From an unconstitutional constitutional amendment to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID E LANDAU ◽  
ROSALIND DIXON ◽  
YANIV ROZNAI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Potential Utility ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Global Constitutionalism

Abstract:The unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine has emerged as a highly successful, albeit still controversial, export in comparative constitutional law. The doctrine has often been defended as protecting a delegation from the people to the political institutions that they created. Other work has noted the doctrine’s potential utility in guarding against abusive constitutionalism. In this article, we consider how these justifications fare when expanded to encompass claims against the original constitution itself, rather than a later amendment to the text. That is, beyond the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine, can or should there be a doctrine of an unconstitutional constitution? Our question is spurred by a puzzling 2015 case from Honduras where the Supreme Court held an unamendable one-term limit on presidential terms, as well as protective provisions punishing attempts to alter that limit, to be unconstitutional. What is particularly striking about the case is that these provisions were not later amendments to the constitution, but rather parts of the original 1982 constitution itself. Thus, this article examines the possibility of ‘an unconstitutional constitution’, what we predict to be the next trend in global constitutionalism.

From promise to retrenchment: On the changing landscape of Israeli constitutionalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Shinar ◽  
Barak Medina ◽  
Gila Stopler
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Israeli Society ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Revolution

Abstract Israeli constitutionalism has long interested comparative constitutional law scholars, whether due to its geopolitical status, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, its internal divisions, or its unique constitutional evolution. Unlike many other countries that have ratified constitutions after the Second World War, Israel was established as a parliamentary democracy, with an explicit intention to ratify a constitution at a later stage. This did not happen. Instead, it underwent a “constitutional revolution” announced by its Supreme Court. Fitting a revolution, much of comparative constitutional law scholarship has focused on this pivotal moment. The articles in this symposium depart from the scholarship focused on that moment. They seek to critically understand what has become of Israeli constitutionalism in the past decade. In this introduction, we highlight several transformations and features which we believe are essential if one is to understand the extant constitutional order in Israel. These should be understood as background conditions against which Israeli constitutionalism is operating. They include the strengthening of judicial review alongside rising political resistance to the Court’s power; populism in political discourse targeting rule of law institutions; the erosion of individual rights alongside the strengthening of nationalist elements; and increasing divisions inside Israeli society. These challenge the idea of a successful constitutional revolution in terms of its inherent promise to better protect individual rights and safeguard the rule of law. In describing these features, we seek to situate the Supreme Court, judicial review, and the legal-constitutional order generally, in the larger sphere of Israeli society and politics.

State Constitutional Law in 1934–35

1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Sole Purpose ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
State Taxes ◽  
State Constitutional Law

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.

A Plague on Both Your Houses

2018 ◽  
pp. 56-70
Author(s):  
Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Political ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Political Events ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

This essay proceeds with the view that the process of judicial appointments is as much political as it is legal, even though the arguments before the Supreme Court in the NJAC Case constantly treated it as a matter of only constitutional law. This essay argues that it is critical to be cognizant of the political events involving successive governments and Chief Justices wresting the power to appoint judges. It asks why and how the process of deciding upon an acceptable procedure for judicial appointments has become the source of an ongoing confrontation between the executive and the judiciary. It is argued in this essay that while the government and the judiciary might individually be justified in their stance, as a result of this conflict, public credibility of both these institutions has been adversely affected.

scholarly journals Tapping the Potential of Senate-Driven Reform: Proposals to Limit the Powers of the Senate

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Heard
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Political Will ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Democratic System

In the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Senate Reform Reference, there was considerable talk about the limitations that the Supreme Court had put on Senate reform. Some political leaders expressed frustration and declared that we are left with the status quo. But, that view both misunderstands what the Court said and underestimates what can be achieved through non-constitutional means. There is much that can be done simply with the political will to change the Senate situation without resorting to constitutional amendment; senators already have the power to effect some serious reform from within. This paper focuses on an unorthodox suggestion: that substantive reforms might be achieved through changes to the Rules of the Senate governing its legislative process. With some changes to both the legislative and appointment processes, substantial improvements to the Senate are both possible and achievable. The result would be a Senate better able to perform its intended function as a chamber of sober second thought. It would also answer the most serious concerns about an appointed Senate’s role in a modern democratic system.

Public Law in the State Courts in 1927–1928

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-636
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Special Session ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
State Supreme Court ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court

Special Session—Power to Propose Constitutional Amendments Not Included in Governor's Call. In 1926 a special session of the Pennsylvania legislature proposed an amendment to the state constitution in the form of a new section, although the subject-matter of this amendment was not referred to in the governor's proclamation calling the session. In a taxpayer's action to prevent the submission to the people of this proposal it was alleged that the proceeding was in violation of Art. 3, Sec. 25, of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides: “When the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session.” In Sweeney v. King the state supreme court held that a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” within the meaning of this clause. In reaching this conclusion it relied heavily upon its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Griest in which it had held that a constitutional amendment is not “legislation” which must be submitted to the chief executive for his approval, a doctrine well established both in state and federal courts. An opposite result on the principal question was reached by the supreme court of California in People v. Curry. Here the restriction upon a called session of the legislature was held to preclude the proposal of a constitutional amendment. The purpose of the restriction was declared to be to regulate the duration of the session and keep down expenses, and this purpose, it was held, ought not to be defeated by a strained or highly technical interpretation.

scholarly journals Comentario de los autos del Tribunal Supremo de 17 de octubre y 6 y 27 de noviembre de 2014, relativos a la ley de consultas populares y la «consulta popular no referendaria sobre el futuro político de Cataluña»

2016 ◽  
pp. 595
Author(s):  
Estela Gilbaja Cabrero
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Central Government ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
The People ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

El Parlamento catalán aprobó en 2014 una Ley de consultas populares. Anteriormente, en 2013, había aprobado una Declaración de soberanía y del derecho a decidir del pueblo de Cataluña. Basándose en los citados documentos, el Presidente de la Generalitat convocó una «consulta popular no referendaria sobre el futuro político de Cataluña», que tendría lugar el 9 de noviembre de 2014. No se llegó a celebrar porque el Tribunal Constitucional decretó su suspensión, ya que el Gobierno había impugnado ante él la Ley, la Declaración y el Decreto de Convocatoria. La Generalitat, una asociación y dos particulares entendieron que los recursos del Gobierno fueron una intromisión en los derechos de los catalanes y acudieron al Tribunal Supremo. El presente trabajo estudia los Autos del Tribunal Supremo que les dan respuesta.Catalan Parliament approved in 2014 a Popular Enquiry Act. Previously, in 2013, they had approved a Declaration of Sovereignty and the right to decide of the people of Catalonia. Based on these documents, the President of the regional Government called to a «non-referendum popular enquiry about the political future of Catalonia», which would be held on November 9, 2014. It did not get to celebrate because the Constitutional Court ordered its suspension, as the central Government had impugned the Act, the Declaration and the Decree calling for the enquiry. The regional Government, an association and two people thought those impugnations were an intrusion on the Catalans’ rights and went before the Supreme Court. This paper studies the reply of the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada

2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 883-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmett Macfarlane
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Retirement Age ◽  
Logical Consistency ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future

This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the Senate Reform Reference from the perspective of its coherence in interpreting the various amending procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. It analyzes the ways that the underlying logic of the Court’s reasoning, particularly with respect to the method of selecting senators and senatorial term limits, creates ambiguity and risks unintended consequences for future attempts at constitutional amendment. The Court’s explicit refusal to distinguish between the federal government’s unilateral ability to enact a retirement age and its logic that term limits, regardless of length, require the consent of the provinces under the general amending procedure lacks logical consistency and arguably erodes the unilateral amending procedure to a problematic degree. In the context of its reasoning with respect to changes to the method of selecting senators, the Court’s reliance on the amorphous notion of the “constitutional architecture” clouds the definable limits of “method of selection” under section 42(1)(b). The Senate Reform Reference introduces considerable ambiguity into what changes the federal executive can implement with respect to the appointments process itself. The article concludes by exploring the political implications that the decision has for the future of Senate reform specifically and for our ability to amend the constitution generally.

scholarly journals Judicial Review And Judicial Supremacy: A Paradigm of Constitutionalism in Nigeria

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-75
Author(s):  
Ajepe Taiwo Shehu
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Natural Consequence ◽  
The People ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

Abstract This paper examines judicial review and judicial power in Nigeria under the 1999 Constitution in relation to the constitution itself and in relation to the political branches of government. Th is is essentially to locate where lays supremacy between the branches and the judiciary particularly the Supreme Court with its final appellate jurisdiction. Judicial review and supremacy of the judiciary had been of recurring academic discuss in some jurisdictions with written Constitutions, particularly the United States from where Nigeria largely borrowed its presidential constitutionalism. This thus suggests that there is a need to examine the controversy within the context of Nigeria’s experience; is it really in the Constitution that creates branches of the government and that is proclaimed to be supreme over all authorities including the judiciary? Is it in the judiciary whose oversight function cuts across the political branches and whose interpretative decisions are binding on the constitution itself and the other branches? Is it in the executive that appoints and removes Justices of the court subject to confirmation by the Senate, or is it in the legislature? The paper argues that the overriding effect of the judicial power of the Supreme Court over all persons and authorities including the Constitution puts the judiciary in supreme position, that being the natural consequence of the power so vested in the judiciary by the “People Themselves.”

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

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