Decision-Making and Social Influence: A Revised Model and Further Experimental Evidence

Sociometry ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santo F. Camilleri ◽  
Thomas L. Conner
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Bogert ◽  
Aaron Schecter ◽  
Richard T. Watson

AbstractAlgorithms have begun to encroach on tasks traditionally reserved for human judgment and are increasingly capable of performing well in novel, difficult tasks. At the same time, social influence, through social media, online reviews, or personal networks, is one of the most potent forces affecting individual decision-making. In three preregistered online experiments, we found that people rely more on algorithmic advice relative to social influence as tasks become more difficult. All three experiments focused on an intellective task with a correct answer and found that subjects relied more on algorithmic advice as difficulty increased. This effect persisted even after controlling for the quality of the advice, the numeracy and accuracy of the subjects, and whether subjects were exposed to only one source of advice, or both sources. Subjects also tended to more strongly disregard inaccurate advice labeled as algorithmic compared to equally inaccurate advice labeled as coming from a crowd of peers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110336
Author(s):  
Lucie Vrbová ◽  
Kateřina Jiřinová ◽  
Karel Helman ◽  
Hana Lorencová

Informal reasoning fallacies belong to a persuasive tactic, leading to a conclusion that is not supported by premises but reached through emotions and/or misleading and incomplete information. Previous research focused on the ability to recognize informal reasoning fallacies. However, the recognition itself does not necessarily mean immunity to their influence on decisions made. An experiment was designed to study the relationship between the presence of informal reasoning fallacies and a consequent decision. Having conducted paired comparisons of distributions, we have found some support for the hypothesis that informal reasoning fallacies affect decision-making more substantially than non-fallacious reasoning—strong support in the case of a slippery slope, weak in that of appeal to fear, anecdotal evidence argument defying evaluation. Numeracy and cognitive reflection seem to be associated with higher resistance to the slippery slope, but do not diminish appeal to fear.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
Craig J. Bryan

This chapter argues that suicide can be more usefully understood as a consequence of decision-making processes that are vulnerable to environmental and social influence rather than a consequence of internal states or traits such as mental illness. Mental illness and emotional distress more generally are better understood as one particular context within which the decision to make a suicide attempt or not often presents itself, but this does not mean that mental illness is the only context within which this choice is considered. This also does not mean that mental illness causes suicide. The basic concept involved in the marshmallow experiment—decision-making under different conditions—has received increased attention in the past decade among suicide researchers. Studies reveal that the decision-making process of someone who almost died as a result of a suicide attempt was no different from the decision-making process of someone who had never attempted suicide, was not currently suicidal, and did not have a mental illness. This finding lines up with the idea that there can be multiple pathways to suicide.


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