Lethal Frontiers: A Soviet View of Nuclear Strategy, Weapons, and Negotiations

1989 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 164
Author(s):  
Gregory F. Treverton ◽  
Alexei G. Arbatov ◽  
Alan B. Sherr
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Soviet View

Chinese Nuclear Strategy: The Early Post-Detonation Period

Asian Survey ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 271-279
Author(s):  
Morton H. Halperin
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Strategy

The Cold War and After

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International System ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Book Deal ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Historical Issues ◽  
Shed Light

What makes for war or for a stable international system? Are there general principles that should govern foreign policy? This book explores how historical work can throw light on these questions. The essays in this book deal with specific problems—with such matters as nuclear strategy and U.S.–European relations. But the book's main goal is to show how in practice a certain type of scholarly work can be done. The book demonstrates how, in studying international politics, the conceptual and empirical sides of the analysis can be made to connect with each other, and how historical, theoretical, and even policy issues can be tied together in an intellectually respectable way. These essays address a wide variety of topics, from theoretical and policy issues, such as the question of preventive war and the problem of international order, to more historical subjects—for example, American policy on Eastern Europe in 1945 and Franco-American relations during the Nixon–Pompidou period. But in each case, the aim is to show how a theoretical perspective can be brought to bear on the analysis of historical issues, and how historical analysis can shed light on basic conceptual problems.

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Regional Power ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Weak Institutions ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
International Stability ◽  
The World ◽  
Modern Era

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The book identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, the book offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. It then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the book shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. This book considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
Previous Scholarship ◽  
As If

This chapter provides a summary introduction to the book. It explains the central question the book addresses and why it is important. Namely, it asks why academic nuclear deterrence theory maintains that nuclear superiority does not matter, but policymakers often behave as if it does. It then provides a brief explanation of the answer to this question: the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. It discusses the implications of the argument for international relations theory and for US nuclear policy. In contrast to previous scholarship, the argument of this book provides the first coherent explanation for why nuclear superiority matters even if both sides possess a secure, second-strike capability. In so doing, it helps to resolve what may be the longest-standing, intractable, and important puzzle in the scholarly study of nuclear strategy. It concludes with a description of the plan for the rest of the book.

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Empirical Record

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”

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