scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Weissenberger-Eibl ◽  
Patrick Spieth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Business Enterprises ◽  
And Control

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

scholarly journals Editorial: Interdisciplinary approach to corporate governance

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3, special issue) ◽  
pp. 220-222
Author(s):  
Andrea Rey
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Research Trend ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
And Gender ◽  
And Control ◽  
A Company

To date, future research trends will certainly concern sustainability and entrepreneurship due to the post-COVID-19 crisis. Studies will focus on the determinants related to corporate governance, such as corporate ownership, or the role of institutional investors, or a company that aims to get public by an IPO as a possible answer to the crisis. A future research trend will surely concern environmental and economic sustainability. Another line of research will concern the protection of biodiversity and gender equality. With the regard to the content of this issue of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal, ownership structure is the most popular issue considered by the authors of the papers.

Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anlin Chen ◽  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Yi-Kai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.

scholarly journals On investment performance, value creation, management and corporate governance: The French case

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mondher Bellalah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
French Case ◽  
Block Holders ◽  
And Control

This paper studies corporate governance, investment, value creation and their effects on corporate performance in some European countries and in particular in France. It accounts for specific aspects of investment performance, governance, management and entrepreneurship. Corporate governance systems can be identified by the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders. In outsider systems characterized by wide dispersed ownership as in the U.S and UK, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between strong managers and widely-dispersed weak shareholders. In insider systems characterized by concentrated ownership or control as in Germany and Japan, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders (or block holders) and weak minority shareholders. There are several models of corporate governance since each country has developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. Some results are reported using a data base conceived by IPAG students.

6. Company Management and Governance

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from Ghana

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kong Yusheng ◽  
Samuel Asubonteng ◽  
Alex Antei-Adje
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Investment Opportunities

We use a sample of 100 firms in Ghana to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10-20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.

Sustainability of Family Business Entrepreneurships in the Middle East

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Bassem E. Maamari ◽  
Ahmad M. Jannoun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Developmental Processes ◽  
Business Sustainability ◽  
Integral Component ◽  
Leadership Accountability ◽  
Systems Leadership

The sustainability of family businesses with their integral component of entrepreneurial venturing are the result of decades of developmental processes. The role that these family businesses play in any economy can only be described as massive. Therefore, understanding the factors that affect or play a role in the success and continuity of these firms is important, and assessing the level and role of corporate governance in this perspective remains a challenge. The interplay of systems, leadership, accountability, transparency and remuneration, is proving to play a role in family business sustainability.

6. Company Management and Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document