Canadian Foreign Policy Interests in Central America: Some Current Issues

1986 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lemco

Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney is faced with a number of difficult choices concerning Canada's foreign policy in Central America. These choices are particularly problematic because their repercussions may have an important impact on Canada- US relations. On the one hand, the Prime Minister must heed public opinion in Canada which favors increased government concern about human rights and economic development in Central America. On the other hand, he must consider American security interests and not irritate or embarrass the United States and President Reagan in particular.Canada's middle power status puts it in a difficult quandary, for it seeks to retain an independent role in Central America, while it finds its influence circumscribed by its proximity to the US superpower. Its ability to wield tangible authority is thus severely attenuated. Canada's asymmetrical relationship with the United States allows it a certain degree of latitude in formulating foreign policy but imposes important constraints as well.

1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Morgenthau

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid. The very assumption that foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy is a subject of controversy. For, on the one hand, the opinion is widely held that foreign aid is an end in itself, carrying its own justification, both transcending, and independent of, foreign policy. In this view, foreign aid is the fulfillment of an obligation of the few rich nations toward the many poor ones. On the other hand, many see no justification for a policy of foreign aid at all. They look at it as a gigantic boon-doggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 129-150
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

Core Europe and North America have often imagined themselves to be invulnerable to the Russian influence campaigns that have affected smaller, weaker countries in the lands in between. However, in recent years, that perception has broken down as Russia regularly hacks democratic elections in the West, sponsors extremists, spreads disinformation, and may have tipped the US 2016 presidential election to Donald Trump. The West now exhibits a similar politics to what we observe in the lands in between—with growing political extremism and polarization on the one hand and the rise of cynical power brokers on the other who seek to profit from both sides of an intensifying divide. Increasingly, democratic elections seem to pose a “civilizational choice” between the forces of liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism on the Russian model.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Yichen Guan ◽  
Dustin Tingley ◽  
David Romney ◽  
Amaney Jamal ◽  
Robert Keohane

Abstract We study Chinese attitudes toward the United States, and secondarily toward Japan, Russia, and Vietnam, by analyzing social media discourse on the Chinese social media site, Weibo. We focus separately on a general analysis of attitudes and on Chinese responses to specific international events involving the United States. In general, we find that Chinese netizens are much more interested in US politics than US society. Their views of the United States are characterized by deep ambivalence; they have remarkably favorable attitudes toward many aspects of US influence, whether economic, political, intellectual, or cultural. Attitudes toward the United States become negative when the focus turns to US foreign policy – actions that Chinese netizens view as antithetical to Chinese interests. On the contrary, attitudes toward Japan, Russia, and Vietnam vary a great deal from one another. The contrast between these differentiated Chinese views toward the United States and other countries, on the one hand, and the predominant anti-Americanism in the Middle East, on the other, is striking.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Paquin

While Stephen Harper’s foreign policy sparked heated debates during his entire tenure as prime minister, these debates were mainly confined to Canadian foreign policy circles. Little attention was paid to allies’ perceptions of these developments and, more specifically, to the perception of the United States, Canada’s main economic and security partner. How did the Bush and Obama administrations perceive these changes? Were they seen as a break from Canada’s past? Did Harper’s handling of foreign policy alter White House calculations with respect to Canada? Based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted in Washington DC with executive officials a few months prior to the end of the Harper era in 2015, this essay shows that despite a widespread perception in Washington that Canada’s foreign policy approach had changed under Harper, partisanship was the main dividing line in terms of how this approach was perceived and assessed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 1940007
Author(s):  
A. SAFRIL MUBAH

This study highlights Indonesia’s strategy in response to the growing competition between the United States and China. In recent years, Indonesia under the administration of President Joko Widodo has played a strategic role in maintaining regional stability in the Indo-Pacific amid inflaming tensions between the two countries. On the basis of an “independent and active” foreign policy with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the center of a concentric circle, Indonesia has employed a hedging strategy to bolster regional stability and foster cooperation among countries in the region. While there may be room for a hedging strategy, it is important to understand how Indonesia has employed this strategy to shape the regional order. This paper argues that Indonesia has adopted a double hedging strategy of economic pragmatism on the one hand and limited bandwagoning on the other. The former includes a deepening of economic cooperation with China through collaboration between Indonesia’s vision of a Global Maritime Fulcrum and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The latter includes keeping the US involved in the Indo-Pacific by proposing its Indo-Pacific concept to regional players without challenging the existing proposals offered by major powers. This paper consists of four sections. The first section introduces the theoretical basis by focusing on Indonesia’s foreign policy ideas as it deals with competition between great powers. The second section discusses the synthesis of Indonesia’s vision of a Global Maritime Fulcrum and concept of the Indo-Pacific. The third section demonstrates how Indonesia has employed its double hedging strategy. The fourth section highlights the conclusions of this study by summarizing Indonesia’s response to competition between the US and China and providing recommendations for further research.


Significance However, the United States has already blocked a Kuwaiti-drafted statement expressing “outrage” at Israeli security forces’ killings of protesters and calling for an independent investigation. The demonstrations by thousands of Gaza Palestinians approaching the Israeli security fence coincided with the formal opening of the new US embassy in Jerusalem. Impacts The turn in international opinion against Israel could bolster Iran and its Lebanese protégé Hezbollah. Events in Gaza make progress in the stalled Egypt-backed ‘reconciliation’ agreement with the West Bank authorities even more unlikely. Few countries will follow the US example of moving their embassies to Jerusalem, despite Israeli inducements. Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s recent foreign policy successes could bolster his position against corruption investigations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-105
Author(s):  
Ognjen Pribicevic

The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden?s victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West?s victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries


1990 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-46
Author(s):  
M.J. Vinod

A comparative study of India's relations with the two Super Powers, the US and the USSR provides a very complex and interesting model in the relations between nations. On the one hand it would appear rather paradoxical that two large and genuine democracies of the world, India and the United States should have but an ordinary relationship devoid of any deep and enduring rapport. At the people-to-people level there exists one might say, an abundance of goodwill and warmth for one another; yet at the state-to-state level there appears to be a lack of understanding and support for each other's position in vital spheres of activity. On the other hand, inspite of their ideological differences, relations between India and the Soviet Union have turned out to be friendly and enduring. The paradox deserves a closer study.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Holslag

The chapter argues that India has a strong interest to balance China and that the two Asian giants will not be able grow together without conflict. However, India will not be able to balance China’s rise. The chapter argues that India remains stuck between nonalignment and nonperformance. On the one hand, it resists the prospect of a new coalition that balances China from the maritime fringes of Eurasia, especially if that coalition is led by the United States. On the other hand, it has failed to strengthen its own capabilities. Its military power lags behind China’s, its efforts to reach out to both East and Central Asia have ended in disappointment, and its economic reforms have gone nowhere. As a result of that economic underachievement, India finds itself also torn between emotional nationalism and paralyzing political fragmentation, which, in turn, will further complicate its role as a regional power.


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