The Mill on the Floss and Antigone

PMLA ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Moldstad

The Mill on the Floss, like Sophocles' Antigone, illustrates George Eliot's belief in the recurring conflict between the individual moral vision and social convention. The central problem in Antigone, she wrote, lay between “reverence for the gods” and “the duties of citizenship: two principles, both having their validity, are at war with each.” Whenever man's moral vision collides with social convention the opposition between Antigone and Creon is renewed. Her words seem applicable to the dominant conflict in The Mill. An honorable but unimaginative person, Tom Tulliver clashes with his sister Maggie when she refuses to abide by conventions which seem inhumane or hurtful to those she loves. As Antigone espouses a higher law by burying Polynices in defiance of Creon, so Maggie espouses a higher law in opposing the vengeance against Wakem. Although Tom and Maggie are both partly right in their quarrel over Maggie's secretly seeing Philip Wakem, Tom, like Creon, is foolishly overconfident in crediting his conventional honor, which is simply no measure of the case. The conflict between Maggie and her brother is further aggravated by the tendency of the practical-minded Tom to domineer over his imaginative and (to him) inconsistent sister.

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-163
Author(s):  
D. V. Krotova ◽  

The article considers the main directions of artistic research of the central problem of E. Grishkovetz’s novel «Asphalt» - genuine self-realization, contradictions between the external canvas of the life of a «successful person» and the absence of a true meaningful filling of it, corresponding to the deep internal needs of the individual. Three important aspects of comprehension the declared problem have been identified - dramatic, tragic and comic. The type of a «hero of our time» presented in the novel «Asphalt» is analyzed in relation to the traditions of the prose of writers - «forty-year-olds» and the «ambivalent» hero characteristic of their work.


2012 ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
E. Terry Prothro ◽  
P. T. Teska

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Raymond L. Dennehy ◽  

This essay proposes that liberal democracy cannot survive unless a monistic virtue ethics permeates its culture, A monistic philosophical conception of virtue ethics has its roots in natural law theory and, for that reason, offers a rationally defensible basis for a unified moral vision in a pluralistic society. Such a monistic virtue ethics--insofar as it is a virtue ethics--forms individual character so that a person not only knows how to act, but desires to act that way and, moreover, possesses the integration of character to be able to act that way. This is a crucial consideration, for immoral choices create a bad character that inclines the individual to increasingly worse choices, A nation whose members lack moral virtue cannot sustain its commitment to freedom and equality for all.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Bellamy

The relationship between liberalism and democracy is notoriously paradoxical. On the one hand, the justification for democratic procedures most commonly rests on liberal assumptions. Standard liberal arguments for democracy range from the importance of consent due to the moral primacy of the individual, to the role of critical argument and the diversity of opinion for the discovery of truth. On the other hand, liberal institutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, have frequently been interpreted as constraints upon democracy, albeit necessary ones if democracy is not to undermine itself. The paradox arises from the fact that liberalism provides a philosophical basis for regarding democracy as the only valid source of law whilst apparently appealing to some higher law in order to limit democracy itself. This paradox is embodied in the constitutions of most liberal democratic states. For generally these documents contain provisions – such as a bill of rights guaranteeing the freedoms of speech, assembly and association – designed to secure popular participation in the democratic process, alongside others – such as rights not obviously intrinsic to democratic decision making and mechanisms for judicial review – which seek to limit the power of democratic assemblies.


1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 524-547
Author(s):  
B. F. Wright

When James Otis in 1764 declared that government “has an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of God, the author of nature, whose laws never vary,” and that “there can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature and the grant of God Almighty, who has given to all men a natural right to be free,” he was at once making use of one of the oldest and most important conceptions in the history of political thought and giving to that concept a distinctly American meaning. His was merely one of the earliest examples in this country of a kind of political theory which was to find reflection in the Declaration of Independence in one generation, in the higher law doctrine in another, and in a famous trilogy of decisions of the Supreme Court in still a third. However, the natural-rights theory is by no means the only usage found for the natural-law concept in the political thought of this country, and it is the purpose of this paper to trace briefly the various interpretations placed upon it and the different forms through which it has passed.It is easy enough to say that natural law has meant just what the individual theorist desired to have it mean; for its content has varied from philosophical anarchy to paternalistic aristocracy, and from the assertion of strongly individualistic democracy to the defence of highly centralized government. But this statement does not dispose of the problem. It is necessary to know why and when these varying interpretations were advanced and what their exponents meant when they spoke so confidently of the laws of nature.


Author(s):  
Bradley G. Bowden

Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it seeks to trace the origins of the various strands of postmodernism within German philosophic idealism; traditions of thought which placed emphasis – like postmodernism – on a subjective understanding of evidence and a supposed capacity of human consciousness to continually move beyond the bounds imposed by social convention and being; second, this paper states that postmodernism, rooted as it is in philosophic idealism, is methodologically and conceptually constrained. Its emphasis on consciousness and will marginalize its capacity to make meaningful contributions in areas such as economics, and the wider trends in human history. Design/methodology/approach This paper is theoretical. It seeks to locate conflicting methodologies – most particularly those relating to postmodernism, positivism and philosophical realism – within the traditions of thought that have emerged since the enlightenment. Findings Postmodernism is rooted in philosophical idealism. As such, it places emphasis on consciousness, identity and being. The essential problem with postmodernism, this paper argues, is not this emphasis. These are legitimate areas of inquiry. Rather, the central problem with postmodernist-informed research is found in the limited range of methodological and conceptual tools in its kitbag. Originality/value Despite the growing influence of postmodernism in its various shades within academia, few of its proponents and critics trace its philosophic origins. In doing so this paper highlights the strengths and limitations of not only postmodernism but also its polar opposite, positivism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 324-338
Author(s):  
Donald R. Riccomini

In Paths of Glory (Stanley Kubrick, 1957) the individual's moral intent is distorted, compromised, and eventually co-opted by the overriding utilitarian ethic of ensuring the survival of the system – the ultimate ‘greater good’ – at all costs. The individual may challenge the system in a noble quest for justice, like Dax. He may hypocritically seek professional advancement from striving to serve it, like Mireau. Or he may cynically manipulate it for political purposes, like Broulard. In each case, the consequences are ultimately the same – the individual is forced to align his particular moral vision, however noble or ignoble, with the imperative of the greater good. The individual may resist or affirm the system and achieve some level of moral consistency and purity, but only momentarily and with limited success. In the end, whatever the value or relevance of the individual conscience to a particular situation, it is overridden by the demands of the greater good.


Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter examines how John Locke's account of government in his Two Treatises can be a solution to the problem of reconciling freedom and authority—a central problem of liberal politics. It argues that Lockean individualism allows the individual no ultimate freedom to decide his or her own ends—these being set by God—but disagrees with the notion that this sort of freedom is necessary to a defense of the rule of law. The chapter first considers the connections between liberty and Locke's account of property, as well as the connections between freedom and republicanism, before discussing Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin's dismissal of liberalism as an essentially “privatized” view of the world. It suggests that Locke's vision of freedom is not a particularly political one, although this is not a knockout blow for the “privatization” thesis.


Ramus ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Ley ◽  
Michael Ewans

For some years past there has been a welcome change of emphasis towards the consideration of staging in books published on Greek tragedy; and yet with that change also a curious failure to be explicit about the central problem connected with all stagecraft, namely that of the acting-area. In this study two scholars with considerable experience of teaching classical drama in performance consider this problem of the acting-area in close relation to major scenes from two Greek tragedies, and suggest some general conclusions. The article must stand to some extent as a critique of the succession of books that has followed the apparently pioneering study of Oliver Taplin, none of which has made any substantial or sustained attempt to indicate where actors might have acted in the performance of Greek tragedy, though most, if not all, have been prepared to discard the concept of a raised ‘stage’ behind the orchestra. Hippolytus (428 BC) is the earliest of the surviving plays of Euripides to involve three speaking actors in one scene. Both Alcestis (438 BC and Medea (431 BC almost certainly require three actors to be performed with any fluency, but surprisingly present their action largely through dialogue and confrontation — surprisingly, perhaps, because at least since 458 BC and the performance of the Oresteia it is clear that three actors were available to any playwright.


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