Hannah Arendt and Critical Theory: A Critical Response

1981 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 196-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Forester
2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-9
Author(s):  
Robyn Marasco

A reflection on Seyla Benhabib’s Exile, Statelessness, and Migration, with a particular focus on her reconstruction of early critical theory and the ‘Benjaminian moment’ that links Hannah Arendt to Theodor Adorno.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 73-105
Author(s):  
Michał Krzykawski

The article offers a new model of materialist philosophical critique (general technocritique or digital critique) as a critical response to new materialism(s). Drawing on the reinterpretation of the legacy of European philosophies and works by Bernard Stiegler, the article strives to elaborate authentically new theoretical account of matter, notably in relation to the techno-logical mode of its organisation. The critique of new materialism(s) is positioned within the unprecedented crisis of the theoretical model of knowledge. What it is possible to discover by the end of the second decade of the 21st century is that humanities scholars have not managed to confront the central issue for their viable future: the whole theoretical and methodological model, which has so far provided fuel for the contemporary humanities and shaped our social class, postcolonial, gender, queer and other sensibilities, is plunging into a deep epistemological crisis, for having lost its efficient and final cause. In a nutshell, the modelof “doing theory,” is no longer valid, inasmuch as “theory” strangely misrecognized the revolutionary developments in cybernetics, which occurred in the 1950s and radically changed the very nature of knowledge. Therefore, a new epistēmē has to be formed in this new digital condition. However, the formation of this new epistēmē requires for us to radically transform what is referred to as “theory” or “critical theory” and to take into account the developments in the sciences and technology (not necessarily in the methodological framework offered by what is defined as STS) in order to lay the foundations under a new critique of political economy in the hyper-material era.


Author(s):  
Steven Maloney

Hannah Arendt (b. 1906–d. 1975) was a singular political theorist and a voracious reader. Arendt’s works show traces of influence from a diverse cross-section of political writers. Her works are noted for their similarities to the civic republic tradition, existential philosophy, critical theory, and pragmatism, to name a few. Despite these influences, her work is difficult to pigeonhole into any single category. Her academic voice and theoretical positions also changed over time. Indeed, her work can be compared to that of a painter who composes sketches and studies to work out the contours of form and method before creating a major work. Arendt’s diverse “sketches and studies,” as well as the breadth of her references and influences, have resulted in divergent interpretations of her work from academics and readers alike.


1979 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard P. Heather ◽  
Matthew Stolz

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Johnson ◽  
Dana R. Villa

Theories of the public sphere, as standardly formulated, aim to specify the minimal, necessary conditions for a discursive realm free of coercion or manipulation. In his article in this Review in September 1992, Dana Villa urged us to reconsider this standard account. He argued that when read in light of postmodernist theory, Hannah Arendt provides the basis for a revised conception of the public sphere that privileges plurality and difference over consensus. Jim Johnson suggests that Villa's analysis is a thinly veiled polemic against critical theory. Johnson argues that, as critique, Villa's argument is neither decisive nor encompassing, and that as polemic it blinds Villa to potentially fruitful disagreements with critical theorists. Villa replies that Johnson misses the synthetic thrust of the original article because he identified public realm theory too narrowly with Habermas. Thus, he misconstrues the dialogue Villa sought to facilitate between Arendt and postmodernism.


Caderno CRH ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 020016
Author(s):  
Yara Adario Frateschi

<div class="trans-abstract"><p>A partir dos textos reunidos no livro <em>Situating the self: gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics</em> (1992), sabe-se que Seyla Benhabib responde aos excessos racionalistas de Habermas e aos limites da tradição universalista moderna com uma releitura da concepção arendtiana de “pensamento alargado”. Neste artigo, eu me proponho a mostrar que a presença de Arendt no pensamento de Benhabib é ainda mais radical do que parece à primeira vista, pois a autora de <em>A condição humana</em> está na raiz do seu projeto teórico orientando o enfrentamento filosófico que Benhabib faz com a tradição, na sua primeira grande obra, <em>Critique, norm, and utopia: a study of the foundations of Crítical theory</em> (1986). A minha hipótese interpretativa é a de que a tese central deste livro, segundo a qual a teoria crítica é assombrada pela filosofia do sujeito, carrega as marcas da crítica arendtiana à filosofia política ocidental.</p><p><strong>Palavras-Chave: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Seyla Benhabib; Filosofia do Sujeito; Filosofia Política; Pluralidade</p></div><div class="trans-abstract"><p class="sec"><span>SEYLA BENHABIB WITH HANNAH ARENDT AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUBJECT</span></p><p class="sec">ABSTRACT</p><p>From <em>Situating the self: gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics</em> (1992), we know that SeylaBenhabib answers Habermas’ excesses and the limits of the modern universalist tradition with a reinterpretation of the Arendtian conception of “enlarged thought”. In this article, I propose to show that Arendt’s presence in Benhabib’s thought is even more radical than it seems at first, because the author of The human condition is at the root of Benhabib’s theoretical project, guiding her in her philosophical confrontation with tradition at her first major work,<em>Critique, norm, and utopia: a study of the foundations of Crítical theory</em>(1986). My interpretive hypothesis is that the central thesis of this book, according to which Crítical theory is haunted by the philosophy of the subject, bears the marks of Arendt’s criticism to Western political philosophy.</p><p><strong>Key words: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Seyla Benhabib; Philosophy of the Subject; Political Philosophy; Plurality</p></div><div class="trans-abstract"><p class="sec"><span>SEYLA BENHABIB AVEC ARENDT CONTRE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU SUJET</span></p><p class="sec">ABSTRACT</p><p>A partir des textes rassemblés dans le livre Situating the self: gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics (1992), on sait que Seyla Benhabib répond aux excès rationalistes d’Habermas et aux limites de la tradition universaliste moderne par une réinterprétation de la conception arendtienne du «mentalité élargie». Dans cet article, je propose de montrer que la présence d’Arendt dans la pensée de Benhabib est encore plus radicale qu’il n’y paraît au premier abord, car Arendt est à l’origine de son projet théorique guidant la confrontation philosophique que Benhabib fait avec tradition, dans son premier grand ouvrage, Critique, norm, and utopia: a study of the foundations of crítical theory (1986). Mon hypothèse interprétative est que la thèse centrale de ce livre, selon laquelle la théorie critique est hantée par la philosophie du sujet, porte les marques de la critique arendtienne de la philosophie politique occidentale.</p><p><strong>Key words: </strong>Hannah Arendt; Seyla Benhabib; Philosophie du sujet; Philosophie politique; Pluralité</p></div>


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 178-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nolen Gertz ◽  

In this paper I argue that while Feenberg’s critical constructivism can help us to see the political potential of technologies, it cannot help us to understand the political actuality of technologies without the help of postphenomenology. In part 2, I examine Feenberg’s attempt to merge Frankfurt School critical theory and SCOT into “critical constructivism.” In part 3, I focus on Feenberg’s analyses of the internet in order to highlight a blind spot in critical constructivism when it comes to threats to democracy that come from out of the demos itself. In part 4, I show how critical constructivism would benefit from adopting the theory of technological mediation found in postphenomenology by presenting a postphenomenological investigation of trolling and other forms of destructive behavior unaccounted for by Feenberg’s investigation of the internet. In part 5, I conclude by turning to the work of Hannah Arendt in order to show why, just as critical constructivism could benefit from becoming more postphenomenological, postphenomenology could benefit from becoming more critical.


One of the crucial issues of modern universalistic theories of practical philosophy is the theoretical justification of normative principles and moral judgments that enables their universal validity. The problems these theories face are caused by separating rational theorizing from contexts of real life. That is the separation of theoretical justification and practice. The common for modern practical philosophy opposition between universalism and contextualism is reinterpreted today, new theories of post-metaphysical universalism appear that provide the developments of the last universalistic project of discourse ethics in the context of a critical theory of the “third generation”. The purpose of this article is to present the ethical philosophy of Hannah Arendt as the original conception where the Kantian theory of judgment and the Aristotelian notion of phronesis are brought together in order to clarify the nature of ethical and moral statements. This problem, as the article highlights, lies in the understanding of subsumption of particular under universal. Universal judgments according to Arendt are justified in the Kantian theory of “enlarged mentality” as the human capacity to interact in communication and activity. The sensitivity to situations is reflected in the Aristotelian notion of phronesis. As Arendt’s justification of normative and ethical judgments is analyzed, the hermeneutic character of her theory is revealed, which is appropriate for the theory of J. Habermas and modern followers of critical theory. The article provides additional insight into the concept of “public space” as the realm which enables the overlapping of theory and practice. As proved the “public space” in the practical philosophy of Hannah Arendt becomes the realm of mutual ethical and moral thinking where judgments are oriented to the level of the human condition in general. The paper concludes by arguing that Arendt’s conception may overcome the opposition between universalism and contextualism, which is relevant in current ethical discourse.


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