scholarly journals Corporate board, ownership structure and the involuntary delisted firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 370-381
Author(s):  
Chu-Yang Chien ◽  
Yuh-Jiuan Parng ◽  
Chen-Wei Lu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Probit Regression ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Examination System ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Control Right ◽  
Lower Ratio

The Financial Supervisory Commission in Taiwan has advocated the importance of corporate governance for several years. The purpose of this study is to act in concern with the policy through the test of the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism, especially Board of Directors’ composition and ownership structure, and the involuntary delisted firms. The study extracts 58 involuntary delisted firms from Taiwan Securities Exchange (TSE) during 1997 to 2007 and matches with 112 similar control firms. The results from probit regression suggest that Board of Directors (BOD) with more number of outside independent directors, larger board size, lower ratio of shares pledged to the total shares, higher seats over control right, and lower control right over right for cash flow may reduce the likelihood of delisting. The study could become monitoring indices for internal examination system, the warning signals for investors, and the reference for the policy makers

Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
pp. 322-337
Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Transmission Channels ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.

scholarly journals The Effect of Good Corporate Governance Mechanism On The Financial Performance of Banking Companies Listed In Stock Exchange Indonesia 2012-2016

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-287
Author(s):  
Desi Pipian Pujakusum
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This study aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance mechanism on the financial performance of banking companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 2012-2016 period. The corporate governance mechanism is proxied by the size of the board of directors, the size of the board of commissioners, audit committee size, the board of director's education, and the board of commissioner’s education. The company's financial performance is proxied by return on assets (ROA). Samples were taken by using purposive sampling. The total number of samples used in this study amounted to 180 research samples. This study was tested with SPSS 20 program. Data analysis technique used in this research is simple regression analysis.  The results showed that the size of the board of directors, the size of the board of commissioners, and audit comitee size have a significant effect on return on assets. These three factors have a significant effect on return on assets, while the board of commissioners education and the board of director's education have no significant effect on return on assets.

Board Size and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Investigation

Think India ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shivan Sarpal ◽  
Fulbag Singh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Operating Profit ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance

The subject of corporate governance has always been of keen interest to the researchers in the area of management and finance. This paper basically concentrates on the corporate board of directors which is an internal corporate governance mechanism. Since the effectiveness of boards counts on several characteristics such as board size, board composition, leadership structure etc, therefore considering this viewpoint, the present study is based on the analysis of board size of BSE listed companies in India. This analysis broadly embraces the relationship between board size and performance as represented by various indicators such as Operating Profit Margin, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Earnings per Share and Tobin’s Q. Spearman’s rho correlation, One Way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests were applied to draw the inferences. Results of the study remained robust and thus concluded that both board size and firm performance were independent of each other as board size was not found to be associated with firm performance.

scholarly journals Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Company Value with Company Performance as Intervening Variable

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
NUR ADILA ◽  
Zaenal Arifin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Company Value ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Corporate Governance is a system that regulates and controls a company which expected to give and increase Company Value to investors. With the existence of Corporate Governance, it is expected that Company Performance will give a good influence on the company. One of the cases is after Indonesia went through a prolonged crisis since 1998, the repairing process in the companies took a long time and it is caused by the weakness of Corporate Governance application in the companies, which will affect the companies’ performance and decrease the companies’ values. The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects of the Corporate Governance mechanism on Company Value with Company Performance as an intervening variable. The case study used in this research is the companies included in IDX BUMN 20 Tahun 2020 list. The result of this study is that Independent Commissioner doesn’t affect values and Company Performance, the board of directors affects Company Value positively, the board of directors doesn’t affect Company Performance. The Audit Committee doesn’t affect the Company Value. The Audit Committee affects the Company Performance positively. The Company Performance is not capable to mediate the independent commissioner’s effect on Company Value. The Company Performance can mediate the effect of the Board of Directors on the Company Value, the Company Performance can’t mediate the effect of Audit Committee on the Company Value.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Book-Tax Differences: Tunisian Evidence

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wiem Dridi ◽  
Adel Boubaker
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Cumulative Effect ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Tax Management ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

This paper’s main objective is to examine the effect of corporate governance on earnings manipulations using BTD proxy. We investigate whether ownership structure board and audit committee characters affect earnings and tax management. Based on a sample of 21 corporations listed on Tunisian stock market during the period 2003-2012, our study employs regression analysis to test the prediction that the governance attributes reduces the likelihood of earnings and tax aggressiveness. We find that the ownership structure is an important corporate governance mechanism that affects BTD. We find that BTD does not vary with board size and the cumulative effect of the function of chief executive and president of the board. We find that the percentage of outside directors is associated with managerial discretion. Finally, we find that the audit committee influences ABTD through the variable relating to the financial expertise of the committee.

Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings

2007 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Ferris ◽  
Tomas Jandik ◽  
Robert M. Lawless ◽  
Anil Makhija
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

AbstractLegal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater likelihood of agency conflicts. We also find that derivative lawsuits are associated with significant improvements in the boards of directors. In particular, the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases. There is also some evidence that other board characteristics change favorably. These findings suggest that shareholder derivative lawsuits are not frivolous as is often claimed, but rather that they can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

scholarly journals DEBT POLICY AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM IN CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mutamimah .
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Debt Policy ◽  
Market Indicator

This research aims to test the debt policy as a mechanism to reduce agency conflict among majority and minority shareholders. This test aims to answer the problems to what extend debt can be used as corporate governance mechanism in a sense of reducing agency conflict. This research is important since most of company ownership structure in Indonesia is categorized concentrated structure, where its make a conflict between majority and minority shareholders. The populations of the research are companies that go public in the Indonesian capital market until the year of 2003. These samples of this research consist of 40 companies that are selected based on nonprobability technique with purposive sampling method. They were divided into two groups, high concentrated ownership structure and low concentrated ownership structure. In processes testing the hypothesis, 2 indicators were used, i.e. market indicator and accounting indicator. Event study analysis was used for market indicator, whereas multiple regression analysis was used for accounting indicator. Based on empirical examination result, it is generally concluded that debt policy cannot be used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict among majority and minority shareholders, both at high and low concentrated ownership structure. This is because of average company debt are higher than average industry debt. Debt policy tend be used as a tool of expropriation to minority shareholders. The expropriation is higher at high concentrated ownership structure rather than at low concentrated ownership structure and the difference is significant.

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