The First Amendment And The Ministerial Exemption: Federal Statutory Mandates

On January 11, 2012 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v. Equal Opportunity Commission, et al.<a name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftn1"><span style="color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</a> that the First Amendment free exercise of religion clause requires the recognition of a ministerial exception from the application of the discrimination provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. Lower federal courts had long recognized such an exemption in federal anti-discrimination statutes, yet the U.S. Supreme Court had never formally done so. The decision of the Court was unanimous, although separate concurring opinions were filed by Justice Thomas and by Justice Alito, who was also joined by Justice Kagan. Thus, in its decision, the Court has mandated immunity for religious organizations from the laws that prohibit discrimination, and retaliation in the workplace. The Hosanna Tabor decision raises issues of how far such a ministerial exemption extends and to what extent it immunizes religious organizations from liability for other types of statutorily prohibited and tortious conduct. There is concern in some sectors that too broad an exemption would immunize religious organizations under numerous neutral, generally applicable laws, such as those governing sexual abuse, unemployment compensation, employer social Security deductions, and sales taxes, all of which have previously been applied to religious organizations. <div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"> <hr size="1" /><div style="mso-element: footnote;" id="ftn1"> <a name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftnref1"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</a> ____ U.S. ____. </div> </div>

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United States Supreme Court Rules on Expert Testimony

PEDIATRICS ◽

10.1542/peds.95.6.934 ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 95 (6) ◽

pp. 934-936 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Gary N. McAbee

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

Expert Testimony ◽

Scientific Evidence ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Federal Courts ◽

State Courts ◽

Expert Witnesses ◽

Us Supreme Court

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.

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Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United States

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.2307/2189627 ◽

1931 ◽

Vol 25 (1) ◽

pp. 83-96

Author(s):

A. H. Feller

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Federal Courts ◽

Judicial System ◽

United States Supreme ◽

Sovereign Immunity ◽

Procedural Complications ◽

The Law

To the ever-increasing confusion of doctrine which makes up the law of sovereign immunity, the courts of the United States have added procedural complications which, though not as weighty, are nevertheless as puzzling as any of the substantive rules. Of recent years the United States Supreme Court and the lower Federal courts have often had occasion to consider the method whereby the question of immunity was raised. The result has been the evolution of a set of rules so vaguely defined in the decisions as to offer little guidance to the bench and bar, and withal of interest to the scholar who finds that these rules exist in no other judicial system.

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Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in the United States Supreme Court: Liberties of the First Amendment

Michigan Law Review ◽

10.2307/1284215 ◽

1951 ◽

Vol 50 (2) ◽

pp. 261 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Burton C. Bernard

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

First Amendment ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

United States Supreme

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Fighting Words

Censorship and Student Communication in Online and Offline Settings - Advances in Educational Marketing, Administration, and Leadership ◽

10.4018/978-1-4666-9519-1.ch003 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 36-43

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

New Hampshire ◽

First Amendment ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

United States Supreme ◽

School Officials

This chapter describes the fighting-words jurisprudence. It explains why fighting words are unprotected speech. It reviews the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) case in which the United States Supreme Court first excluded fighting words from First Amendment protection. The chapter aims to show that, since fighting words are unprotected speech, school officials can censor such speech outside the schoolhouse gate without violating the First Amendment. However, school officials must establish that the speech qualifies as fighting words – a challenging task.

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Speech out of Thin Air

10.5406/illinois/9780252037115.003.0005 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Randall P. Bezanson

Keyword(s):

New Jersey ◽

Supreme Court ◽

First Amendment ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Boy Scouts ◽

Boy Scouts Of America ◽

Home Town ◽

Lesbian And Gay ◽

The Supreme Court

This chapter examines the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Since age eight, James Dale had been a Scout in his home town of Monmouth, New Jersey. By 1988, when he finished as a youth Scout on his eighteenth birthday, he had earned twenty-five merit badges and had become an Eagle Scout, one of the highest honors in Scouting. At age 19, Dale “came out” while attending Rutgers, and became actively involved in the university's lesbian and gay organization. He later received a letter from the Boy Scouts of America saying that he no longer met its standards for leadership, since avowed homosexuals were not permitted in the organization. Dale sought to appeal the decision, but to no avail. He was dismissed from his position as assistant scoutmaster, and his adult membership in the Scouts was revoked. Dale sued, claiming that the Scouts' decision was illegal under the terms of the New Jersey public accommodations law. Dale's lawsuit ultimately prevailed in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The Boy Scouts then appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court. In order to get to the Supreme Court the Scouts had to argue that the New Jersey law could not constitutionally be applied to the Boy Scouts based on its First Amendment right of free speech.

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An update on the conflicting first amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court

Education and the Law ◽

10.1080/09539960020012103 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 12 (3) ◽

pp. 195-200

Author(s):

Charles J. Russo ◽

Ralph D. Mawdsley

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Supreme Court ◽

First Amendment ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

United States Supreme

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Muddying the Waters: The Downstream Implications of Wal-Mart v. Dukes for Medical Monitoring Class Actions in Missouri

Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and Public Health Law ◽

10.5195/pjephl.2013.52 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 7 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Rachel D. Guthrie

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Federal Courts ◽

Class Action ◽

Medical Monitoring ◽

Toxic Exposure ◽

Class Actions ◽

Latent Disease ◽

Federal Jurisdiction

In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the United States Supreme Court heightened scrutiny of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement and imposed a strict injunctive standard for relief sought under FRCP Rule 23(b)(2). In 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court followed several other states in acknowledging that claimants tortiously exposed to toxins may seek medical monitoring for latent disease in a class action. Although state courts are not bound by federal procedural rules, class actions increasingly invoke federal jurisdiction, and this Article attempts to analyze the likely implications of Dukes for toxic exposure class actions. Further, using Missouri as a benchmark, this Article provides suggestions for bolstering the chances of recovery for toxic exposure claimants facing removal to federal courts.

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Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment

10.31235/osf.io/9fc3a ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Mark Lemley

Keyword(s):

Supreme Court ◽

First Amendment ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

The State ◽

State Action ◽

Antitrust Laws ◽

The Subject ◽

Antitrust Immunity ◽

State Action Doctrine

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has focused increasingattention on two doctrines that provide immunity from antitrust liabilityfor certain anticompetitive activity: the state action doctrine and thepetitioning immunity doctrine (sometimes known as the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, after the two cases that established it). These doctrines havebeen the subject of seven Supreme Court decisions in as many years. Inspite of (or perhaps because of) the Court’s numerous recent decisions,there remains a great deal of confusion about the source and the scope ofthese doctrines. This Article attempts to clarify both doctrines.The Supreme Court and a number of commentators contend that the antitrustimmunity doctrines are the product of statutory interpretation of theantitrust laws themselves. The Court contends that petitioning and stateaction are “essentially dissimilar” to the types of business activity theantitrust laws were designed to regulate. This Article disagrees. Bothpetitioning and state action present precisely the sorts of problems withwhich the antitrust laws are concerned — exploitation of consumers throughthe charging of supracompetitive prices.To determine the source of antitrust immunity, the Court must look beyondthe antitrust laws to the constitutional principles that are implicated bythe doctrines. For the state action doctrine, the constitutional principleat stake is largely one of federalism, and the more general democraticprinciples embodied in the Court’s non-delegation jurisprudence. For thepetitioning immunity doctrine, the First Amendment protection of speech andpetitioning provides the relevant principles. After examining the source ofthe antitrust immunity doctrines, this Article considers the appropriatescope of those doctrines in light of the constitutional principles at issue.

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The Future Of Affirmative Action After Grutter v. Bollinger

Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) ◽

10.19030/jber.v2i10.2926 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2 (10) ◽

Author(s):

Paula Alexander Becker

Keyword(s):

Affirmative Action ◽

Supreme Court ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

Fourteenth Amendment ◽

United States Supreme ◽

Font Size ◽

The Supreme Court ◽

The Future ◽

The Subject

The future of affirmative action was the subject of a pair of consolidated cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in June 2003.  Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of race in the admission of students to a University or whether diversity can provide a compelling government interest sufficient to meet Fourteenth Amendment standard was the controversy decided by the Supreme Court.  This case will affect the future of affirmative action not only in higher education, but also in the employment arena as well.

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Child Pornography

Censorship and Student Communication in Online and Offline Settings - Advances in Educational Marketing, Administration, and Leadership ◽

10.4018/978-1-4666-9519-1.ch006 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 55-60

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

New York ◽

Supreme Court ◽

First Amendment ◽

Child Pornography ◽

United States Supreme Court ◽

The United States ◽

United States Supreme ◽

Student Speech ◽

The Supreme Court

This chapter discusses child pornography speech which the United States Supreme Court first categorically excluded from First Amendment protection in New York v. Ferber (1982). The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the child-pornography jurisprudence. The chapter also highlights a case applying the Supreme Court precedent on child pornography to student speech. The chapter concludes that, due to its unprotected nature, students censored for child pornography speech have no First Amendment recourse.

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