The rise and fall of party leaders: exploring leadership selection, re-selection, and de-selection using qualitative comparative analysis

The main purpose of this paper is to detect the reasons for party leaders' persistence or departure from the office, starting from the moment they are selected or re-selected. More specifically, we try to assess which (if any) characteristics of the leadership race (LR) called to appoint (or re-appoint) the party leader, in combination with other conditions, could favour leadership re-selection in office at the end of the term, rather than a more or less forced early departure. To this end, we have investigated all the LRs promoted by both bigger and smaller parties in four Western European countries over the last three decades. Bridging the literature on leadership selection and leadership survival, we built a theoretical framework that allowed us to turn to an original methodological approach in the field – qualitative comparative analysis – to unravel asymmetrical, equi-final, and conjunctural causation by looking at the combinations of conditions leading to the outcome, namely re-selection or departure from the office. Specifically, we identified five main conditions which are likely to affect the outcome, both alone and in combination with each other: whether there is an outgoing leader running for re-election (incumbency); a broad inclusiveness of the LR called to appoint the party leader; large victory (namely low competitiveness for contested LR or high approval rates for coronation of a single candidate); participation in government during the leadership tenure; and party electoral support (‘big’ mainstream vs. ‘small’ niche/challenger parties).

“Work Ethic” Value as Soeharto’s Development Tool in Indonesia

This research paper mainly discusses Soeharto and his “Work Ethic” value system. It focuses on the role of local wisdom as a fundamental value that has moulded leadership character and style of Soeharto in Indonesia. A term during his leadership tenure was used by Soeharto to identify, list and explain the source of the dominant local wisdom. Content analysis was used as the method of analysis in to explain a series of “End of the Year Speech”, “Nationhood Speech” and “Party Speech”. Initial analysis on the speech texts showed that emphasis on values was given at every serie of the speeches delivered. Next, quotations of every paragraph in the speech texts were scrutinized for groupings of dimensions (Value Dimensions) specifically referring to Asian Values. The paragraphs of every text were recited for the final time in order to identify Derived Values originated from each of the Value Dimensions. Recordings of data were carried out by using Archive for Technology, the Life World and Everyday Language. Text Interpretation (ATLAS).ti version 7 software. It was discovered that Soeharto used his “Nationhood Speech” serie as his main medium to deliver values to his people. Value Dimension “Work Ethics” was identified as the second most important value in his delivery of messages on development. Meanwhile, Derived Values “Strong/Kind/Dilligent/Viable/Earnest” were values that frequently appeared in the dimension. At the end of this paper, an explanation on the application of these values in the leadership and development under Soeharto is obtained. In conclusion, a leader who manipulated local wisdom is capable of achieving development that is more pragmatic and effective. Reinvigorating the local wisdom is a significant factor that can catalyze a continuous development specifically in Indonesia and generally in the South East Asia.

ANALISIS PENYELESIAN SENGKETA INTERNAL LEMBAGA NEGARA (STUDI KASUS PELANTIKAN PIMPINAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH REPUBLIK INDONESIA PERIODE 2017-2019)

The establishment of the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia so called Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD-RI) at least has two objectives. The first is to enhance justice for the people in the region. Secondly, to expanding and increasing the participation of local communities in national life. The process to form this state institution is done by amending the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. However, in doing that amendment there was an internal conflict within the body of DPD-RI involving the old and the new leaders of this institution last year. The length of leadership tenure which was initially made 5 years was amended to became 2.5 years. The different length of leadership tenure was then canceled by the Supreme Court and it was decided to be the same as other institution such as The People’s Consultative Assembly and The House of Representative in that the leadership tenure should be in accordance with the electoral cycle of 5 years. However, although the regulation of DPD-RI has been canceled, the Supreme Court keeps sending its representative to guide the oath of position of the new DPD-RI leadership. The only regulation that has been introduced by the state was regulation toward conflict between state institutions and this conflict can merely be resolved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the state to seek solution to solve this problem to prevent the same thing happened to other state institution in the future.

Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies

Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

Autocratic political cycle and international conflict

This article reveals a temporal pattern of conflict behavior over the course of autocratic leaders’ tenure. By identifying a commonly observed domestic political cycle in autocracies, I discuss how the level of domestic constraints on autocrats’ conflict behavior changes over time in three distinct periods: (1) power struggle in the early period of tenure; (2) power consolidation; and (3) power dissipation in the later period of power transition. The empirical analysis on autocratic conflict cycle reveals that the likelihood of autocratic crisis initiation significantly increases during the early years of autocratic leadership tenure, after which it moderately decreases over time. This finding suggests that autocrats’ tenure is a substantively important predictor of autocratic leaders’ conflict behavior.

The Tenure Arrangement Of Primary Constitutional Organ Leaders In Indonesian Constitutional System

The tenure arrangement of primary constitutional organ leaders is required as the implementation of power limitation principle and the manifestation of political equality principle as the characteristic of democratic state. The tenure arrangements of primary constitutional organ leaders in Indonesia have four models: tenure arrangement through the 1945 Constitution, tenure arrangement through Law, tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law but regulated in the constitutional organs’ internal regulation, and tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law as well as internal regulation. The problem in this paper is: First, how is the arrangement of leadership tenure in the constitutional organs according to the Indonesian legislation system. Second, how to adjust the arrangement of constitutional organ leader in order to provide legal certainty and prevent conflict that can disrupt organs’ performance. The arrangement through the Constitution is the most powerful model in term of legal certainty regarding that the Constitution is in the highest national legal order and materials related to the structure and organization of primary constitutional organs constitute the Constitution’s substance. The model not regulated in law but regulated in internal regulation prone to cause conflict because every member of the constitutional organs which meets the requirements may change the internal regulation at any time. To avoid this conflict, this paper concludes that it requires the change of regulation regulating the tenure of constitutional organ leaders so that it is no longer regulated in the constitutional organs’ internal regulations, but it is set in the 1945 Constitution or at least in the Law in order to have a better legal certainty.