Public Law in the State Courts in 1927–1928

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-636
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Special Session ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
State Supreme Court ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court

Special Session—Power to Propose Constitutional Amendments Not Included in Governor's Call. In 1926 a special session of the Pennsylvania legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution in the form of a new section, although the subject-matter of this amendment was not referred to in the governor's proclamation calling the session. In a taxpayer's action to prevent the submission to the people of this proposal it was alleged that the proceeding was in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 25, of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides: “When the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session.” In Sweeney v. King the state supreme court held that a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” within the meaning of this clause. In reaching this conclusion it relied heavily upon its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Griest in which it had held that a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” which must be submitted to the chief executive for his approval, a doctrine well established both in state and federal courts. An opposite result on the principal question was reached by the supreme court of California in People v. Curry. Here the restriction upon a called session of the legislature was held to preclude the proposal of a constitutional amendment. The purpose of the restriction was declared to be to regulate the duration of the session and keep down expenses, and this purpose, it was held, ought not to be defeated by a strained or highly technical interpretation.

scholarly journals ANALISIS PENYELESIAN SENGKETA INTERNAL LEMBAGA NEGARA (STUDI KASUS PELANTIKAN PIMPINAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA PERIODE 2017-2019)

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 364
Author(s):  
Yanzah Bagas Nugraha ◽  
Dwi Andayani Budisetyowati
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
State Institution ◽  
The State ◽  
The Body ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Leadership Tenure ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic

The establishment of the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia so called Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD-RI) at least has two objectives. The first is to enhance justice for the people in the region. Secondly, to expanding and increasing the participation of local communities in national life. The process to form this state institution is done by amending the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. However, in doing that  amendment there was an internal conflict within the body of DPD-RI involving the old and the new leaders of this institution last year. The length of leadership tenure which was initially made 5 years was amended to became 2.5 years. The different length of leadership tenure was then canceled by the Supreme Court and it was decided to be the same as other institution such as The People’s Consultative Assembly and The House of Representative in that the leadership tenure should be in accordance with the electoral cycle of 5 years. However, although the regulation of DPD-RI has been canceled, the Supreme Court keeps sending its representative to guide the oath of position of the new DPD-RI leadership. The only regulation that has been introduced by the state was regulation toward conflict between state institutions and this conflict can merely be resolved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the state to seek solution to solve this problem to prevent the same thing happened to other state institution in the future.

Raising Revenue and Raising Hell

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-234
Author(s):  
Christopher Capozzola
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
The State ◽  
Personal Income ◽  
Estate Tax ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Trust Company ◽  
Treasury Department

It was a time of greenbacks, goldbugs, and grangers; milquetoast mugwumps; single-taxers, socialists, standpatters, and the Sugar Trust. Calls for more taxes filled the air. Populist Mary Lease urged Americans to “raise less corn and more hell,” and even Andrew Carnegie piously endorsed an estate tax “by which the State marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life.” All that hell-raising pushed an income tax through Congress in 1894, but a year later, the Supreme Court granted relief to Charles Pollock, a ten-share stockholder in the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, leaving Justice Henry Brown to moan in dissent that “the decision involve[d] nothing less than the surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class.” The Populist Party demanded that “[t]he power of government—in other words, of the people—should be expanded … to the end that oppression, injustice, and poverty shall eventually cease in the land.” By the summer of 1914, oppression, injustice, and poverty were still around, but the Constitution had a Sixteenth Amendment, and the power to collect corporate excise and personal income taxes rested in the hands of the Treasury Department. But still, with all that hell-raising, I wouldn't wanted to work there.

State Constitutional Law in 1934–35

1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
State Constitutional Law

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.

From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID E LANDAU ◽  
ROSALIND DIXON ◽  
YANIV ROZNAI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Potential Utility ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Global Constitutionalism

Abstract:The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.

Toward A Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo T. Spiller ◽  
Richard G. Vanden Bergh
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The State ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
State Supreme Courts ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Judicial Selection ◽  
State Supreme Court

State Supreme Courts have grown in importance during the last thirty years in the formation of public policy. Their judgements determine many aspects of constitutional law, tort reform, judicial selection, and campaign finance reform, among others. A vast body of literature has been developed that analyzes State Supreme Court decision making, which emphasizes the conditioning effects of the legal and institutional environment. This article expands on this previous work by incorporating the interaction of the judiciary with other government institutions, and applies the Positive Political Theory approach to law and legal institutions to the State Supreme Court. In addition, the neo-institutionalist literature of the selection process is incorporated to defend a systematic approach towards decision making. Towards that end, this article explores how judicial decisions are conditioned by institutional rules, resulting in a formal modeling of how the State Supreme Courts interact with political actors to form constitutional interpretation. This model includes the judicial selection process'retention or competitive reelection—and is extended to constitutional amendment rules, explaining how these two interact rather than acting independently. Finally, the hypothesis is tested that when State Supreme Court judges face retention elections and political preferences are homogeneous, the probability increases of observing constitutional amendment prosposals.

scholarly journals THE CONCEPT AND THE CONTENT OF THE INTERROGATION OF THE SUSPECT IN CUSTODY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (40) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The U.S

The paper analyses some relevant issues related to the treatment oflaw enforcement officers in the United States after a person has been taken intocustody or otherwise deprived of liberty, which requires informing that personof his/her constitutional rights. In the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States set standards for law enforcementofficers to follow when interrogating suspects held in custody.Suspects who are subject to custodial interrogation must be warned of theirright to remain silent; that any statements they make may be used as evidenceagainst them; that they have a right to an attorney; and if they cannot afford anattorney, the State will assign them one prior to any questioning, if they so wish.According to Miranda, unless those rights are not read, any evidence obtainedduring the interrogation may not be used against the defendant.Ever since Miranda was decided, state and federal courts have struggled witha number of issues with regard to its application, including the suspect’s beingin custody, which entitles the suspect to being readMiranda rights, the suspect’swaiving the right to have an attorney present during questioning. Some decisionsby the U.S. Supreme Court have attempted to answer these difficult questions.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

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