Political Finance in TransitionFinancing the 1976 Election. By Herbert E. Alexander Political Finance. By Herbert E. Alexander Public Financing of Congressional Campaigns. By American Enterprise InstituteMoney in Congressional Elections. By Gary C. Jacobson Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws. By Michael J. Malbin

Polity ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-331
Author(s):  
David Adamany
2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel W. Johnson

Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates’ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional electoral system makes most competitive contests relevant only to the intra-coalitional balance of power. This account implies that political finance is as much a function of political systems and the supply of contributions as it is candidates’ demand for funds, and motivates several hypotheses about campaign finance in Chile. Among others, the analysis confirms that incumbents and challengers compete on a level playing field, spending similar amounts of campaign finance. The paper also illustrates that incumbents and challengers fare equally well in Chile's “secret” donation system.


The Forum ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond J. La Raja

AbstractThe campaign finance system has fragmented campaign activity in response to rules that are unworkable in a strong party system. The 2014 congressional elections illustrate how party coalitions have adapted to practices that enable them to raise and spend money outside this formal regulatory framework. For several election cycles, partisan interest groups have used outside campaign organizations to circumvent rules that constrain candidate and party committees. The 2014 elections illustrate how party leaders in Congress and these candidates have now embraced the outside campaign strategy to wrest some control from other elements of the party. Recent changes to campaign finance rules may shift additional money toward traditional committees, but outside groups like Super PACs are now established features of US political campaigns.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 628-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Coate

This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen.The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.


2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT ASHWORTH

Two candidates compete for elective office. Each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters, but this requires costly advertising. The candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising. These contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors, should the candidate win the election. Voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best, taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests. There is an incumbency advantage in fundraising, which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all. Introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system, while it can reduce welfare in other districts. The optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo

The vast majority of papers written about interest groups' political influence focuses on the role of money in politics. Business and interest groups' participation in campaign finance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the recent congressional moves to reform campaign finance laws, campaign finance studies have received a prominent position in public discourse.


2000 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Gilligan

Campaign finance reform is the subject of ongoing public policy debates in many modern democratic societies. In the United States, individuals and interest groups from across the ideological spectrum have proposed or embraced a variety of campaign finance reforms in attempts to alter the electoral landscape. At least one recent presidential candidate highlighted the issue of campaign finance reform which appear to resonate with voters, as part of a broader strategy to secure his party's nomination. Many of these reforms propose to alter the sources and uses of financial resources in Congressional elections.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Berry

The relationships between interest groups, political parties, and elections have always been dynamic, but in recent years change has accelerated in ways that have favored some interests over others. This chapter considers these developments as the result of a variety of factors, the most critical of which are the growth of polarization, a new legal landscape for campaign finance, and new organizational forms. The chapter goes on to suggest, that as bipartisanship has ebbed, elections have become winner-take-all affairs and interest groups are pushed to choose sides. The chapter further suggests that the rise of super PACs is especially notable as wealthy individuals have become increasingly important, single sources of campaign money, supplanting in part traditional interest groups, especially conventional PACs. It concludes that even as sums spent by super PACs and other interest groups have skyrocketed, the impact of their direct spending on persuading voters remains uncertain.


1987 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 14-15
Author(s):  
Clyde Wilcox

Many Political Science courses include sections on campaign finance activity. Courses on Congress and on the Presidency may include sections on the financing of elections for these offices, and courses on campaigns and elections will probably cover campaign finance. In addition, courses on interest groups and on parties may include sections that focus on the activities of these actors in financing campaigns for public office.The Federal Election Commission can provide an assortment of materials that may be useful in teaching about campaign finance. Some of these materials are most useful as sources of data for lecture preparation, while other offerings can be used as part of student projects or papers. In the sections below, these materials will be described, and some classroom uses will be suggested.


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