scholarly journals ANALISIS PENYELESIAN SENGKETA INTERNAL LEMBAGA NEGARA (STUDI KASUS PELANTIKAN PIMPINAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA PERIODE 2017-2019)

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 364
Author(s):  
Yanzah Bagas Nugraha ◽  
Dwi Andayani Budisetyowati

The establishment of the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia so called Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD-RI) at least has two objectives. The first is to enhance justice for the people in the region. Secondly, to expanding and increasing the participation of local communities in national life. The process to form this state institution is done by amending the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. However, in doing that  amendment there was an internal conflict within the body of DPD-RI involving the old and the new leaders of this institution last year. The length of leadership tenure which was initially made 5 years was amended to became 2.5 years. The different length of leadership tenure was then canceled by the Supreme Court and it was decided to be the same as other institution such as The People’s Consultative Assembly and The House of Representative in that the leadership tenure should be in accordance with the electoral cycle of 5 years. However, although the regulation of DPD-RI has been canceled, the Supreme Court keeps sending its representative to guide the oath of position of the new DPD-RI leadership. The only regulation that has been introduced by the state was regulation toward conflict between state institutions and this conflict can merely be resolved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the state to seek solution to solve this problem to prevent the same thing happened to other state institution in the future.

FIAT JUSTISIA ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
La Ode Angga La Ode Angga

The Harmonization of the Authority between Supreme Court (MA) institutions The Constitutional Court (MK) and Judicial Commission (KY) is a must. It is done by way of revision of the Law of the Supreme Court, MK and KY for the harmonization of authority. However, if the revision finds a dead end, then the fifth amendment (5) of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (UUDNRI 1945) is limited to be reconstructed by the provision of Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution by affirming the authority of KY clear so that it is not considered to interfere with judicial power. The harmonization can be done by adding an institution that oversees the authority of the Constitutional Court by performing reconstruction in Article 24B paragraph (1) so that there is no more tendency of absolute power. The supervised judge is a judge of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.  Keywords: Harmonization, Authority, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Judicial Commission.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-234
Author(s):  
Christopher Capozzola

It was a time of greenbacks, goldbugs, and grangers; milquetoast mugwumps; single-taxers, socialists, standpatters, and the Sugar Trust. Calls for more taxes filled the air. Populist Mary Lease urged Americans to “raise less corn and more hell,” and even Andrew Carnegie piously endorsed an estate tax “by which the State marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life.” All that hell-raising pushed an income tax through Congress in 1894, but a year later, the Supreme Court granted relief to Charles Pollock, a ten-share stockholder in the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, leaving Justice Henry Brown to moan in dissent that “the decision involve[d] nothing less than the surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class.” The Populist Party demanded that “[t]he power of government—in other words, of the people—should be expanded … to the end that oppression, injustice, and poverty shall eventually cease in the land.” By the summer of 1914, oppression, injustice, and poverty were still around, but the Constitution had a Sixteenth Amendment, and the power to collect corporate excise and personal income taxes rested in the hands of the Treasury Department. But still, with all that hell-raising, I wouldn't wanted to work there.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Sholahuddin Al-Fatih

Post-reform of the role of judicial institution is run by two institutions namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The duties and authorities of the two institutions are regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 and the act that addresses the three institutions more specifically. Several powers possessed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, one of them is the authority to judicial review. The Constitutional Court is authorized to review the act on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, while the Supreme Court is authorized to review under the Act on the above legislation.The unfairness of the regulatory testing function is feared to trigger bureaucratic inefficiency. Based on data released by the Supreme Court Clerk, it was recorded during 2016 that the Supreme Court received 18,514 cases, including the Hak Uji Materi (HUM) subject to legislation under the Act. While the number of cases of judicial review of the Constitutional Court in 2016-2017 amounted to only 332 cases. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a bureaucratic reform and provide new ideas related to the model of one court of judicial review in Indonesia. So that in this paper will be discussed deeply about problematic of judicial review in Indonesia and the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the act under one roof with SIJURI mechanism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Heru Nuswanto ◽  
Amri P. Sihotang,

<p>Kedudukan komisi yudisial sebagai pengawas system peradilan di Indonesia di rasa sangat penting untuk menjadikan system peradilan di Indonesia professional dan berintegritas. Persoalan kemudian hadir pasca putusan <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky">MK No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> dimana dalam putusan menjadikan Komisi Yudisial tidak lagi sebagai pihak yang ikut serta mengawasi perekrutan hakim tingkat pertama. Padahal dalam system ketatanegaraan jika lembaga komisi yudisial peran dan fungsinya dibatasi akan menjadikan mahkamah agung sebagai lembaga absolute dalam kekuasaan yudikatif.</p><p>.</p><p>Pasca putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky"> No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> tidaklah menjadi penghambat Komisi Yudisial dalam melakukan penegakan kode etik. Bahkan pada sisi lain Komisi Yudisial harus mampu melakukan penerobosan penafsiran bahwa putusan tersebut semata-mata memberikan ruang dan kedudukan Komisi Yudisial untuk merespon upaya kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman yang secara mandiri dan merdeka akan tetapi harus sesuai real nilai-nilai pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dengan menempatkan Komisi Yudisial yang nantinya akan menguji idependensi hakim-hakim yang merupakan hasil seleksi dari Mahkamah Agung secara ketat dalam menjalankan tugas dan fungsinya sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip dasar kode etik yang telah telah dicanangkan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku.</p><p>Status of the Judicial Commission as the regulatory system in the sense of justice in Indonesia Sangat system makes for a review of integrity and professional judiciary in Indonesia. Present Problems then after the Constitutional Court ruling No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 Where hearts Judicial Commission Decision making is NOT Again as parties Yang Participate oversee the recruitment of judges of first instance. Whereas hearts constitutional system if Institution Role and functions of the Judicial Commission shall be limited to make the Supreme Court as the Institute for Judicial power absolute hearts.</p><p>Post a Constitutional Court decision No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 does not become an obstacle to the Judicial Commission in enforcing the code of conduct. Even on the other side of the Judicial Commission should be able to make a breakthrough interpretation that the decision merely provides the space and the position of the Judicial Commission to respond to the efforts of the independence of judiciary is independent and free but must be corresponding real values of Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic Indonesia by placing the Judicial Commission which will examine idependensi judges were selected from the Supreme Court strictly in performing their duties and functions in accordance with the basic principles of the code of conduct that has been implemented in accordance with the legislation in force.</p>


Author(s):  
Anna Triningsih

<p>Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 tentang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (UU MD3) pasca putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) dinilai memiliki problem substantif/materil akibat materi muatannya bertentangan dengan Undang-Undang Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (UUD NRI 1945), yang mengakibatkan kerugian konstitusional terhadap Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD), meliputi dikuranginya kewenangan DPD untuk dapat mengajukan (Rancangan Undang-Undang) RUU, dikuranginya kewenangan DPD untuk membahas RUU dan dikuranginya kewenangan DPD dalam kedudukannya sebagai lembaga perwakilan daerah. Hal ini menunjukan bahwa pembentukan UU MD3 nyata-nyata tidak menghormati putusan MK yang diberi mandat UUD NRI 1945 sebagai lembaga penafsir dan penjaga konstitusi, dengan tidak menghormati, mematuhi, dan melaksanakan putusan MK ini menunjukkan ketidakpatuhan terhadap putusan lembaga negara yang telah ditunjuk konstitusi untuk mengawal kemurnian pelaksanaan konstitusi. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode normatif menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan ( statute approach ), pendekatan konsep ( conceptual approach ), dan pendekatan historis ( historical approach ). Ketidaktaatan penyusunan UU MD3 pada putusan MK merupakan pengingkaran UUD NRI 1945 dan perkembangan ini merupakan langkah mundur reformasi. Pembentuk Undang-Undang, dalam hal ini, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) dan Presiden harus segera melakukan perubahan UU Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan dengan berpijak pada rambu-rambu konstitusional Putusan MK Nomor 92/PUU-X/2012.</p><p>Law Number 17 Year 2014 on the People’s Consultative Assembly, House of Representatives, Regional Representatives Council, and the Regional House of Representatives (MD3 Law) after the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) is considered to have a substantive problem due to the substance that is contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (the 1945 Constitution), which resulted in the constitutional loss of Regional Representatives Council (DPD), including the reduction of DPD authority to propose draft bills, to discuss draft bills and the reduction in its authority as the regional representative institution. This shows that the drafting of MD3 Law is obviously not respecting the decision of the Court that is mandated by the 1945 Constitution as the interpreter and guardian institution of the constitutional, by not respecting, obeying and implementing MK’s decision which indicates non-compliance with the decision of the state institution that has been designated to guard the purity of the constitution implementation of the constitution. This study uses normative method with statute approach, conceptual approach and a historical approach. The noncompliance of the drafting of MD3 Law towards the MK’s decision is a denial of MK and this development is a step back of Reformation. The legislators, in this case, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the President should immediately amend the Law Number 12 Year 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations based on the MK’s Decision No. 92/PUU-X/2012. </p>


Author(s):  
Jackie Dugard

This article examines whether, to give effect to the section 26 constitutional right to adequate housing, courts can (or should) compel the state to expropriate property in instances when it is not just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers from privately-owned land (unfeasible eviction). This question was first raised in the Modderklip case, where both the Supreme Court of Appeal (Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA)) and Constitutional Court (President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC)). dodged the question, opting instead to award constitutional damages to the property owner for the long-term occupation of its property by unlawful occupiers. It is clear from cases such as Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada 2009 4 SA 463 (SCA), that, mindful of separation of powers concerns, courts have until very recently been unwilling to order the state to expropriate property in such circumstances. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that the state has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligations to provide alternative accommodation for poor communities. In this context, this article argues that there is a growing need for the judiciary to consider, as part of its role to craft effective remedies for constitutional rights violations, the issue of judicial expropriation. It does so, first, through an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence on evictions sought by private landowners and, second, through an in-depth engagement of the recent Western Cape High Court case, Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons whose Identity are Unknown to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province of the Western Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC).    


Jurnal Hukum ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 612
Author(s):  
Widayati

Indonesia is a sovereign country folk. One implementation of the sovereignty of the people is the election that followed by political parties for members of Parliament and members of parliament and individuals for DPD.Political parties are the main pillars of democracy. Establishment of political parties must meet the requirements in accordance with legislation. Terms of founding a political party regulated under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties.As the main pillar of democracy, political parties should be able to carry out its functions properly. There are some restrictions on political parties, among others, are prohibited from engaging in activities contrary to the Constitution of 1945 NRI and legislation; engage in activities that endanger the integrity and safety Homeland. If the ban is violated, then the government may ask the parties to the freezing of the District Court. If the parties do not accept the decision of freezing the District Court, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the PN, then the Government may propose the dissolution of the parties to the Court.The procedure by which parties to the Court daitur dissolution under Article 68 paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court's decision regarding the request for the dissolution of political parties must be decided upon within a period of 60 (sixty) days after pemoohonan recorded in the Register of Case Constitution.Keywords: Parati dissolution of political, constitutional systemIndonesia


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