Homeric Gods and the Values of Homeric Society

1972 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. H. Adkins

A recent article has observed, with particular reference to the Homeric poems, that ‘divine intervention <cannot> be simply removed from the poems to leave a kernel of sociological truths’. I agree; though I should interpret the words in a manner different from their author. I shall endeavour to show in this article that not merely divine intervention, but divine behaviour as a whole in the Homeric poems, is governed by the same values as human behaviour in the poems; so that the ‘sociological truths’—or whatever they should be termed—can encompass divine as well as human behaviour in Homer. Nor, it seems to me, is this even prima facie surprising. True, the conversations on Olympus recorded in Homer are in one sense entirely free composition, since no bard in the tradition had ever met an Olympian or attended an assembly of the gods. But the bards lived in a society which—like later Greek societies that we are better able to observe—believed itself able to discern the hand of gods in the events which befell it or its several members; which, not surprisingly, attributed pleasant events to the favour of its gods, unpleasant events to the anger of its gods; enquired why the god or gods concerned was pleased or angry; and ascribed reasons for divine pleasure or anger analogous to those for which a powerful human being in the society might have been expected to become pleased or angry.


2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Spital

In their recent article, Glannon and Ross remind us that family members have obligations to help each other that strangers do not have. They argue, I believe correctly, that what creates moral obligations within families is not genetic relationship but rather a sharing of intimacy. For no one are these obligations stronger than they are for parents of young children. This observation leads the authors to the logical conclusion that organ donation by a parent to her child is not optional but rather a prima facie duty. However, Glannon and Ross go a step further by suggesting that because parent-to-child organ donation is a duty, it cannot be altruistic. They assert that “altruistic acts are optional, nonobligatory…supererogatory…. Given that altruism consists in purely optional actions presupposing no duty to aid others, any parental act that counts as meeting a child's needs cannot be altruistic.” Here I think the authors go too far.



1998 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Tollefsen

In a recent article Thomas May has argued that the use of advance directives (ADs) to respect a no longer competent patient's autonomy is a failed strategy. Respect for patient autonomy is clearly one of the guiding moral principles of modern medicine, and its importance is reflected in medical emphasis on informed consent. Prima facie, at least, ADs seem likewise to respect patient autonomy by allowing patients to make decisions about treatment in advance of situations in which the patient may no longer be able to specify the form of treatment desired. So a claim that ADs do not extend patient autonomy to these situations of diminished competence represents a serious criticism of our understanding not only of advance directives, but of autonomy as well.



1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. G. Brown

In a recent article (1972) I gave reasons for attributing to Mill a restricted view of the demands of morality, according to which no conduct would be prima facie wrong unless it was harmful to others. This interpretation of Mill raises the problem of reconciling such a view of morality with the principle which Mill calls the Principle of Utility. I tried to show that a reconciliation was possible by invoking the reminder, for which we are indebted to Alan Ryan (1965, 1970) and D. P. Dryer (1969), that Mill conceived of the Principle of Utility as a very abstract principle, and said that it governed not just morality but the whole of the Art of Life. I concluded that, whatever the subject matter of Mill's Principle of Utility might be, it was not the rightness and wrongness of actions.



1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-414
Author(s):  
P. H. Tanner

The practice of safety can be treated as the operation of a system with which it is intended to control the level of some parameter ‘risk’. The following is an attempt at a description of the behaviour of a population of individuals engaged in a risky occupation in terms of such a system. In the first section the casualty figures for commercial airline operations are analysed to show that there is a prima facie case for a belief that in this case risk level is regulated by those immediately engaged in the industry. The second section contains a description of a proposed ‘input/output’ model of an individual regulating his own risk, and preliminary results are given for a simulated population of aircraft operators having these characteristics. Lastly, the credibility of the model in terms of known human behaviour is examined, some tentative conclusions are drawn and an indication is given of its proposed use and development.



Author(s):  
Smitarani Satpathy ◽  
◽  
Dr. Srikanta Patnaik ◽  

The paper contains the simple idea of Artificial Intelligence on social media and human behaviour. The major concern of this paper is to show the changing behaviour of human being and Artificial Intelligence usefulness in human life as well as social media. Social media popularity came into high during the last decade due to smart technologies used in mobile and internet. In last 10 years research on AI shows its impact on human life as well as in media marketing.



2016 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-206
Author(s):  
Juraj Dolník

Abstract This paper is intended to be a contribution to research of communication formations that are shaped by systematic communication. The approach of the author is based on the idea that the human being has a gift for making signs and people make use of this property if they are adapting to a situation of recurrent coexistence. This property enables the participants of such a situation to create social signs with the structure sociolect as the form of the sign: the semantic interpretation of this form as the meaning of the sign. One way of analysing this meaning is by looking at the foundation of the motivation of animal and human behaviour. The author argues that this meaning is based on a feeling of safety and the participants of potential communication formations follow the principle of coordination in order to sustain this feeling and to introduce the state of communication comfort.



Dialogue ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 661-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles B. Daniels

In a recent article, Don Marquis canvasses the arguments on both sides of the abortion controversy and then puts forward his own argument against abortion:A. To deprive someone of the value of his or her future is prima facie wrong.B. The future an adult has is included in the future of the fetus it developed from.C. Abortion deprives the fetus of the value of its future.D. Therefore, abortion is prima facie wrong.I wish to show that this reasoning in no way settles the issue of whether abortion is wrong. Section 1 concerns premise B, Sections 2 and 3 C, and Section 4 A.Notes



Dialogue ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-223
Author(s):  
Charles B. Daniels

In a recent article “Abortion and Simple Consciousness' (Journal of Philosophy, V. LXXIV, N. 3, pp. 159–172), Werner S. Pluhar puts forward the following view:A few words of explanation are in order. The reasoning can, I think, be summed up as follows: If one thinks that being conscious is what gives beings rights (and this seems to be a fairly common idea), then what justifies preferential treatment for humans as opposed to sentient members of other species? The fact, or so the answer goes, that humans have a higher degree of consciousness than do members of other species. But human fetuses do not have a higher degree of consciousness than, say, adult dogs. What justifies preferential treatment of human fetuses as opposed to adult dogs? The fact that human fetuses have a higher potential for reaching a higher degree of consciousness than do adult dogs. The liberal who holds that future generations have rights, e.g., to a healthy environment, thereby holds that merely potentially conscious beings have rights. If we have a right to life, then future generations also have that right. But fetuses are no less potentially conscious beings than unconceived future generations. So even a liberal must concede that if we have a right to life, fetuses have a right to life, and that it is at least prima facie wrong to destroy them by abortion.



1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel E. Palmer

Abstract:This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not as strong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian and deontological. First, I show that utilitarian considerations clearly favor the stakeholder theory. I then argue that though Hasnas rightly accents the basic deontological constraint at the core of the stockholder theory, he is wrong to think that acknowledging such a constraint necessarily counts against the stakeholder theory. Here, I develop Ross’s notion of prima facie obligations to show how a viable stakeholder theory might be developed within a deontological framework.



TEM Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1769-1774
Author(s):  
Nur Huda Jaafar ◽  
Azhana Ahmad ◽  
Mohd Sharifuddin Ahmad ◽  
Nurzeatul Hamimah Abd Hamid

Software agent is autonomous technology that helps a lot the human being in performing the task. The capability of agent to take actions on behalf of human is one of the reasons why researchers or developers of autonomous systems adapt the human characteristics either in the form of physical or behaviours. Sincerity is one of ethical human behaviour that can be instilled in software agent environment system. To instil the ethical behaviour such as sincerity, the belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture should be designed. This paper explains the BDI architecture for sincere software agent environment system during performing task.



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