Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 516-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burns H. Weston

In his recent book The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Thomas Franck defines “legitimacy” as it applies to the rules applicable among states. “Legitimacy,” he writes, “is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.In adopting Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, implicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq in response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council made light of fundamental UN Charter precepts and thereby flirted precariously with “generally accepted principles of right process.” It eschewed direct UN responsibility and accountability for the military force that ultimately was deployed, favoring, instead, a delegated, essentially unilateralist determination and orchestration of world policy, coordinated and controlled almost exclusively by the United States. And, in so doing, it encouraged a too-hasty retreat from the preeminently peaceful and humanitarian purposes and principles of the United Nations. As a consequence, it set a dubious precedent, both for the United Nations as it stands today and for the “new world order” that is claimed for tomorrow.

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-195
Author(s):  
Michael D. Rosenthal

For many years, the United Nations Security Council expressed its concerns about the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program, doing so in the context of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. With the intent to resolve its concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The Resolution endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that had been concluded on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Iran (the E3/EU + 3). Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA are closely intertwined. Their implementation will result in strict limits on Iran’s ability to produce weapongrade nuclear material. On-site verification and monitoring of these limits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will provide assurance that Iran is observing them. Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA also provide for a step-by-step removal of sanctions imposed on Iran for its past failure to resolve concerns about its nuclear program. Past concerns about “possible military dimensions” to Iran’s nuclear program, while neither misplaced nor necessarily fully assuaged, were put aside, being outweighed by the prospect that the JCPOA offers, “a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”


Author(s):  
André Luiz Reis da Silva ◽  
Gabriela Dorneles Ferreira da Costa

This research aims to compare the strategic interests and the positioning at the foreign policy level of Brazil and Turkey in the 21st century, considering the rise to power of, respectively, Workers’ Party (PT, in Portuguese) and Justice and Development’s Party (AKP, in Turkish). Methodologically, it was used bibliographical research and analysis of speeches in the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 2010 and 2015. It was verified convergence between Brazil and Turkey in themes as the acknowledgment of the multipolarity of the World Order, the necessity of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform, the importance of the fortification of the global economic governance by G-20 and the compromise with the International Law, with the terrorism combat and with the Humans Right protections. As divergence point, it was verified the debates about the sort of reform to be implemented at the UNSC and some questions involving the Arab Spring, such as the military intervention at Libya in 2011. At last, some themes are more recurrent at one country’s foreign policy than another’s; as topics regarding Central Asia and Middle East, at Turkey’s case, and subjects regarding BRICS and south-american regional integration, at Brazil’s case.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kate Breach

<p>To win its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in both 1993-94 and 2015-16, New Zealand campaigned using the same prime pillar; its ability to act independently on the world’s prime authority for maintenance of international peace and security. With the substantial change in New Zealand’s international relationships between the two UNSC tenures, most particularly with the United States of America and China, many commentators have questioned whether New Zealand still acts independently in international affairs. Employing analytic eclecticism, this thesis applied a combined analytical framework to assess the drive behind New Zealand’s actions during both its 1993-94 and 2015-16 UNSC tenures, allowing both traditional international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the constructivist lens of national identity to be combined for greater explanatory power for the state’s actions in the contemporary era of complex international interdependencies. This research determined that most of New Zealand’s actions aligned with pursuit of its interests, as a small state, as ensured through multilateralism under the lens of institutional neo-liberalism. However, a number of actions taken, and strong positions held, by New Zealand on the UNSC in both periods did not align with the state’s pursuit of material interests under traditional international relations theories. By first establishing the popularly internalised national identity characteristics (or content) during each UNSC tenure period, defined as residing in public opinion, this thesis argues that a ‘win-set’ of national identity content relative prioritisation during each period enabled, and arguably drove, New Zealand’s political elite to take actions or hold positions not aligned with those of powerful states on which the small country’s material interests depended. It is argued that New Zealand’s actions on the UNSC in 2015-16 reinforced the social construction of New Zealand’s internationally regarded national identity content as an independent advocate for the global good, which was strongly established during its 1993-94 tenure.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kate Breach

<p>To win its seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in both 1993-94 and 2015-16, New Zealand campaigned using the same prime pillar; its ability to act independently on the world’s prime authority for maintenance of international peace and security. With the substantial change in New Zealand’s international relationships between the two UNSC tenures, most particularly with the United States of America and China, many commentators have questioned whether New Zealand still acts independently in international affairs. Employing analytic eclecticism, this thesis applied a combined analytical framework to assess the drive behind New Zealand’s actions during both its 1993-94 and 2015-16 UNSC tenures, allowing both traditional international relations theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism and the constructivist lens of national identity to be combined for greater explanatory power for the state’s actions in the contemporary era of complex international interdependencies. This research determined that most of New Zealand’s actions aligned with pursuit of its interests, as a small state, as ensured through multilateralism under the lens of institutional neo-liberalism. However, a number of actions taken, and strong positions held, by New Zealand on the UNSC in both periods did not align with the state’s pursuit of material interests under traditional international relations theories. By first establishing the popularly internalised national identity characteristics (or content) during each UNSC tenure period, defined as residing in public opinion, this thesis argues that a ‘win-set’ of national identity content relative prioritisation during each period enabled, and arguably drove, New Zealand’s political elite to take actions or hold positions not aligned with those of powerful states on which the small country’s material interests depended. It is argued that New Zealand’s actions on the UNSC in 2015-16 reinforced the social construction of New Zealand’s internationally regarded national identity content as an independent advocate for the global good, which was strongly established during its 1993-94 tenure.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110294
Author(s):  
Francesco Petrone

This article analyses the role played by the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries within the context of the reform of international institutions, in primis the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In recent years, the new emerging powers, among which the BRICS occupy a central position, have instigated a paradigm shift in international relations and global governance (GG). Furthermore, some scholars argue that the BRICS could inaugurate a new world order. Since the United Nations (UN) is one of the institutions in which these changes need to be more broadly reflected due to its global projection, it is doubtful if the BRICS will be able to bring about its reform. In fact, several debates were conducted about the need to reform the UN and, in particular, the Security Council (SC). In order to do this, the article examines the interests of the BRICS countries, within the group itself, and their vision for the UNSC. Only a common vision within the group could have specific effects in reforming the UNSC, thus giving a new shape to GG, which may not be possible. There are several obstacles from within the BRICS itself in this regard, despite the fact that during their summits, they have repeatedly called for the UN reforms.


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