GRAMMAR IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

2021 ◽  
pp. 161-180

Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein produced a series of manuscripts, whose contents are published in part as Part II of Philosophical Investigations, and as Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology I and II, and Last Writings I and II. For the most part these read like nightstand diaries (of a sort I ...


Author(s):  
Marie McGinn

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises difficulties for the idea that what comes before my mind when I hear, or suddenly understand, a word can impose any normative constraint on what I go on to do. The conclusion his reflections seem to force on us gives rise to a paradox: there is no such thing as going on to apply an expression in a way that accords with what is meant by it. The paradox can be seen as one horn of a dilemma, the other horn of which is Platonism about meaning. It is generally agreed that resolving the paradox means finding a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. This chapter looks at three attempts to find the middle course: communitarianism, naturalized Platonism, and quietism. It then considers whether Charles Travis offers a way out of the dilemma which avoids the problems of the other views discussed.


Author(s):  
Mark Wilson

Scientists have developed various collections of specialized possibilities to serve as search spaces in which excessive reliance upon speculative forms of lower dimensional modeling or other unwanted details can be skirted. Two primary examples are discussed: the search spaces of machine design and the virtual variations utilized within Lagrangian mechanics. Contemporary appeals to “possible worlds” attempt to imbed these localized possibilities within fully enunciated universes. But not all possibilities are made alike and these reductive schemes should be resisted, on the grounds that they render the utilities of everyday counterfactuals and “possibility” talk incomprehensible. The essay also discusses whether Wittgenstein’s altered views in his Philosophical Investigations reflect similar concerns.


Author(s):  
Alice Crary

In this chapter, Alice Crary argues that a truly ‘realist’ work of literature might be one that, instead of conforming to familiar genre-specifications, attempts by other means to expose readers to the real—that is, to how things really are. Crary highlights Coetzee’s efforts to elicit what she calls ‘transformative thought’: a process that involves both delineating the progress of individual characters in their quests for reality, and, in formal terms, inviting readers to, for instance, imaginatively participate in such quests. With regard to The Childhood of Jesus, she highlights resonances between these features of Coetzee’s writing and Wittgenstein’s procedures in the Philosophical Investigations. In doing so, Crary brings out a respect in which literature and philosophy are complementary discourses: literature can deal in the sort of objective or universal truth that is philosophy’s touchstone, and philosophical discourse can have an essentially literary dimension.


Author(s):  
Paul Humphreys

Paul Humphreys pioneered philosophical investigations into the methodological revolution begun by computer simulations. He has also made important contributions to the contemporary literature on emergence by developing the fusion account of diachronic emergence and its generalization, transformational emergence. He is the discoverer of what has come to be called “Humphreys” Paradox in probability theory and has also made influential contributions to the literature on probabilistic causality and scientific explanation. This collection contains fourteen of his previously published papers on topics ranging from numerical experiments to the status of scientific metaphysics. There is also and a previously unpublished paper on social dynamics. The volume is divided into four parts on, respectively, computational science, emergence, probability, and general philosophy of science. The first part contains the seminal 1990 paper on computer simulations, with three other papers arguing that these new methods cannot be accounted for by traditional methodological approaches. The second part contains the original presentation of fusion emergence and three companion papers arguing for diachronic approaches to the topic, rather than the then dominant synchronic accounts. The third part starts with the paper that introduced the probabilistic paradox followed by a later evaluation of attempts to solve it. A third paper argues, contra Quine, that probability theory is a purely mathematical theory. The final part includes papers on causation, explanation, metaphysics, and an agent-based model that shows how endogenous uncertainty undermines utility maximization. Each of the four parts is followed by a comprehensive postscript with retrospective assessments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Béatrice Godart-Wendling

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’évaluer l’hypothèse de John Rupert Firth (1890–1960) énonçant que l’article de l’anthropologue Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages” (1923), constituerait une des sources d’inspiration ayant conduit Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) à élaborer une nouvelle conception de la signification en termes d’‘usage’. S’appuyant sur certains passages des Philosophical Investigations (1953), Firth établit ainsi une filiation entre les deux grandes idées phares de Malinowski, à savoir l’importance de la notion de ‘contexte de situation’ et l’idée que le langage serait un ‘mode d’action’ et les principales thèses (la signification comme usage, l’acquisition du langage, le langage comme un ensemble de jeux) que développera Wittgenstein. L’examen du bien fondé de cette hypothèse conduira à préciser la synergie des idées qui eut lieu en matière de pragmatique dans l’Angleterre de la première moitié du XXe siècle.


2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Janyne Sattler

ABSTRACT: In Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations the notion of a 'language game' gives human communication a regained flexibility. Contrary to the Tractatus, the ethical domain now composes one language game among others, being expressed in various types of sentences such as moral judgments, imperatives and praises, and being shared in activity by a human form of life. The aim of this paper is to show that the same moves that allow for a moral language game are the ones allowing for learning and teaching about the moral living, where persuasion takes the place of argument by means of a plural appeal. For this purpose, literature would seem to be one of the best tools at our disposal. As a way of exemplifying our moral engagement to literature I proceed at last to a brief analysis of Tolstoy's Father Sergius, to show how playing this game would help us accomplish this pedagogical enterprise.


1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-227
Author(s):  
Charles E. Marks

In § 243 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes a private language as follows: “The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” A private language is what each of us would need to talk of his own sensations if two philosophical theses were true: namely, (1) that only the person who has a sensation can know that he has it and what kind of sensation it is and (2) that since (1) is true, the names he applies to his own sensations can only be understood by him. If (1) and (2) were true, could a person classify and talk about his own sensations?


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-376
Author(s):  
Marialena Avgerinou

This paper provides a parallel linguistic and conceptual reading of Wittgenstein?s and Beckett?s works. More specifically, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations are looked at in relation to the absurd plays Not I and Waiting for Godot, respectively. The limits of language as described in the Tractatus are part of the verbally and conceptually asphyxiating world brought on stage by Beckett in the monologue Not I, while the transition to ?language games? of the Philosophical Investigations can be identified in parts of Waiting for Godot. The suggested conclusion is that Wittgenstein?s expression of the ineffable, the problematic use of language and (its) meaning can be and have been expressed in a form of art, while the meanings of Wittgenstein?s writings are in harmony with their stylistic form, his concept of ?showing? further illustrating this idea.


Author(s):  
Sébastien Gandon

In Philosophical Investigations 193–94, Wittgenstein draws a notorious analogy between the working of a machine and the application of a rule. According to the view of rule-following that Wittgenstein is criticizing, the future applications of a rule are completely determined by the rule itself, as the movements of the machine components are completely determined by the machine configuration. On what conception of the machine is such an analogy based? In this paper, I intend to show that Wittgenstein relied on quite a specific scientific tradition very active at the beginning of the twentieth century: the kinematic or the general science of machines. To explain the fundamental tenets of this line of research and its links with Wittgenstein, I focus on Franz Reuleaux (1829–1905), whose works were known to Wittgenstein.       The first payoff of this investigation is to help distance the functionalist framework from which this passage is often read: Wittgenstein’s machines are not (or not primarily) computers. The second payoff is to explain why Wittgenstein talks about machines at this place in his discussion on rule-following: it is not the machine model in itself that is criticized in PI 193–94, but the “philosophical” temptation to generalize from it.


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