From the Subjectivity of Transcendental Idealism to the Objectivity of Absolute Idealism:

2019 ◽  
pp. 262-266
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Absolute Idealism

The Metaphysics of Powers in Kant and Hegel

2021 ◽  
pp. 243-270
Author(s):  
Clinton Tolley
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Real ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Real Existence ◽  
Common Understanding

This chapter explores the metaphysics of powers as articulated in the modern German idealist tradition, running from the Leibniz-Wolffians, through Kant’s “transcendental” idealism, to Hegel’s “absolute” idealism. These various forms of idealism are shown to share a common understanding of the nature of powers in general, as metaphysically distinct from what is merely ideal, and as possessing real existence over and above any mental ideas or representations—not least so as to serve as both the cause of, and the support for, the real existence of ideas themselves. Beyond these broad points of convergence on the ontology of powers as such, the chapter also traces out developments in the accounts of powers given in the various branches of metaphysica specialis (cosmology, psychology, theology). More generally, the chapter aims to revisit the question of the precise significance of the idealisms in this tradition upon the metaphysics of powers in particular.

Value and idealism

2000 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gardner
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Core ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This paper is concerned with the attempt to base a general theory of value on an idealist metaphysics. The most explicit and fully developed instance of this approach is, of course, found in Kant, on whom I shall concentrate, though I will also suggest that the account I offer of Kant has application to the later German idealists. While the core of the paper is devoted to commentary on Kant, what I thereby wish to make plausible is the idea that Kant's endeavour to base a general conception of value on an idealist metaphysics is of contemporary, not merely historical, interest. Specifically, my suggestion will be that a correct understanding of what is demanded by our ordinary, pre-philosophical grasp of value shows there is reason to think that something along the lines of Kant's transcendental idealism (or, like absolute idealism, developed from it) is required for a fully adequate metaphysics of value. Essential to the case I will make is a distinction between Kant's moral theory and his broader account of value, my claim being that, whether or not Kantian moral theory is ultimately dependent on any metaphysics, the broader conception of value to be found in Kant cannot be detached from his doctrine of transcendental idealism.

The Philosopher's Progress: C.S. Lewis' Intellectual Journey from Atheism to Theism

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-143
Author(s):  
Norbert Feinendegen
Keyword(s):  
Christian Faith ◽  
Philosophical Position ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Intellectual Journey ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Although Lewis describes his intellectual journey to the Christian faith in Surprised by Joy and The Pilgrim's Regress, the actual steps of his progress from Atheism to Theism are still a matter of controversy. Based on Lewis' letters, his diary All My Road Before Me and recently published sources (in particular ‘Early Prose Joy’), this paper gives an outline of the main steps of Lewis' philosophical progress during the 1920s. The first part sketches the five main stages Materialism, Realism, Absolute Idealism, Subjective Idealism, and Theism, and submits a proposal for their dating. The second part describes these stages in greater detail and discusses the reasons that urged Lewis to adopt a new philosophical position at a particular time. It will become apparent that a thorough philosophical understanding of these stages is an indispensable prerequisite for any serious effort to establish a chronology of Lewis' intellectual progress during these years.

The Lessons of Kant’s Paralogisms

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Snowdon
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Important Lesson

The overall question of this chapter is: what relevance do Kant’s Paralogisms have for current philosophy? After characterising Kant’s negative points about rational psychology, it is argued that once we abandon transcendental idealism and we appreciate that Kant’s assumption that we lack intuitions of ourselves is problematic, then Kant’s approach lacks a convincing basis. It is further argued that Strawson’s much more favourable reading of Kant’s argument relies on certain conceptual assumptions that are also unwarranted. The major and important lesson for our time, it is suggested, is that Kant identifies a serious weakness in a popular style of pro-dualist reasoning.

Anti-theodicy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. N. Trakakis
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Model ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Skeptical Theism ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Methodological Considerations

First, the nature of ‘anti-theodicy’ is outlined, and some indication is provided as to how this position differs from both theodicy and skeptical theism, and how the anti-theodicy view can be supported on the basis of moral and methodological considerations. Secondly, a possible metaphysical basis for anti-theodicy is sought, and this is achieved by abandoning anthropomorphic conceptions of God in favour of alternative models of divinity that might make possible new and more fruitful perspectives on the problem of evil. The alternative model advanced here for special attention is the Absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley. The chapter concludes by showing how the problem of evil can be answered from a Bradleian perspective.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
General Manner ◽  
Philosophical System ◽  
Present Book ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The crucial interpretive hypothesis of the present book is that central parts of Spinoza’s theoretical philosophy, and in particular his philosophy of mind established in Part Two of the Ethics, can only be understood against the backdrop of the conviction that subjective experience is explainable, and that its successful explanation is ethically relevant because it makes us wiser, freer, and happier. The introduction discusses, in a general manner, what requirements a philosophical system that aims do this must fulfill. Such a system, it is argued, commits itself to a realist version of extreme rationalism that maintains the difference between thought and reality; it cannot, as is sometimes assumed, turn into some form of absolute idealism. Furthermore, in looking at how this fits with Spinoza’s approach in the Ethics, the book shows how the structure of Part Two, along with Spinoza’s proceeding in geometrical manner, must be comprehended.

Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Mind

Whereas a certain popular (Fregean) interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality makes Husserl into an internalist and methodological solipsist, the aim of Chapter 4 is to show that Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism prevents his theory from being either. I first discuss competing interpretations of Husserl’s concept of the noema, and argue that the Fregean interpretation misreads the transcendental character of Husserl’s phenomenology. I next present an interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental idealism that highlights its difference from metaphysical idealism and shows why Husserl’s conception of the mind–world relationship cannot be adequately captured within the internalism–externalism framework. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss how the claim that Husserl is a methodological solipsist fails to engage properly with his account of transcendental intersubjectivity, and how that latter account eventually transforms the very character of the transcendental project.

scholarly journals Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-673
Author(s):  
Joe Saunders ◽  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Space And Time

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant’s account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant’s behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

scholarly journals Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism

Kant-Studien ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 498-511
Author(s):  
Truls Wyller
Keyword(s):  
Human Subjects ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Spatial Objects ◽  
Temporal Duration ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Laws Of Motion ◽  
Second Analogy

Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).

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