called “speculative turn” in contemporary Continental philosophy with regard to the ecology of the Absolute. Following the radical redefinition of the mechanics of speculation that has been proposed by theorists of the speculative turn (especially Quentin Meillassoux) as rejection of the absolute essence of classical metaphysics, the author concentrates on the tension between speculative rejection and the problem of grounds which arises from putting the question this way. By rejecting the Absolute as sufficient reason and therefore undermining the grounds of thought, speculative philosophy expands the field of grounds. The logic of sufficient reason is augmented by insufficient reason, sufficient unreason, and insufficient unreason. This field of grounds encompasses the whole “kinesis” of the speculative turn, including the current attempts to turn away from speculation and move beyond the grounds and absolute relied upon in the “new geophilosophy.” The author notes that the shift from the question of “what?” to the question of “where?” indicates that the new geophilosophy is a “territorial geophilosophy.” Even though it nullifies the problem of grounds, it remains subject to grounds as insufficient reason, and thereby exemplifies the vulgar understanding of speculative thought as mere speculation. At the same time, the speculative turn replaces territorial geophilosophy with a resource-based geophilosophy which is more concerned with the question of “when?”. The author maintains that precisely this kind of questioning forces speculative philosophy both to the edge of the field of the Absolute and to a solution for the problem of rejecting grounds as insufficient unreason, Insufficient unreason unlocks a vertical dimension to strata of the Absolute, through which speculation turns into a trowel that unearths the absolutus and discards the Absolutes.

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-93
Author(s):  
Kevin Kennedy

In recent years, the relation between contingency and systematic claims to the absolute has again come to play an important role in Continental philosophy. This essay takes a closer look at how this relation is developed in the works of French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux. It argues that a specific demand for systematic knowledge underlies not only Meillassoux's ontology, but also his ethics, which come into conflict with his own systematic aspirations in certain key areas, most notably in his attempt to derive an ethico-political model of subjectivity from his theory of contingency. The essay furthermore explores whether Meillassoux's monism of chance, by systematizing contingency and declaring it a universal principle, does not in fact deprive the contingent of its contingent character, introducing a reductive stability that condemns the subject to a passive waiting ultimately lacking in ethical significance.


Konturen ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Tracy McNulty

Quentin Meillassoux, like his mentor Alain Badiou, is sometimes accused by his critics of “fetishizing mathematics.” Without embracing the negative judgment implied in such a charge, this essay asks: what might be gained by taking seriously the link between fetishism and speculative philosophy? The claim that Meillassoux “fetishizes” mathematics potentially reveals something fundamental not only about the formalism at the heart of his speculative realism (whose “glaciality,” inanimacy, or inhuman character might sustain a certain disavowal, namely of “finitude” or castration) but about fetishism itself, whose philosophical character is attested not only by its ideality or relation to the absolute, but by its concern with thought or construction. The aim of this essay is thus not to dwell at length on the work of Meillassoux, but rather to think about the “speculative realism” specific to fetishism itself, and its unique contribution to speculative philosophy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-571
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Poljakova

Abstract The article treats the problem of interpretation in its respect to reality by example of Umberto Eco’s moderate ‚realistic‘ position and his criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche, the “father” of postmodernism. Here the strongest arguments on both sides are evaluated: Eco’s “negative realism” pointing out the impossibility of some interpretations and Nietzsche’s thinking out the absolute absence of a privileged position proceeding from which it would be possible to unequivocally identify what is real. The article argues that the crucial point why some interpretations may prove to be stronger or weaker is best described in terms of the concept of power. One however should avoid misconceptions, since power itself is interpretation which nevertheless allows for the gradation of reality, the mobility of its horizons, their shifting and even their potential availability. A much-disputed question of prehistoric times as well as that of death as a limit of interpretability is inter alia included in the analysis. Both classical anti-realistic positions, such as that of Wittgenstein, and the argumentation of contemporary advocates of realism, such as Quentin Meillassoux, are taken into consideration.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Reid-Bowen

This article provides an introduction to a new trend in continental philosophy, the turn toward metaphysics, realism and speculative philosophy. This stands in sharp contrast with the antirealist and correlationist traditions that have held sway since Kant’s Copernican Revolution in 1781. It is claimed that the study of religion and gender has been shaped by the antirealist legacy of Kant, but there are good reasons for taking account of the new ‘speculative turn’. Two examples from the leading exponent of this turn, speculative realism, are introduced, and some provisional notes toward applying these to the gender-critical turn in the study of religion are considered. Research notes on the current state of the Goddess movement serve as a test case for the introduction of an object-oriented ontology into religious and gender studies.


Author(s):  
OWEN PIKKERT

Abstract Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is the claim that everything has a sufficient reason. But is Leibniz committed to the necessity or to the contingency of his great principle? I argue that Leibniz is committed to its contingency, given that he allows for the absolute possibility of entities that he claims violate the PSR. These are all cases of qualitatively indiscernible entities, such as indiscernible atoms, vacua, and bodies. However, Leibniz's commitment to the contingency of the PSR seems to stand in tension with his inference of the PSR from his theory of truth. I argue that this apparent tension can be resolved satisfactorily. When it comes to his modal views on the PSR, Leibniz's position is entirely consistent.


Sincronía ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol XXV (80) ◽  
pp. 131-150
Author(s):  
Carlos Alberto Navarro Fuentes ◽  

The objective of this work is to introduce Quentin Meillassoux's 'speculative materialist realism', establishing a critical stance against the metaphysical tradition of the 'absolute' that has prevailed in post-Kantian Western philosophy, based on the need for contingency that he proposes. This implies making a critique of what has been understood as realism, necessity and existing. To do this, key concepts of Meillassoux's philosophy are broken down, exemplifying its influence -and possible presence back in time- on other thinkers and artists in their respective narratives such as Graham Harman, Timothy Morton, Nick Land, and Florian Hecker, who delve into issues that generate discomfort, amazement, nihilism and pessimism in contemporary societies, such as probability and prediction in financial markets, the Anthropocene and nature, the conflictive relationship between subject and object, truth and chaos, between other things, subtracting ourselves from the humanist discourse on which the scientific, financial and environmental paradigms of our time rest and which have ended up cracking the identity of man, with capitalist production being the most determining geological factor. Let us to reflect on the following questions. What narratives can give an account of the current condition of the world? What narratives emerge when we stop focusing our attention on man? What habits of thought force us to change the awareness that everything around us is contingent?


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 725-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norah Campbell ◽  
Gerard McHugh ◽  
PJ Ennis

In this paper, we trace the compounding and escalation of frames to try and encompass the reality of climate change. These frames capture significant aspects, revealing new contours and extreme organizational challenges. However, what if climate change is unframeable? We locate three ontological dimensions of climate change – its unboundedness, incalculability and unthinkability – that make this case. This means that climate change is not a problem that organizations can encompass, divide or draw lines around – some ‘thing’ that can be recuperated into existing institutional, infrastructural and interpersonal frameworks. Instead, it is calling forth forms of organization without any precedent. We argue that the philosophy of speculative realism, specifically the work of Quentin Meillassoux, reveals climate change as a new World for which we do not have categories. We deploy Meillassoux’s concepts which are non-human and rational to think through what climate change is ontologically. Meillassoux’s work is characterized as the reintroduction of the old philosophical idea of the absolute, and we use it as a possible way to overcome the equivocal status of climate change without succumbing to despondency and passivity. Rather than a negative, overwhelming threat, climate change gives us what we call a bleak optimism: the realization that climate change has already happened, and that human civilization must learn how to die in a way that is a creative and just foreclosure of the Earth’s organizational forms.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Szabó

Pierre Simon Laplace defines classic probability in his “Essai philosophique sur les probabilités” in 1814. According to Laplace, probability is the correlate of partial human knowledge. Laplace’s notion of probability rests on the idea that if there is no reason to believe one event is more likely to happen than the other, then the two events should be considered equally probable. This idea is the principle of insufficient reason defined by Jacob Bernoulli, most probably a counterpoint to Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason. The principle of insufficient reason is called the principle of indifference by Keynes and it is known under this name in criticism. Laplace defines probability as the number of useful happenings for creating an event divided by the number of events equally probable. The paper traces three presuppositions of Laplace’s definition and fasifies them one by one to show that his definition of classic probability cannot be defended. The paper claims that because i. in a determinist world there are not only epistemic probabilities, ii. epistemic probabilities are not necessarily subjective and iii. the principle of indifference does not provide sufficient basis for analysing probability, the classic definition of probability cannot be argued for.


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 852-874
Author(s):  
Jure Simoniti

The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel?s Logic, ?being? and ?nothing? are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of ?being? is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the ?thetical judgement?. And the article?s first thesis claims that Hegel couldn?t have placed ?being? at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between ?being? and ?nothing?, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the ?transcendental inter-subjectivity? in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel?s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that ?being? and ?nothing? are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of ?public? whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.


Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 153-166
Author(s):  
Kristupas Sabolius

Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjamas spekuliatyviojo realizmo ir meno santykis. Teigiama, kad nors naujasis judėjimas išpopuliarėjo kuratorių ir menininkų kontekstuose, vieno jo pradininkų Quentino Meillassoux knygoje „Po baigtinybės“ siūloma pozicija nepalieka galimybių paties meno legitimavimui. Spekuliatyvieji realistai stengiasi įveikti koreliacionizmo prieigą, pagal kurią tarp mąstymo ir būties egzistuoja būtinas ryšys. Kartu tokia pozicija nenumato galimybės meninėms praktikoms pasiekti realybės sferą – sukurdamas ką nors nauja, menininkas nuolatos pažeidžia absoliutaus pasaulio autonomiją. Tačiau atmetus spekuliatyvųjį realizmą grindžiantį reduktyvų racionalizmą, Meillassoux postuluojamas „kontingencijos būtinybės“ principas gali tapti meninės prieigos orientyru. Kūrybinėse praktikose įgyvendinamas kontingencijų radikalizavimas gali pasiūlyti nespekuliatyvią akistatą su Hiper-Chaosu, virtualybės plotmėje aktualizuodamas „virsmo kitu“ perspektyvą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: spekuliatyvusis realizmas, menas, kontingencija, virtualumas. Quentin Meillassoux and Radical (Im)possibility of ArtKristupas Sabolius AbstractThis paper addresses the problematic relationship between Speculative Realism and art. Although the newly-born movement became popular among curators and artists, one finds no space left for legitimization of creative practices in Quentin Meillassoux’s “After Finitude”. By criticizing the so-called correlationism which privileges the necessary binding between being and thinking, Speculative Realism would not grant art a possibility of the access to the reality of things-in-themselves. By creating something new, artistic practices constantly violate the absolute autonomy of the world. On the other hand, if rejected the reductive rationalism of speculation, the principle of “the necessity of contingency”, as postulated by Meillassoux, could provide some guidelines for artistic take on the issue of reality. Through the radicalization of contingency in creative practices and the restitution of the value of the virtual, one could perform the transformation into Otherness and not-speculative confrontation with the realm of Hyper-Chaos.Keywords: speculative realism, art, contingency, virtuality.


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