scholarly journals On investment performance, value creation, management and corporate governance: The French case

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mondher Bellalah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
French Case ◽  
Block Holders ◽  
And Control

This paper studies corporate governance, investment, value creation and their effects on corporate performance in some European countries and in particular in France. It accounts for specific aspects of investment performance, governance, management and entrepreneurship. Corporate governance systems can be identified by the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders. In outsider systems characterized by wide dispersed ownership as in the U.S and UK, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between strong managers and widely-dispersed weak shareholders. In insider systems characterized by concentrated ownership or control as in Germany and Japan, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders (or block holders) and weak minority shareholders. There are several models of corporate governance since each country has developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. Some results are reported using a data base conceived by IPAG students.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Weissenberger-Eibl ◽  
Patrick Spieth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Business Enterprises ◽  
And Control

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anlin Chen ◽  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Yi-Kai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.

scholarly journals Investor Protection and Agency Theory in Corporate Governance in Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Imtiaz Ahmed Khan ◽  
Altaf Hussain Abro ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Global Trend ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Very High

The paper discusses the minority shareholders’ protection under the quantumof agency cost in corporate governance in Pakistan. The agency theory statesthat in most of the cases, the controlling shareholders and the topmanagement are normally involved in expropriating the funds of the company.This phenomenon increases the agency cost. The agency cost is directlyproportional to the cost of functioning of the company. In other words, theagency cost is inversely proportional to the profit of the company. Accordingto the agency theory, if the agency cost is decreased, the profit for investorincreases. The Pakistani corporate sector is dominated by the businessfamilies, the state and an opportunity to get the private benefits at the cost ofother stakeholders. There are the different mechanisms as discussed andapplied around the world to minimize the agency cost so as to make companyfinancially strong and better profit for the investors. In Pakistan, the agencycost is very high. Hence, there is a need to revamp the corporate governancemechanism to reduce the agency cost in order to provide a better protection tominority shareholders in a particular in the context of the global trend keepingin the view of the nature of corporate structure in Pakistan.

scholarly journals A tale of lost chances. A short history of corporate governance and ownership in Italy

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Colli
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Transformation ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Short History ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Control

When the process of institutional transformation reached its peak at the end of the Nineties, many commentators (and politicians) said the Italian system of governance, ownership and control of large firms was on the verge of a (hopefully) quick process of convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon standards of transparency, protection of minority shareholders, diffused presence of institutional investors able to exert a monitoring role over the management and an increase in the efficiency of the whole system. Apart from these expectations, this process has been occuring at a very slow pace – and according to other observers, has not taken place at all. This article through a dynamic, historical approach reconstructs the process of evolution and change in the institutional framework, and explores the reasons of this limited convergence.

scholarly journals Examining models for measuring corporate governance to resolve financial crises

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jabbar Sehan Issa ◽  
Asmaa Habib Alnasiry
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
New Information ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
And Control ◽  
Work Done

This document deals with corporate governance and its impact on corporate performance and economic performance. This work is first summarized and based on previous work done, for example, to provide a clearer expression of the corporate governance models of shareholders and shareholders. It then addresses some of the key factors that lead to the effectiveness of corporate governance, and examines some of the strengths, weaknesses, and economic consequences associated with different corporate governance systems. In addition to providing information not provided in previous work, it also provides new information on the concentration of ownership and voting rights in a number of OECD countries. This document also provides empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance, firm performance, and economic growth. Finally, several policy implications are identified. This document shows how a corporate governance framework can influence the development of stock markets, R&D and innovative, corporate activities and the development of an active SME sector, thereby affecting economic growth. However, there is no single model of corporate governance, and each country has, over time, developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome representation problems arising from separation of ownership and control. This document examines the various mechanisms used in different systems (eg centralized ownership, executive rent schemes, stock market, inter-corporate shareholding, etc.) and examines the available evidence. Whether they have achieved their goal or not. do. For example, one of the benefits of centralized ownership is that it provides more effective oversight of management and helps with representation problems arising from separation of ownership and control. However, some costs reduce liquidity and the likelihood of risk diversification. Although dispersed ownership carries more liquidity, it may not provide the appropriate incentive to encourage the long-term

Corporate Governance in China: A Survey*

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuxiu Jiang ◽  
Kenneth A Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Corporate Social

Abstract This article surveys corporate governance in China, as described in a growing literature published in top journals. Unlike the classical vertical agency problems in Western countries, the dominant agency problem in China is the horizontal agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders arising from concentrated ownership structure; thus one cannot automatically apply what is known about the USA to China. As these features are also prevalent in many other countries, insights from this survey can also be applied to countries far beyond China. We start by describing controlling shareholder and agency problems in China, and then discuss how law and institutions are particularly important for China, where controlling shareholders have great power. As state-owned enterprises have their own features, we separately discuss their corporate governance. We also briefly discuss corporate social responsibility in China. Finally, we provide an agenda for future research.

scholarly journals Corporate governance systems and sustainability: CSR as a factor of convergence between outsider and insider systems

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela M. Salvioni ◽  
Simona Franzoni ◽  
Francesca Gennari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Social Risk ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Sustainable Value ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
And Control

In an era of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, the growing integration of financial markets seems to be a key factor of corporate governance convergence. One of the most striking differences between corporate governance systems of different countries is the dissimilarity in the firms’ ownership and control that exists across countries. According to the degree of ownership and control, corporate governance systems can be distinguished in outsider systems (characterised by wide dispersed ownership) and insider systems (characterised by concentrated ownership). The transition from a governance approach founded on the shareholder view and oriented to the optimization of economic performance to a policy founded on the stakeholder view and oriented to the appreciation of the interdependence among economic, social and environmental responsibility, seems to be a factor of de facto convergence between outsider and insider systems of corporate governance. The main finding of this chapter is that the effective integration of CSR, sustainability and leadership makes easier the convergence between insider and outsider corporate governance systems. Leadership starts at board level. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability require good corporate governance, grounded on stakeholder engagement, fairness, transparency and accountability. All these principles are related with more externally focused boards and determine a governance approach directed to the growth of sustainable value. In light of the above, this chapter will consider how the social responsibility and the role of the leaders (CEOs, Board of Directors, managers, etc.) can determine a governance approach directed to the growth of sustainable value over time. This is possible through the exploitation of opportunities and the economic and social risk management with which the companies should compete. The achievement of sustainability leadership requires significant changes in the operational guidelines and critical factors for company’s success and it imposes the improvement of the internal control systems intended to provide essential support for responsible governance. Therefore, leadership aiming at sustainability (regardless of the corporate governance system) requires CSR to be transferred from top management to the entire organisation, increasing the ability to manage complexity with respect to articulated goals. So, the corporate social responsibility, if properly realized, tends to be a factor of substantial convergence between the different existing systems of corporate governance.

scholarly journals Corporate governance in family run business – a Malaysian case study

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-147
Author(s):  
Cyril H. Ponnu ◽  
C.K. Lee ◽  
Geron Tan ◽  
T.H. Khor ◽  
Adelyn Leong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Chinese Families ◽  
Managerial Entrenchment ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Ethnic Chinese ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Transparency And Disclosure ◽  
And Control

This paper addresses the debate on family run business and corporate governance before and after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. As there are only few studies on the corporate governance of family businesses in Malaysia, this paper aims to provide a broad view of the corporate governance practises of family run companies in Malaysia. The majority of family-run companies in Malaysia are operated by ethnic Chinese families in Malaysia. To understand the practices of corporate governance in these companies, this study selected 3 of the top 10 family run companies by market capitalization in Malaysia. This paper discusses the issues and problems related to family run businesses in the light of the separation of ownership and control, lack of board independence and protection of minority shareholders, lack of independence of external auditors, lack of transparency and disclosure as well as managerial entrenchment.

scholarly journals The determinants of employee stock ownership: French case

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 110-116
Author(s):  
Dalenda Ben Ahmed ◽  
Zouhaira Khelil-Rhouma
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Stock Ownership ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Employee Stock Ownership ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Dividend Distribution ◽  
French Case

The present study scrutinizes the factors affecting the practice of employee stock ownership. This work sheds light on the role and contribution of this practice to enhance the corporate governance systems. Our study uses a sample of 216 listed French companies in 2010. The empirical approach is a linear regression used to examine the relation between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The results show that the large companies are the most likely to practice the ESO and this is developed by a reduction in debt, the dividend distribution, and the tax rate. The focal point of this work is to go beyond the simple scope of the existence of the employee stock ownership and is interested in the conditions of its development in the French companies.

scholarly journals The Italian two-tiers model. Evidence and comparison with some other countries

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 388-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Provasi ◽  
Patrizia Lucia Maria Riva
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Dual Model ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
Tier System ◽  
And Control ◽  
Corporate Governance Model ◽  
First Time

New dynamics and globalized economy has led to the need to modify the Corporate Governance systems. Many countries have not identified a unique model for the company management but they allow free choice between continuing to use the traditional models adopted by the country itself or implementing different models sometimes considered more suitable with the aims and operational management of the companies. The new Corporate Governance model introduced in the most global jurisdictions is the two-tiers model (or dual model) considered the most suitable to achieve a better separation between ownership and control and to ensure a better transparency. The introduction of the two-tier system of Corporate Governance is not without uncertainty; it has affected all countries except the Anglo-Saxon ones. The purpose of this research is to investigate the features of the dualistic governance model in some countries different for their culture and legislative system. In particular the research aims to point out the characteristics of the dual model introduced for the first time in the Italian Legal System by Law No. 6/2003 and to perform a comparative analysis with the most consolidated two-tiers model implemented in Germany (which is considered the benchmark), in some other European countries (France and the Nordic countries) and with the experiences of Asian countries and in particular of Japan. From the comparative analysis we try to understand whether differences in purposes and ways of implementation can be pointed out

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