Bill Griffiths, An Introduction to Early English Law: The Law-Codes of Ethelbert of Kent, Alfred the Great, and the Short Codes from the Reigns of Edmund and Ethelred the Unready, Norfolk, England: Anglo-Saxon Books, 1995. Pp. 90. $12.95 (ISBN 1-898281-14-9). [Available in the United States from Paul & Col, c/o PCS Data Processing, Inc., 360 W. 31 St., New York, NY 10001.]

1998 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-175
Author(s):  
William Pencak
Author(s):  
Scorey David ◽  
Geddes Richard ◽  
Harris Chris

This chapter first discusses the law of misrepresentation and nondisclosure as it has developed in New York, since the law of that state is designated in the majority of Bermuda Form policies as governing the resolution of ‘any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or related to the Policy’, which would clearly include a dispute about alleged misrepresentation in its procurement. The second part discusses English law. This is relevant for a number of reasons. It is not at all uncommon that the version of the Bermuda Form in play in respect of a given dispute will expressly adopt the law of England and Wales as controlling. This is often the case where the policy is issued to a multinational corporation whose management and headquarters are not located in the United States, or where the policy is not issued by an insurer resident in Bermuda.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Ngambu Wanki

In this article, I attempt to establish the need for the convergence of the spirit of the law—the Preamble—and the letter of the law—the provisions of the Constitution of Cameroon contained in its articles. First, I adduce prototypes or archetypes of ‘Jacobin constitutionalism’ and Anglo-Saxon-style constitutionalism as benchmarks through which I evaluate the extent to which the spirit and letter of the law of the Constitution of Cameroon have been converged. Having established the incongruence of the Preamble with these prototypes, I have referred to the Constitution of post-apartheid South Africa as a fitting paradigm that entrenches modern constitutionalism against which the Preamble to the Cameroon Constitution can be compared, revisited and revised. South Africa has been selected based on the view that, as another African country, it would serve as a more appropriate benchmark for reviewing the Preamble to the Cameroon Constitution than those of the United States, France or other Western nations, which might result instead in a skewed logic. Also, both countries have similar legal systems and historical experiences. A juxtaposition of the two constitutional preambles vividly exposes the lapses in the Cameroon example. As a result, I have suggested that the Cameroon Constitution be amended for the purposes of reviewing its Preamble to bring it into line with the conventional requirements of democratic preambles and to transform the formal demands of the Preamble as tangible demands placed on a government through entrenched provisions. Reasons have been advanced in support of the necessity for including preambulatory clauses in a constitution without which the intent of the constitution per se would be deferred.


1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-161
Author(s):  
C F Guarino ◽  
S Townsend

A review of legislation and implementing regulations pertaining to disposal of sludge at sea in the United States was performed. The experiences under the law of two major municipalities that have employed diposal at sea were studied and compared. Major changes are shown to have taken place in the Federal approach to regulating ocean disposal. Ocean dumping regulations are shown to have produced very different current situations for two major municipalities. The City of Philadelphia, operating under rigid federal policies, successfully ended ocean disposal over a year before the statutory deadline by implementing carefully managed, but costly, land-based sludge disposal alternatives. The City of New York, in contrast, still uses the ocean for sludge disposal and has recently won a ruling in Federal District Court which may allow continued ocean disposal for many years beyond the December 31, 1981 end-date proscribed by the law. †This paper should be included in Theme 1A - Legislation.


Author(s):  
Michael Lobban

This article looks at the different approaches which have been taken in the study of legal history in England and America by both historians in law and history faculties. The pioneer English legal historian was F.W. Maitland, who felt that the skills of the lawyer were needed to understand the legal materials which were the source of much medieval social and economic history. Maitland, who had no wish to use history to explain current doctrine, inspired a generation of medieval historians to look at legal questions. The study of legal history in English law schools was in turn revolutionized by S. F. C Milsom, who felt that the key to legal history was not to apply the skills of the present lawyer to the law of the past, but to attempt to get into the minds of previous generations of lawyers. Following Milson, doctrinal legal history flourished in England. In the United States, a different tradition dominated law schools. Here, the pioneer was J. Willard Hurst, who turned attention away from narrow doctrinal history, to a broader contextual study of law, looking at the operation of law in society. The article discusses the kind of historiography which developed in America after Hurst, before turning to what discuss what role doctrinal legal history can continue to play, both to inform historical and legal debates.


1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-395
Author(s):  
David Y. Thomas

When the Fathers were framing the Constitution of the United States they sought at every turn to safeguard the interests of the people and at the same time secure to officials a reasonable degree of independence. This solicitude was especially manifest in the case of judicial officers, whose terms were made to run during good behavior. Impeachment was the method adopted to determine what constituted misbehavior. Chief Justice Marshall early laid down the principle that terms otherwise undefined in the Constitution were used in the sense which was well known and accepted at the time the Constitution was written. Impeachment was adopted and adapted from the English practice. To understand our own law, then, it is necessary to know what the English law of impeachment, the lex et consuetudo parliamenti, was at the time of its adoption and in what way it was modified or changed in being adopted.


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