scholarly journals A tale of lost chances. A short history of corporate governance and ownership in Italy

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Colli
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Transformation ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Short History ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Slow Pace ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Control

When the process of institutional transformation reached its peak at the end of the Nineties, many commentators (and politicians) said the Italian system of governance, ownership and control of large firms was on the verge of a (hopefully) quick process of convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon standards of transparency, protection of minority shareholders, diffused presence of institutional investors able to exert a monitoring role over the management and an increase in the efficiency of the whole system. Apart from these expectations, this process has been occuring at a very slow pace – and according to other observers, has not taken place at all. This article through a dynamic, historical approach reconstructs the process of evolution and change in the institutional framework, and explores the reasons of this limited convergence.

6. Company Management and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-120
Author(s):  
Imogen Moore
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
The Uk ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions and coursework. Each book includes typical questions, suggested answers with commentary, illustrative diagrams, guidance on how to develop your answer, suggestions for further reading, and advice on exams and coursework. This chapter explores important issues in company management and corporate governance, starting by examining the role of directors and shareholders (and the relationship between them) and the separation of ‘ownership and control’. Since the early 1990s, the governance of listed companies has been dominated by self-regulatory codes (currently the UK Corporate Governance Code). This chapter examines how these codes operate and considers key themes in corporate governance, including the role of non-executive directors and auditors; the position of institutional investors; and executive remuneration.

Body and law in late Anglo-Saxon England

1998 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine O'Brien O'Keeffe
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Manuscript Production ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Individual ◽  
And Control ◽  
Point Of Departure

This article explores some textual dimensions of what I argue is a crucial moment in the history of the Anglo-Saxon subject. For purposes of temporal triangulation, I would locate this moment between roughly 970 and 1035, though these dates function merely as crude, if potent, signposts: the years 970×973 mark the adoption of the Regularis concordia, the ecclesiastical agreement on the practice of a reformed (and markedly continental) monasticism, and 1035 marks the death of Cnut, the Danish king of England, whose laws encode a change in the understanding of the individual before the law. These dates bracket a rich and chaotic time in England: the apex of the project of reform, a flourishing monastic culture, efflorescence of both Latin and vernacular literatures, remarkable manuscript production, but also the renewal of the Viking wars that seemed at times to be signs of the apocalypse and that ultimately would put a Dane on the throne of England. These dates point to two powerful and continuing sets of interests in late Anglo-Saxon England, ecclesiastical and secular, monastic and royal, whose relationships were never simple. This exploration of the subject in Anglo-Saxon England as it is illuminated by the law draws on texts associated with each of these interests and argues their interconnection. Its point of departure will be the body – the way it is configured, regarded, regulated and read in late Anglo-Saxon England. It focuses in particular on the use to which the body is put in juridical discourse: both the increasing role of the body in schemes of inquiry and of punishment and the ways in which the body comes to be used to know and control the subject.

scholarly journals Dividends and institutional investors activism: Pressure resistant or pressure sensitive?

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
José María Diez-Esteban ◽  
Óscar López-de-Foronda
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Different Characteristics

This paper provides new international evidence on the relationship between dividend policy and institutional ownership by analysing a sample of US and UK and Irish firms characterised by an Anglo-Saxon tradition and a matching sample of other EU companies from Civil Law legal systems. We hypothesize that, due to the different characteristics of both the legal system and the nature of agency conflicts in firms from those countries, the type of institutional investors and their role in corporate governance is different and so the use of dividend policy to solve the conflict of corporate governance problem differs in each legal system. We find that while in firms from Anglo-Saxon tradition the relation between dividends and institutional investors, pension and investment funds, is possitive, in Civil Law countries the relation is negative where investors are banks or insurance companies with other private interest inside the firm. These results are consistent with our hypotheses and breed new insights into the role of dividend policy as a disciplining mechanism in firms from different legal system with an important presence of institutional investors

scholarly journals The first map of salt deposits in Romania (1780). Current corresponding toponyms

Diacronia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dinu Moscal
Keyword(s):  
Short History ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
Sedimentary Deposits ◽  
History Of ◽  
Salt Deposits

The history of salt exploitation in the Carpathian arc area is far from being complete regarding certain periods of Romania’s historical provinces, although a lot has been written on this topic. A map of the salt deposits drafted in 1780 represents one of the most important achievements in this field. One of the mandatory aspects of this historical approach is the identification of places from where salt is or was extracted. Following a short history of the primary documentations of the exploitation of salt on the territory of Romania, this study presents Fichtel’s (1780) contribution to identifying the salt deposits on this territory. The updating of the toponyms on the map poses no difficulties for the historical provinces Moldavia and Wallachia, yet the situation is different in the case of the toponyms in Transylvania, since the nomenclature from the Hungarian domination period (until 1918) was mostly modified starting with the year 1919. Correspondences from the current nomenclature were provided for all these toponyms. The study offers an update of the localization of salt wells or springs and sedimentary deposits of salt, as indicated by Fichtel, by identifying present corresponding toponyms for the ones indicated on the map.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Weissenberger-Eibl ◽  
Patrick Spieth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Business Enterprises ◽  
And Control

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

scholarly journals Asset Manager Capitalism as a Corporate Governance Regime

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Asset Management ◽  
Corporate America ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Governance Regime ◽  
History Of ◽  
And Control ◽  
Question Today ◽  
Core Features

Who holds power in corporate America? Scholars have invariably answered this question in the language of ownership and control. This paper argues that tackling this question today requires a new language. Whereas the comparative political economy literature has long treated dispersed ownership and weak shareholders as core features of the U.S. political economy, a century-long process of re-concentration has consolidated shareholdings in the hands of a few very large asset management companies. In an historically unprecedented configuration, this emerging asset manager capitalism is dominated by fully diversified shareholders that lack direct economic interest in the performance of individual portfolio companies. The paper compares this new corporate governance regime to its predecessors; reconstructs the history of the growth and consolidation of the asset management sector; and examines the political economy of asset manager capitalism, both at the firm level and at the macroeconomic level.

scholarly journals A Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom.

1891 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 162 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. L. Osgood ◽  
James K. Hosmer
Keyword(s):  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Short History ◽  
History Of

Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anlin Chen ◽  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Yi-Kai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.

scholarly journals On investment performance, value creation, management and corporate governance: The French case

2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mondher Bellalah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Governance Systems ◽  
French Case ◽  
Block Holders ◽  
And Control

This paper studies corporate governance, investment, value creation and their effects on corporate performance in some European countries and in particular in France. It accounts for specific aspects of investment performance, governance, management and entrepreneurship. Corporate governance systems can be identified by the degree of ownership and control and the identity of controlling shareholders. In outsider systems characterized by wide dispersed ownership as in the U.S and UK, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between strong managers and widely-dispersed weak shareholders. In insider systems characterized by concentrated ownership or control as in Germany and Japan, the main specificity is the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders (or block holders) and weak minority shareholders. There are several models of corporate governance since each country has developed a variety of mechanisms to overcome agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. Some results are reported using a data base conceived by IPAG students.

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