The Currency Exchange Rate Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund

1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 722-762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Edwards

A comprehensive amendment to the constitutional instrument of the International Monetary Fund has been submitted to the 128 member states of that organization for their acceptance in order that it may enter into force. The “Proposed Second Amendment” to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund was approved by the IMF’s Board of Governors on April 30, 1976. In the United States and many other countries the amendment will, in accordance with internal law, be submitted to appropriate legislative bodies for consent to acceptance.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Heng Sheng ◽  
Mohd Saifullah Rusiman ◽  
Norziha Che Him ◽  
Suliadi Firdaus Sufahani ◽  
Efendi Nasibov

2012 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57
Author(s):  
Ho-Don Yan ◽  
Cheng-Lang Yang

Whether an undervalued currency is an attainable industrial policy for developing countries? sustained development has recently invoked many discussions. This paper studies the case of Taiwan after first determining the misalignment of Taiwan?s currency by estimating the fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate. Three sub-periods for Taiwan?s currency exchange rate misalignment are identified: undervaluation in the periods 1981-1986 and 1998- 2008 and overvaluation during 1987-1997. Second, we use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to examine the Granger causality between exchange rate misalignment and GDP, by incorporating export and investment variables. The evidence shows that exchange rate misalignment does Granger cause GDP and it mainly comes from the third sub-period when the Taiwan dollar was undervalued. From past experience and the current economic doldrums of the last resort of global exports - the United States - currency undervaluation is not a validated strategy upon which emerging markets can wishfully impinge.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-125

The annual joint meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was held in Washington from September 10 to 14, 1951, concurrently with the annual meetings of the Governors of the individual bodies. The Czechoslovakian Governor proposed at the opening meeting that delegates from the People's Republic of China be substituted (in all Fund, Bank and Joint machinery) for the delegates from the “Kuomintang group”. No action, however, was taken on the “expulsion” resolution. At the closing joint session, on September 14, the Governors disposed of the remainder of the substantive work of the Joint Procedures Committee by agreeing that: 1) the seventh annual meeting of the joint Boards of Governors be held in Mexico City in the first half of September, 1952; 2) the Governor for Brazil be chairman for the joint Board of Governors for the ensuing year, while the Governors for China, France, India, the United Kingdom and the United States be vice-chairmen; 3) the composition of the Joint Procedures Committee for the ensuing year be the Governors for Brazil (chairman), Australia (vice-chairman), Lebanon (reporting member), and China, Finland, France, India, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.


2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (03) ◽  
pp. 285-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHONG-YAH LIM

The article analyzes the limits of the IMF as a global multilateral economic agency to handle serious balance of payments disequilibria. Capital control and growth rates in developing Asia and the twin deficit problem of the United States are also discussed. It also assesses the probability of the reemergence of an exchange rate crisis in Southeast Asia and the wisdom of having an Asian IMF.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  

This volume is the Forty-First Issue of Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF. It includes decisions, interpretations, and resolutions of the Executive Board and the Board of Governors of the IMF, as well as selected documents, to which frequent reference is made in the current activities of the IMF. In addition, it includes certain documents relating to the IMF, the United Nations, and other international organizations. As with other recent issues, the number of decisions in force continues to increase, with the decision format tending to be longer given the use of summings up in lieu of formal decisions. Accordingly, it has become necessary to delete certain decisions that were included in earlier issues, that is, those that only completed or called for reviews of decisions, those that lapsed, and those that were superseded by more recent decisions. Wherever reference is made in these decisions and documents to a provision of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement or Rules and Regulations that has subsequently been renumbered by, or because of, the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement (effective April 1, 1978), the corresponding provision currently in effect is cited in a footnote.


2019 ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

Removal of jobs from one country to another to exploit lower paid workers tends to raise objections from those whose jobs are removed. However, historically, such jobs have tended to be low-wage, low-skill jobs, and the people holding them have typically not been able to mount effective resistance. Recently, highly skilled, highly paid IT jobs have begun to be exported from the United States, and although some of the questions raised are the same as for the earlier low-wage jobs, there are some different considerations. What are the relevant ethical considerations involved in exporting jobs to exploit lower wages? In certain circumstances, there seems to be nothing wrong with this practice. If, for example, the currency exchange rate makes work done in the U.S. cheaper than work done in France, but otherwise the standards of living of the workers in the two countries are comparable, it is hardto see an ethical issue here. This seems to be a form of arbitrage on labor prices. “Arbitrage” is defined as buying the currently relatively low-priced commodity and selling the currently relatively high-priced commodity in the expectation that the market will correct one or both prices. In liquid markets, it serves a scavenger function to even out price disparities. For example, New York-London gold arbitrage is a recognized function performed by some firms. They buy the cheaper gold and sell it into the more expensive market. The net effect is to reduce or eliminate price disparities. It is a sort of benign communication function in a market economy, helping to even out prices consistently throughout markets. Although offshoring has some of the features of arbitrage, it does not seem to have all the relevant features that make arbitrage a benign, healthy function of a market economy. The most important difference is that the “commodity” subject to arbitrage in offshoring is labor. In a true arbitrage situation, the commodity’s location does not change the nature of the commodity, and this is why price differences in gold are simply fluctuations due to market functioning. But it makes a big difference where labor is located. The whole point of offshoring jobs is precisely that we don’t want to move laborers from India or China to the United States, because then we would have to pay them prevailing U.S. wages. For offshoring to work, we must take advantage of a social context with prevailing lower wages. Offshoring is in fact a new ethical problem brought about by the availability-at-any-location feature of information technology. By the use of IT, we can take advantage of social contexts with prevailing lower wages when the relevant features of the job can be performed great distances away.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-593
Author(s):  
Aike I. Würdemann

Abstract In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1850206
Author(s):  
Kati Suominen

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), only a few years ago fading into obscurity in the thriving world economy, made a comeback during the 2008-2009 crisis. The G-20 re-tasked the Fund and tripled its lending capacity. Notwithstanding its new windfall and duties, the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness are in doubt. The main challenges center on disagreements between the Western European nations and emerging markets over the Fund’s governance and focus, a specter of disintegration of the global crisis management architecture by way of bilateral and regional financial arrangements (particularly in Asia), and limitations to the Fund’s responsiveness to major crises. Yet the threat of global financial instability persists, and the Fund is uniquely qualified to counter it. The United States, the Fund’s founder and main shareholder, has sponsored sound reforms to the Fund in the context of the G-20. However, farther-reaching paradigmatic changes are required for the Fund to effectively manage global economic instability in the 21st century: focusing the Fund’s analytical powers squarely on systemic risks and largest economies rather than on small, developing nations; turning the Fund from a crisis firefighter into a global preventive care unit that rewards members for sound policies; and making the Fund a bridge between public and private insurance markets.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 616-621 ◽  

The Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held its eighteenth annual meeting in Washington, D.C., from September 30 through October 4, 1963, under the chairmanship of Mr. Emilio Colombo, Governor for Italy. Introducing the annual report, Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, the new Chairman of the Executive Board and Managing Director of the Fund, welcomed the governors of the twenty member countries which had joined the Fund since the last annual meeting: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, and Upper Volta. With the addition of these new members the Fund had a total membership of 102. Mr. Schweitzer commented that in the fiscal year ended in April 1963 eighteen countries had purchased the equivalent of $580 million from the Fund and the equivalent of $807 million had been received in repurchases. Both purchases and repurchases were less than in the previous fiscal year when the United Kingdom had made a very large drawing. The Fund had also made stand-by arrangements with twenty countries under which $1.8 billion was available, including the recently renewed stand-by arrangement of $1.0 billion with the United Kingdom and the $500 million stand-by arrangement with the United States.


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