The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”

Author(s):  
James Cameron

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.


Author(s):  
Alexey Arbatov

AbstractIn recent literature, much attention has been paid to factors that affect nuclear deterrence and stability from the outside: new missile defence systems, non-nuclear (conventional) high-precision long-range weapons, the influence of third and threshold nuclear states, space weapons, and—more recently—cyber threats. These new factors have pushed the core of nuclear deterrence—strategic relations between Russia and the United States—to the background in the public consciousness. Yet dangerous changes are taking place. This chapter examines the real and imaginary causes of the current situation and suggests potential ways to reduce tensions that could benefit international security. It concludes that nuclear deterrence can serve as a pillar of international security with one crucial reservation: namely, that it can only work in conjunction with negotiations and agreements on the limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without such checks, nuclear deterrence goes berserk. It endlessly fuels the arms race, brings the great powers to the brink of nuclear war in any serious crisis, and sometimes the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence can instigate a confrontation.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

The conclusion summarizes the argument of the book as a whole, pointing to the central importance of domestic public and congressional opinion since the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, and through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of Richard Nixon’s administration, in the formulation of US nuclear strategy, even when such opinion diverges fundamentally from the views of the president. This forces presidents into playing a double game in their attempt to reconcile their personal beliefs on nuclear weapons with public expectations. The chapter argues that this dilemma is common across U.S. national security policymaking, but is especially acute in the case of nuclear strategy because of its extremely abstract nature. The chapter concludes by showing how the double game between presidents and their publics played out for the rest of the Cold War. It then offers a tentative prediction regarding its resurgence as the United States’ global commitments come under new pressure from Russia and China.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Barry Cooper

Raymond Aron began his studies of postwar politics by taking into consideration the impact of the atomic bombing of Japan by the United States. As was true of many strategic thinkers after 1945, he was concerned that the new technology would alter the significance of warfare and thus of politics — because, as a student of Clausewitz, Aron was of the view that war and politics were intimately connected. This paper explores the evolution of Aron’s thinking from 1945 until the 1980s and the development and changes in nuclear strategy. Alone in France, and almost alone in Europe, Aron kept abreast of changes in American nuclear strategy and made some insightful, if commonsensical, analyses of the then secret strategic thinking of the Soviets as well as of the European NATO allies of the United States.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Michael Reisman

The United States military potential may be viewed in two interlocking dimensions. The first is nuclear deterrence: the maintenance of a posture designed to deter other states with nuclear military potential from nuclear adventures. The second is comprised of nuclear and more conventional capabilities, designed to communicate to the widest spectrum of adversaries a capacity and willingness to exercise coercion in different settings in order to protect vital national interests.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter develops a new theory of nuclear deterrence, the superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory. The theory brings together traditional arguments in the nuclear strategy literature about the advantages of nuclear superiority and combines them with nuclear brinkmanship theory to provide the first coherent theoretical explanation for why nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. It argues that military nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its effective resolve, and enhancing its bargaining position. On the other hand, states in an inferior strategic position face a relatively higher cost of nuclear war, are less willing to run risks in a crisis, and are more likely to back down early in a dispute. This chapter serves, therefore, as the theoretical and conceptual core for the first half of the book


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Rene Beres

This paper argues that current US nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war fighting. The proponents of this counterforce strategy claim it is necessary to make US deterrence more credible. The author rejects this claim and shows how US strategy actually degrades US security. Moreover, the author contends that it actually encourages nuclear war because it is based on a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions. After examining these assumptions in detail, the author proposes an alternative strategy for nuclear war avoidance and for improving the likelihood of nuclear disarmament. This strategy involves a comprehensive test ban treaty, joint renunciation of first use, and the establishment of new and more extensive nuclear weapon free zones.


2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Charles-Philippe David

There has been a tendency lately in the United States to talk about the breakdown of the domestic consensus on the purpose of American nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration policies have been largely responsible for the growing felt need by many to question the doctrine and plans underlining that strategy. Why did the erosion of the strategic consensus take place ? One explanation examined in this paper is that the U.S. government has appeared in its nuclear strategy to emphasize more and more counterforce and limited nuclear war plans as its nuclear weapons policy, and therefore has become increasingly receptive to the idea that atomic bombs can be treated like conventional weapons and thought in ways characteristic of the pronuclear world. The central purpose of this article is to analyze how those two phenomenons - the attractiveness of counterforce and the erosion of the strategic consensus - are related to one another. The evolution of the doctrine of counterforce is assessed through a survey of the literature from 1974 to 1984, and particularly from 1980 with the coming to power of the Reagan administration.


Author(s):  
Attarid Awadh Abdulhameed

Ukrainia Remains of huge importance to Russian Strategy because of its Strategic importance. For being a privileged Postion in new Eurasia, without its existence there would be no logical resons for eastward Expansion by European Powers.  As well as in Connection with the progress of Ukrainian is no less important for the USA (VSD, NDI, CIA, or pentagon) and the European Union with all organs, and this is announced by John Kerry. There has always ben Russian Fear and Fear of any move by NATO or USA in the area that it poses a threat to  Russians national Security and its independent role and in funence  on its forces especially the Navy Forces. There for, the Crisis manyement was not Zero sum game, there are gains and offset losses, but Russia does not accept this and want a Zero Sun game because the USA. And European exteance is a Foot hold in Regin Which Russian sees as a threat to its national security and want to monopolize control in the strategic Qirim.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
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Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


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