Relations of the United States with the Council of the League of Nations

1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clarence A. Berdahl

The Council of the League of Nations being commonly considered in the United States as the League's supreme organ, as the body which represents par excellence the League system and spirit, it would seem obvious that there should have been the greater hesitation, in view of our non-membership in the League and our official anti-League declarations, to have direct relations with it. Nevertheless, the record reveals that it has been impossible for the United States government to ignore the Council consistently, and that, as a matter of fact, official relationships of one kind or another have been occasionally entered into with that body also. These relationships have, in the first place, taken the form of direct correspondence between the Council and the United States, which has been carried on at intermittent periods and on various subjects, but which has involved every Administration, and which by this time amounts to a considerable volume.

1921 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-50
Author(s):  
Charles Noble Gregory

On October 29, 1919, the first annual meeting of the International Labor Conference opened at Washington, D. C. It convened pursuant to the invitation of the United States Government authorized by joint resolution of Congress in accordance with and under the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations. The meeting was in some respects embarrassed by the fact that the League of Nations had not yet come into existence, but it nevertheless proceeded, doubtless on the theory that, in the present disjointed times, it is not inappropriate that the creature should precede the creator.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-683
Author(s):  
Frederick A. Middlebush

When the United States government, on January 7, 1932, and the Extraordinary Assembly of the League of Nations, on March 11, 1932, and again on February 24, 1933, invoked non-recognition as a sanction,1 the necessity at once arose of determining what would be the precise effects, as far as international relations are concerned, of withholding recognition of Manchukuo. It may seem strange that the decision to resort to non-recognition as a sanction was taken before an attempt was made to determine the practical effects of such action on the Far Eastern situation. Presumably, however, this must be the procedure in the application of international sanctions.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
pp. 127-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Champney ◽  
Paul Edleman

AbstractThis study employs the Solomon Four-Group Design to measure student knowledge of the United States government and student knowledge of current events at the beginning of a U.S. government course and at the end. In both areas, knowledge improves significantly. Regarding knowledge of the U.S. government, both males and females improve at similar rates, those with higher and lower GPAs improve at similar rates, and political science majors improve at similar rates to non-majors. Regarding current events, males and females improve at similar rates. However, those with higher GPAs and political science majors improve more than others.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


Slavic Review ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin M. Weissman

In March 1921 Lenin predicted, “If there is a harvest, everybody will hunger a little and the government will be saved. Otherwise, since we cannot take anything from people who do not have the means to satisfy their own hunger, the government will perish.“ By early summer, Russia was in the grip of one of the worst famines in its history. Lenin's gloomy forecast, however, was never put to the test. At almost the last moment, substantial help in the form of food, clothing, and medical supplies arrived from a most unexpected source —U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.Hoover undertook the relief of Soviet Russia not as an official representative of the United States government but as the head of a private agency —the American Relief Administration (A.R.A.).


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