Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 628-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Coate
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
Finance Policy ◽  
Pareto Improving ◽  
Campaign Advertising ◽  
Contribution Limits

This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen.The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.

Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The Public ◽  
Degree Of Separation ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Increasing Function ◽  
The Ideal

I present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies. Informed voters, however, vote based on those policies, so candidates face a trade-off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote. Electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies: particularistic and collective. In the case of particularistic policies, the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high, and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion. The model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages. For the case of collective policies, the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters, and contributions are zero.

Campaign Finance

2019 ◽  
pp. 414-432
Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Contentious Issue ◽  
History Of ◽  
Campaign Expenditures ◽  
Money In Politics

The role of money in politics has long been a contentious issue. Over the last decade the amount of money given in contributions to political campaigns has grown substantially. This chapter provides an overview of both theoretical and empirical studies and the scholarly literature that has emerged on this topic over the last forty years. Further, the chapter describes the history of US campaign finance laws. Then, it documents what has been learned from the several literatures that have emerged on campaign expenditures, campaign contributions, and campaign finance regulations. This chapter also suggests shortcomings in the current literature and points to potential avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT ASHWORTH
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Public Financing ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Decentralized System ◽  
Elective Office

Two candidates compete for elective office. Each candidate has information she would like to reveal to the voters, but this requires costly advertising. The candidates can solicit contributions from interest groups to finance such advertising. These contributions are secured by promises to perform favors for the contributors, should the candidate win the election. Voters understand this and elect the candidate they like best, taking into account their expectations about promises to special interests. There is an incumbency advantage in fundraising, which is sometimes so great that the incumbent faces no serious opposition at all. Introducing partial public financing through matching funds improves voter welfare in districts that have advertising under the decentralized system, while it can reduce welfare in other districts. The optimal policy must strike a balance between these two effects.

scholarly journals Lobbying and Information in Politics

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. de Figueiredo
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Public Discourse ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Soft Money ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Campaign Finance Laws ◽  
Money In Politics

The vast majority of papers written about interest groups' political influence focuses on the role of money in politics. Business and interest groups' participation in campaign finance, in the form of hard and soft money, has been the subject of hundreds of theoretical and empirical studies. Moreover, with the recent congressional moves to reform campaign finance laws, campaign finance studies have received a prominent position in public discourse.

Interest Groups and Elections

2019 ◽  
pp. 339-357
Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Berry
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Campaign Finance ◽  
Organizational Forms ◽  
Super Pacs ◽  
New Organizational Forms ◽  
Winner Take All ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Take All

The relationships between interest groups, political parties, and elections have always been dynamic, but in recent years change has accelerated in ways that have favored some interests over others. This chapter considers these developments as the result of a variety of factors, the most critical of which are the growth of polarization, a new legal landscape for campaign finance, and new organizational forms. The chapter goes on to suggest, that as bipartisanship has ebbed, elections have become winner-take-all affairs and interest groups are pushed to choose sides. The chapter further suggests that the rise of super PACs is especially notable as wealthy individuals have become increasingly important, single sources of campaign money, supplanting in part traditional interest groups, especially conventional PACs. It concludes that even as sums spent by super PACs and other interest groups have skyrocketed, the impact of their direct spending on persuading voters remains uncertain.

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