Ecuadoran Foreign Policy Since 1979: Ideological Cycles or a Trend towards Neoliberalism?

1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 57-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanne A.K. Hey

The end of the Cold War raises many questions about the role of Third World states in the emerging “New World Order.” During the “old” world order, however, Latin America played a crucial role in the US sphere of influence. This alone merits study of its recent foreign policy behavior, not only because the region is home to many of the newly industrializing states, but also because it will undoubtedly be an important player in regional and global politics into the 21st century (Brysk, 1992; Lowenthal, 1993). How will Latin Americans respond to a Hemisphere dominated by the United States? Will they resist or endorse the trend towards open markets and economies? This article investigates this question with regard to Ecuador, exploring whether Ecuador's foreign policymakers are in the process of shifting towards embrace of a US-dominated Hemisphere governed by free-market economic ideals or, rather, are developing policies in accordance with their own ideological predilections.

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M Walt

This article uses realism to explain past US grand strategy and prescribe what it should be today. Throughout its history, the United States has generally acted as realism depicts. The end of the Cold War reduced the structural constraints that states normally face in anarchy, and a bipartisan coalition of foreign policy elites attempted to use this favorable position to expand the US-led ‘liberal world order’. Their efforts mostly failed, however, and the United States should now return to a more realistic strategy – offshore balancing – that served it well in the past. Washington should rely on local allies to uphold the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East and focus on leading a balancing coalition in Asia. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump lacks the knowledge, competence, and character to pursue this sensible course, and his cavalier approach to foreign policy is likely to damage America’s international position significantly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Aleksei D. Katkov

In the 1990s the end of the Cold War and the US’s efforts to build a “new world order” actualized in scientific discourse the problem of understanding the principle of state sovereignty. Moreover, due to the WTO accession, the discussion among United States’ scholars intensified about the preservation of sovereignty of their own state. As a result, both the US authorities and most experts advocate the inviolability of the sovereignty of their country, noting, however, that it might be temporarily limited by different international obligations, first of all by economic agreements, but this does not affect it radically and the possibility of withdrawing from various kinds of contracts remains. At the same time, the last superpower’s foreign policy actions at the end of the 20th century (interference in the internal affairs of Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Yugoslavia, etc.) clearly illustrate the disregard for the sovereignty of other states. In an attempt to explain this policy, they argued that sovereignty, while remaining a significant principle in general, can be lost, which opens up the legitimate path to the internationalization of a conflict. All in all, despite the fact that such an understanding of sovereignty as a conditional principle, is not new in itself, the United States took some steps to extend this understanding to the whole world, granting itself the right to single-handedly determine cases where and why sovereign rights are lost.


Author(s):  
Gregorio Bettiza

Since the end of the Cold War, religion has been systematically brought to the fore of American foreign policy. US foreign policymakers have been increasingly tasked with promoting religious freedom globally, delivering humanitarian and development aid abroad through faith-based channels, pacifying Muslim politics and reforming Islamic theologies in the context of fighting terrorism, and engaging religious actors to solve multiple conflicts and crises around the world. Across a range of different domains, religion has progressively become an explicit and organized subject and object of US foreign policy in ways that were unimaginable just a few decades ago. If God was supposed to be vanquished by the forces of modernity and secularization, why has the United States increasingly sought to understand and manage religion abroad? In what ways have the boundaries between faith and state been redefined as religion has become operationalized in American foreign policy? What kind of world order is emerging in the twenty-first century as the most powerful state in the international system has come to intervene in sustained and systematic ways in sacred landscapes around the globe? This book addresses these questions by developing an original theoretical framework and drawing upon extensive empirical research and interviews. It argues that American foreign policy and religious forces have become ever more inextricably entangled in an age witnessing a global resurgence of religion and the emergence of a postsecular world society.


Author(s):  
Peter Rutland ◽  
Gregory Dubinsky

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.


1995 ◽  
pp. 445-482
Author(s):  
Brigitte Schulz

With the end of the Cold War, much attention has been paid to the nature of the emerging new world order. By what criteria will power and influence be measured in this new era? Who will be the winners and losers? What types of allegiances will develop? Or is Francis Fukuyama's argument correct that, with the collapse of communism, we have reached the "...endpoint of man's ideological evolution" and thus "the end of history". Unlike Marx, who saw socialism at the end of humanity's arduous journey, Fukuyama tells us that the search is off because we have already arrived at our evolutionary destination: liberal capitalism...Other analysts envision less optimistic scenarios...One of the most popular scenarios over the past few years has been to anticipate growing tensions between the three main core powers: the US, Germany, and Japan... The first task of this paper, then, is to look at Germany within the context of the radically altered post-Cold War period... We argue that Germany, based on a multitude of factors which will be outlined below, is not now, nor will it ever become in the foreseeable future, a global hegemon... Indeed, as will be asserted in the second part of this paper, Germany will enter into a close alliance with the United States to form a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic marriage in which the common bonds of "culture and civilization" will replace a virulent anti-communism as the common vow.


Author(s):  
Alexey Gromyko ◽  

In 2021 it is impossible to neglect the fact that our world is moving in a totally wrong direction. Differences between the United States and China are becoming one of the fundamental elements of major powers' competition. Some experts believe that confrontation between the US and China will result in a new edition of bipolarity. Others maintain that the rivalry between the world's two leading economies is a bilateral conflict and cannot evolve into a bipolar world order similar to that of the Cold War. In any case, US-China military tensions are a major risk. These tensions are a time bomb. There is a real risk of a dangerous escalation over Taiwan.


Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the United States’ historical engagement with Africa, particularly during the Cold War era that saw the intensification of US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry, before discussing the rise of a New World Order in the immediate post–Cold War period that held out the possibility of positive US involvement in Africa. It then explores the United States’ adoption of a more realist approach after Somalia, as well as its renewal of limited engagement between 1996 and 2001. It also analyzes US policy towards Africa after 9/11, with emphasis on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror, as compared to the approach of the Obama administration calling for political transformation in Africa.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-44
Author(s):  
A. P. Tsygankov

The article discusses the modern stage of international relations as a transition from the US-centric to another, polycentric world order. America has many opportunities to infl uence the formation of the future world order, which it uses for maintaining a dominant role in the world. However, America also has severe weaknesses for making the global transition; the main one considers the psychological unpreparedness of the country’s establishment for a change in the global role of the United States. The country’s transitional situation gives rise to an identity crisis, accompanied by the most heated debates in the political class regarding the development of foreign policy and strategy. In the variety of positions and narratives of the American strategy, one can distinguish (1) proponents of the liberal globalization and maintaining America’s dominant position, (2) advocates of superpower status and resource dominance by coercion and (3) realists or those who call for building a new global balance of power and coordinating the US interests with other powers. This identity crisis is associated with the globally changing position of the country that has been at the center of the international system for the past 75 years. The American political class was never monolithic before and even during the Cold War, representing a range of diff erent foreign policy ideas and positions. However, foreign policy disagreements previously did not question the national identity and fundamental value of the country. For America, these values were associated with a global role in promoting the ideals of freedom and liberal democracy, previously underpinned by confrontation with the USSR. The disappearance of the Soviet power strengthened the position of liberal globalists and enhanced the strategic narrative of the global promotion of American values. The diff erence of the contemporary period is that nationalists and realists no longer accept the arguments of liberal globalists, resulting in a deepening of ideological polarization in the political class and society. The domestic ideational and political crisis splits the elites, delays the transition to a new world order, and makes it impossible to pursue a sound international strategy. Such a strategy will be the result of both an internal political struggle and a response of the country’s leadership to the processes of pluralization and polycentrism developing in the world.


1970 ◽  
pp. 32-44
Author(s):  
D. Lakishyk ◽  
D. Puhachova-Lakishyk

The article examines the formation of the main directions of the US foreign policy strategy at the beginning of the Cold War. The focus is on determining the vectors of the United States in relation to the spatial priorities of the US foreign policy, the particular interests in the respective regions, the content of means and methods of influence for the realization of their own geopolitical interests. It is argued that the main regions that the United States identified for itself in the early postwar years were Europe, the Middle and Far East, and the Middle East and North Africa were the peripheral ones (attention was also paid to Latin America). It is stated that the most important priorities of American foreign policy were around the perimeter of the zone of influence of the USSR, which entered the postwar world as an alternative to the US center  of power. Attention is also paid to US foreign policy initiatives such as the Marshall Plan and the 4th Point Program, which have played a pivotal role inshaping American foreign policy in the postwar period.


Author(s):  
Oleg Prikhodko

The European Union is an important player in the U.S. policies aimed at maintaining liberal world order. The US-EU interaction has been shaped by a number of key variables, including international environment, specific goals of the U.S. administrations, institutional maturing of the EU, and a complex interplay of American and European diverging and overlapping interests. President D. Trump’s tenure was the most strained period in the US-EU relations, with an erosion of mutual trust and a ghost of trade war looming large. The Biden administration has reversed the U.S. policy towards the European Union. The US-EU summit held last June signified a return of normality in the relations of the transatlantic partners. Washington and Brussels outlined a broad agenda that embraces security, trade and economic issues, coordination in international affairs (concerning, in particular, Russia, China, and Iran), cooperation in decarbonizing of the world economy and promotion of a climate-friendly environment. A broad web of links between the United States and Europe facilitates their joining efforts in addressing global and regional challenges. Although, the US and the EU reached a series of compromises to mitigate their most acrimonious disagreements (Boeing–Airbus subsidies dispute is a vivid example in this regard), there are still unsettled major issues like a comprehensive free trade treaty unsuccessfully negotiated since the Obama presidency. The “Chinese factor” may turn out to be the most divisive one in the transatlantic relations, since the U.S. tough policy towards Beijing makes the EU countries to take hard decisions they prefer to avoid. While it is premature to predict precise implications of the Biden administration’s policy, one can reasonably expect the EU to become a more helpful partner to Washington in diplomatic and economic affairs.


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