scholarly journals Banking union through Hungarian eyes–assessment of a possible close cooperation

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-77
Author(s):  
Anikó Szombati
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Insurance Fund ◽  
Member States ◽  
Supervisory System ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Institutional System

Legislation laying down the first two pillars of the institutional system of the Banking Union was finalised in April 2014. In accordance with the regulations, non-euro area Member States, including Hungary, may notify the ECB at any time if they wish to participate in the common system even before the euro is adopted. The paper aims at summarising the possible pros and cons vis-à-vis the Banking Union from a Hungarian perspective. It highlights the reasons for not opting in at the inception of the new supervisory system and also gives indications about those major milestones that could give rise to the reconsideration of the present position. In its existing form, the single supervisory and crisis management mechanism has not achieved the initial target, i.e. the separation of the stability of national banking systems and the fiscal capacity of Member States and the elimination of interdependencies. In addition, close cooperation implies weaker powers than those provided by actual membership, and the separation of central bank and supervisory functions carries risks in non-euro area countries. By contrast, the attraction of Banking Union membership lies in the opportunity to join a uniform European system, a wider analyst base and ultimately, the “ammunition” of the EUR 98 billion available for crisis management in comparison to the Hungarian banking system. In October 2013, a uniform supervisory system integrated into the central bank was set up in Hungary, and the domestic resolution institutional system was complete by the end of 2014. Therefore, until the finalisation of the Banking Union through the creation of the common deposit insurance fund and a common fiscal backstop, it is reasonable to put the decision to join on hold; indeed, such a decision should be made in light of several factors presented in this study.

scholarly journals THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS

2016 ◽  
pp. 190-198
Author(s):  
M. S. Fedorov
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Common ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

The article deals with the system of EU's functional units responsible for conducting crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It analyses their structure and particular features. The author puts forward three main factors, which affected the shape of this system. First, it is the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the veto-power of EU member states in this field. Second, the EU-US and the EU-NATO relations have also influenced the shape of the CSDP organizational structures. On the one hand, the Alliance has served as an example of a successful security organization for the European integration strategists. On the other, Washington has always sought to embed the European security and defense integration into NATO and to control it. Third, the CSDP institutional system embodies a specific approach towards crisis management, elaborated by the EU - a combination of both military and civil instruments of peacemaking (the so-called "civil-military synergy"). Thus, there are two chains of units within the CSDP, designed for planning and conducting military operations and civil missions respectively. Having analyzed political and operational units of the CSDP the author concludes that, overall, the created institutional system is well-suited to the ambitions of the EU in the field of crisis management. However, the EU member states cannot use the potential of this system to the full because of the political differences that divide them.

scholarly journals Multilevel cooperation in the EU resolution of cross-border bank groups: lessons from the non-euro area Member States joining the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Smoleńska
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Essential Condition ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Single Resolution Mechanism ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Administrative Oversight ◽  
The Eu

AbstractCross-border banking presents a unique set of challenges in the EU from the perspective of arranging administrative oversight structures. Structuring cooperation between different EU and national authorities in a way which is conducive to trust-building and mutual engagement is an essential condition for overcoming disintegrative tendencies in the internal market. To assess how the existing EU arrangements fare in this regard in the context of EU resolution law, this article comparatively analyses the different models of multilevel administrative cooperation in the post-crisis EU framework. These are specifically the centralised model of the European Banking Union (Single Resolution Mechanism) and the relatively looser networked model of the resolution colleges. The multilevel cooperation under both models is nuanced given the distinct roles of the national resolution authorities, EU agencies and the differentiated status of non-euro area Member States in the EBU (Croatia, Bulgaria). The article’s findings allow to identify specific problems of constitutional nature pertaining to the accountability of administrative cooperation, equality of Member States and the implications of Meroni doctrine’s distortive effects.

scholarly journals A New Crisis Manager at the Horizon – The Case of the European Union

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-263
Author(s):  
Steven Blockmans
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Crisis Response ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Management Capability ◽  
Concrete Form ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The Common

The 1999 Kosovo crisis has forced the European Union to finally give concrete form to its ambitions in the sphere of the common foreign and security policy. At a time when agreement on defence issues seems out of reach, the member states' focus is on the development of a crisis management capability. It is argued that when the Union's diplomatic structures are complemented with military and civilian crisis response tools, much needed balance will be given to the Union's persona as an economic giant and a political dwarf. The article includes a number of measures which should be taken with a view to reinforcing and extending the Union's external role in this field.

EWU-Krisenmanagement: Warum die Politik auf dem richtigen Weg ist

2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Becker ◽  
Horst Löchel
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Current Crisis ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Short Run ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Great Persistence ◽  
The Right

SummaryWith troubles in the European Monetary Union (EMU) showing great persistence, the emergency measures and ad-hoc crisis management of European authorities has been subject to harsh criticism. The current fierce debate among economists and the broad public has given rise to two camps advocating fundamentally different approaches how to exit the sustained crisis. While according to the Integrationists′ view, the only viable way to get rid of pressing debt problems and to restore confidence in the Euro area lies in a common guarantee for national debt obligations, so-called Minimalists advocate a strict return to the cornerstones of the Maastricht Treaty, in particular strict compliance with the debt and deficit limits laid out by the Treaty as well as a credible application of the ‚no-bail-out‘ rule. However, in their pure form, both strategies do not serve for a timely and effective crisis management as they either require a level of supranational integration that - given the still prevalent Westphalian order - cannot be attained in the short run nor is it on the agenda of European policy, or essentially deny the significant flaws within the EMU architecture that failed to prevent current fiscal woes.The current crisis management of European authorities has followed neither of the two extremes but has taken a viable middle-of-the-road approach that resulted in useful and necessary repairs to the institutional architecture of the Euro area, most notably the establishment of the commonly guaranteed stability mechanisms EFSF and ESM as well as the first steps taken towards a European banking union. Hence, in contrast to most observers, we argue that the European authorities, by operating a prudent stepby- step approach, are on the right track towards solving the current crisis. As a result, European Central Bank could move back to its original approach of monetary policy.

scholarly journals The Resilience of the Euro

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-22
Author(s):  
Philip R. Lane
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Risk Premia ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
Economic Recovery ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Fiscal Capacity ◽  
The Common

Over 2014 – 2019, the euro area charted a substantial post-crisis economic recovery while also reducing macro-financial vulnerabilities. The array of post-crisis institutional reforms has improved the capacity of the euro area to withstand adverse shocks, even if the narrowing of imbalances also came at a high cost (especially in the most indebted member countries). The pandemic has provided a new test: the combination of a common central bank and the enlargement of the common fiscal capacity has provided substantial policy support and fostered a narrowing in risk premia, despite significant differences in levels of public debt and exposures to the pandemic shock. While the resilience of the euro is sure to be tested further in the coming years, the extent of the underlying political backing for the common currency should not be underestimated.

scholarly journals The Asymmetric Implementation of the European Banking Union (EBU): Consequences for Financial Stability

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Vollmer
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
European Stability Mechanism

Abstract EU Member States outside the Eurozone are hesitating to enter the European Banking Union (EBU) and to establish “close cooperation” in bank supervision with the ECB. This paper analyzes the consequences of such asymmetric integration for financial stability in Europe. It argues that the main obstacles against establishing close cooperation are a lack of voting rights and insufficient access to the fiscal backstop provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The paper presents arguments as to why international cooperation in bank supervision could be welfare improving, if multinational banks are dominant. It also discusses suitable reform options for making it more attractive for EU Member States to begin a close cooperation with the ECB.

scholarly journals Comparison Between Bulgaria and Croatia in their Road Towards ERM II and The Banking Union of the EU

2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-276
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
The Other ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Single Currency ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Close Cooperation ◽  
The Eu

The last ERM II accession before July 2020 was in 2005. After the establishment of the Banking Union of the EU, starting from 2014, there was no enlargement of ERM II by EU Member State that is outside the Euro area. Therefore, the accession on 10 July 2020 of Bulgaria and Croatia to the ERM II on one hand and to the Banking Union on the other hand through the mechanism of the so-called close cooperation with the ECB represents a particular interest. The participation in these two mechanisms is a precondition for the accession to the Euro area and the adoption of the single currency. The comparison between the two countries shows that their path to the ERM II and the Banking Union is quite similar. However, there are also few peculiarities.

Recommendations

2020 ◽  
pp. 303-330
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Euro Crisis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Capital Markets Union ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

This chapter draws together the implications of the Euro crisis for the EU and its Member States and critically evaluates the shortcomings of the Treaty schema in terms of transparency and accountability. The discussion begins with the measures intended to ‘complete’ and ‘deepen’ the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It sets out the author’s own view regarding the key reforms that would be necessary, albeit one that is informed by the proposals made by the EU institutions. These include a reform of the EU fiscal rules; the provision of technical assistance to Member States implementing structural reforms; establishing a Euro area stabilization function; completing the Banking Union and making progress towards a Capital Markets Union; and strengthening the role of EU financial watchdogs. This chapter further puts forward a number of concrete proposals on how to bolster transparency and accountability in the area of EMU, the dividing line being between those proposals that could be implemented without a Treaty amendment and those reforms that would require a Treaty revision. It further addresses separately accountability (and transparency) in the Banking Union, as well as the role of EU courts in the EMU.

scholarly journals The European Sovereign Debt Crisis

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip R Lane
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
European Level ◽  
Original Design ◽  
European Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽  
Crisis Conditions

The origin and propagation of the European sovereign debt crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro. In particular, there was an incomplete understanding of the fragility of a monetary union under crisis conditions, especially in the absence of banking union and other European-level buffer mechanisms. Moreover, the inherent messiness involved in proposing and implementing incremental multicountry crisis management responses on the fly has been an important destabilizing factor throughout the crisis. After diagnosing the situation, we consider reforms that might improve the resilience of the euro area to future fiscal shocks.

The current economic and debt crisis in eurozone and crisis of grand theories of European integration

Human Affairs ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dušan Leška
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Social Constructivism ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Liberal Intergovernmentalism ◽  
The Common

AbstractThe economic and debt crisis threaten many eurozone countries and the very existence of the common currency, the euro. The crisis has meant that some special mechanisms have had to be created (EFSF, ESM) and the introduction of special procedures in heavily indebted countries. The deepening of the crisis and the economic recession in the euro area have resulted in the growth of nationalism and anti-European sentiments in EU member states. Resolving the crisis, however, requires further convergence of the eurozone countries, the formation of a fiscal union and a banking union. At the same time, the crisis has shown that the grand theories of European integration, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, have failed to provide answers to the questions raised by the crisis, and this has led to the growing importance of social constructivism.

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