The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary C. Jacobson
Keyword(s):  
Regression Models ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Survey Questions ◽  
Finance Policy ◽  
Campaign Expenditures

Incomplete understanding of the connection between campaign spending and election outcomes has hindered evaluation of enacted and proposed congressional campaign finance reforms. Reanalysis of the 1972 and 1974 House and Senate campaign spending data using both OLS and 2SLS regression models shows that spending by challengers has a much greater impact on the outcome than does spending by incumbents. A similar analysis of the effects of spending on voters' recall of candidates in the 1972 and 1974 SRC surveys supports the explanation that campaign expenditures buy nonincumbents the necessary voter recognition already enjoyed by incumbents prior to the campaign. The 1974 survey questions on Senate candidates indicate that, although the inability to remember candidates' names does not preclude having opinions about them, voters recalling candidates are much more likely to offer evaluative comments, and these more frequently refer to candidates personally. Aware voters offer more negative as well as positive evaluations (though positive outnumber negative); familiarity is not automatically advantageous. And voters' evaluations of candidates strongly influence how they vote. The implications of these findings for congressional campaign finance policy are readily apparent.

A Dynamic Model of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections

1996 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 37-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ◽  
Tse-min Lin
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Election Outcome ◽  
Empirical Estimation ◽  
Dynamic Assignment ◽  
Aggregate Effect ◽  
Disaggregated Data ◽  
General Dynamic

In contrast to conventional studies on campaign finance, which focus on the aggregate effect of money on the vote, we propose a more general dynamic model based on temporally disaggregated data. The model is supported by the substantive understanding that at different stages of the campaign process candidates have different goals, and their expenditures should have different effects on the final election outcome. Using Achen's (1986) framework of quasi experiments, the model includes dynamic “assignment equations” and “outcome equations”, which address the problem of nonrandom assignment. A final vote equation is derived in which the coefficients of period-specific incumbent expenditures are constrained by an Almon polynomial. Empirical estimation provides evidence for a three-stage dynamic campaign process.

Is the equalization/normalization lens dead? Social media campaigning in US congressional elections

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 718-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Gainous ◽  
Andrew Segal ◽  
Kevin Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Interactive Effects ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose Early information technology scholarship centered on the internet’s potential to be a democratizing force was often framed using an equalization/normalization lens arguing that either the internet was going to be an equalizing force bringing power to the masses, or it was going to be normalized into the existing power structure. The purpose of this paper is to argue that considered over time the equalization/normalization lens still sheds light on our understanding of how social media (SM) strategy can shape electoral success asking if SM are an equalizing force balancing the resource gap between candidates or are being normalized into the modern campaign. Design/methodology/approach SM metrics and electoral data were collected for US congressional candidates in 2012 and 2016. A series of additive and interactive models are employed to test whether the effects of SM reach on electoral success are conditional on levels of campaign spending. Findings The results suggest that those candidates who spend more actually get more utility for their SM campaign than those who spend less in 2012. However, by 2016, spending inversely correlates with SM campaign utility. Research limitations/implications The findings indicate that SM appeared to be normalizing into the modern congressional campaign in 2012. However, with higher rates of penetration and greater levels of usage in 2016, the SM campaign utility was not a result of higher spending. SM may be a greater equalizing force now. Practical implications Campaigns that initially integrate digital and traditional strategies increase the effectiveness of the SM campaign because the non-digital strategy both complements and draws attention to the SM campaign. However, by 2016 the SM campaign was not driven by its relation to traditional campaign spending. Originality/value This is the first large N study to examine the interactive effects of SM reach and campaign spending on electoral success.

Political Finance and Participation in Congressional Elections

1976 ◽  
Vol 425 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul A. Dawson ◽  
James E. Zinser
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Capita Income ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Political Finance ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Registered Voters ◽  
Campaign Expenditures

Citizens participate in the electoral process both to enjoy intrinsic benefits and in the hope of future bene fits. Factors affecting the strength of these consumption and investment motives therefore will affect registration and turnout rates, levels of campaign contributions, and electoral margins. To some extent, the strength of these motives is fixed by relatively static factors: levels of district per capita income, the degree of income inequality, the partisan division of registered voters. However, both motives also are affected by factors more apt to vary: for example, statutory arrangements, the activities of political parties, levels and types of campaign expenditures. In particular, statutory arrangements and the activities of parties which reduce costs can increase participation. Moreover, substan tial efforts to alter the partisan division of registered voters can increase campaign contributions. Also, campaign expenditures channel motivations in partisan directions, stim ulate partisan turnout, and affect electoral margins. Results reported here suggest the likelihood of bipartisan support for policies facilitating registration and voting, challenge assumptions about the effects of incumbency on campaign contributions, raise doubts about legislated ceilings on cam paign expenditures, and weaken the case for public financing of congressional elections.

Gauging (Perceived) Corruption

2021 ◽  
pp. 45-70
Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Central Issue ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Descriptive Data ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
Minor Problem ◽  
A Minor

Chapter 3 aims to gauge both the reality of, as well as public opinion on, the central issue of corruption. It investigates public opinion on corruption among elected officials, source of corruption, effectiveness of laws and regulations in mitigating corruption, support for campaign finance reforms, etc. The data strongly suggest that people think corruption is rampant despite limited evidence that quid pro quo corruption is anything more than a minor problem. This fundamental attitude has not changed much in the wake of the Citizens United decision. Furthermore, they believe the problem is mostly intractable and that most of the commonly proposed reforms of the campaign finance system will not work. Nevertheless, they still support these reforms. Moving from simple descriptive data to more associational analyses, this chapter also explores the effect of campaign finance laws on campaign spending and then the effect of both on corruption attitudes. The results are not what the Court would have expected.

Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Simon Weschle
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Demand Side ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Institutional Factor ◽  
Citizens United ◽  
Us States ◽  
The Us

Abstract Existing research on the revolving door examines why employers hire former politicians. I complement this demand-side approach by demonstrating the importance of the supply-side. In particular, I argue that one important institutional factor that shapes politicians' willingness to leave office for a private sector job is campaign finance legislation. Less restrictive rules increase campaign spending for incumbents, which makes revolving door employment less attractive. Empirically, I use novel data from the US states and a difference-in-differences design to show that the exogenous removal of campaign finance legislation through Citizens United reduced the probability that incumbents left office to work as lobbyists. The supply-side approach provides insights into comparative differences in the prevalence of the revolving door.

scholarly journals Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage: Competition and Money in Chile's Congressional Elections

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel W. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Political Finance

Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates’ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates’ demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile's “secret” donation system.

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