From Johann to Maurice: Science and Expression in the Philosophical Praxis of Medicine

Phenomenology’s return to lived experience and “to the things themselves” is often contrasted with the synthesized perspective of science and its “view from nowhere.” The extensive use of neuropsychological case reports in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, however, suggests that the relationship between phenomenology and science is more complex than a sheer opposition, and a fruitful one for the praxis of medicine. Here, I propose a new reading of how Merleau-Ponty justifies his use of Adhémar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein’s reports on Johann Schneider for his phenomenology of embodied perception. I argue that for Merleau-Ponty these neuropsychological case reports represent a coherent deformation of the intercorporeally expressed existence of Schneider that through speech fall again onto the common ground of perception, thereby allowing Merleau-Ponty to understand, in the equivalent sense delivered by language, Schneider’s total being and fundamental illness. I then discuss what Merleau-Ponty’s method implies for a phenomenological praxis of medicine, and for the role of science in this praxis.

The Aesthetics of Proximity and the Ethics of Empathy

Where does affect reside in a phenomenology of perception? How should we understand ethics when bodies are close? What changes when we are distant? In this chapter, the author illustrates the “aesthetics of proximity,” degrees of spatio-temporal as well as spatio-tactile closeness between sounds and bodies, and the implications for an embodied ethics of response. Using Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “flesh,” which he defines as an element (like water or fire), the author explores the relation of feeling and matter in close encounters, evoking Sufi sounds of worship in Morocco and France, as well as the Black Lives Matter movement during a global pandemic.

Stuck on repeat: Why do we continue to ruminate?

An oft misattributed piece of folk-wisdom goes: “Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results.” In many cases, we don’t just do things repeatedly but think over the same topics repeatedly. People who ruminate are not often diagnosed as insane—most of us ruminate at some point in our lives—but it is a common behaviour underlying both depression and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema in J Abnorm Psychol 109(3):504, 2000). If rumination is something we all do at some time, what is it about ruminative thought that makes it ‘sticky’ and difficult to stop for the worst sufferers? In order to answer this question, I will present a plausible account of how ruminative behaviour becomes entrenched to the point where sufferers of anxiety and depression simply cannot make meaning from the world except in terms of the kinds of behaviours, actions and thoughts they have become reliant on. I develop my account from Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion (2006, 2011, 2014) using the work of Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of perception, Taylor and Francis Group. (Online), ProQuest Ebook Central, 2012. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ed/detail.action?docID=1433878. Accessed 29 Dec 2020) in order to bridge the gap between the explicit thought we experience—an important part of the lived experience of rumination. To conclude, I will apply my account to Wu and Dunning’s (Rev General Psychol 22(1):25–35, 2018; Hypocognitive mind: How lack of conceptual knowledge confines what people see and remember, 2019. 10.31234/osf.io/29ryz) theory of hypocognition to further illuminate the particular cognitive qualities that can be experienced by ruminators, i.e. a prohibited access to particular emotion concepts.

The social construction of embodied experiences: two types of discoveries in the science centre

Based on a large corpus of video and eye-tracking data and inspired by multimodal conversation analysis, this paper analyses how visitors discover natural phenomena during their use of hands-on exhibits in a science and technology centre (STC). In these discoveries, individual multisensorial experiences of natural phenomena are communicatively transferred from one visitor to another. This paper describes two contrasting sequential formats of joint discoveries in the STC. In the first and more frequent case, experiences are socially shared by focussing the co-visitors’ visual attention on one point in their interactional space, while in the second case perceptions are socially shared via reproduction sequences, i.e. by repeating the actions that have led to the discovery with exchanged roles. We will argue that in these reproduction sequences, sharing experiences can be understood via the concept of “intercorporeality” (Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2014 [1945]. Phenomenology of perception. London, New York: Routledge). Our paper contributes to the current debate on intercorporeality, as it empirically shows that it is analytically fruitful to extend the concept to situations without simultaneous perception.

The flesh of imagination: locating materiality in biology inspired visual art

This paper is an exploration of the sensuous and material dimensions of artworks inspired by biological science. The study uses Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of “flesh” to reflect upon the embodied processes of understanding which unfold during a viewer's initial encounter with an artwork. Using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and the work of selected artists based in India – which engage with biology and botany– the discussion locates the sensing body in a reciprocal relationship with these artworks

Phenomenological and existential contributions to the study of erectile dysfunction

The current medical approach to erectile dysfunction (ED) consists of physiological, psychological and social components. This paper proposes an additional framework for thinking about ED based on phenomenology, by focusing on the theory of sexual projection. This framework will be complementary to the current medical approach to ED. Our phenomenological analysis of ED provides philosophical depth and illuminates overlooked aspects in the study of ED. Mainly by appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, we suggest considering an additional etiology of ED in terms of a weakening of a function of sexual projection. We argue that sexual projection can be problematized through cognitive interferences, changes in the ‘intentional arc’, and modifications in the subject’s ‘body schema’. Our approach further highlights the importance of considering the ‘existential situation’ of patients with ED. We close by reflecting briefly on some of the implications of this phenomenological framework for diagnosis and treatment of ED.

The moral (re)presentation: an essay on Merleau-Ponty's notion of time in the Phenomenology of Perception.

The moral (re)presentation: an essay on Merleau-Ponty's notion of time in the Phenomenology of Perception Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to investigate the notion of memory in Merleau-Ponty, suggesting a possible interpretation of the time and memory within Merleau-Ponty’s genetic phenomenological analysis. Ultimately, our hypothesis is that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the problem of representation and perception - particularly the problem of retention - places an ethical ground in perception. We will suggest that the phenomenological approach to memory might pave a different undertaking of morals as constructed in the living-present. Our objective is then to point a moral dimension to the process of presentation-representation that happens in consciousness, and establish that our way into the comprehension of values has both a passive and active (intended) dimension that is often underdeveloped in studies of how we establish moral and political convictions. Keywords: Time, Memory, Representation, Perception, Ethics A (re)presentação moral: um ensaio sobre a noção de tempo de Merleau-Ponty na Fenomenologia da Percepção Resumo: O propósito desse ensaio é instigar a ideia de memória em Merleau-Ponty, sugerindo uma possível interpretação de tempo e memória dentro da análise genética-fenomenológica de Merleau-Ponty. Em última medida, nossa hipótese é que o entendimento de Merleau-Ponty sobre o problema da representação e da percepção - particularmente o problema da retenção - coloca um fundamento ético para a percepção. Nós iremos sugerir que a abordagem fenomenológica para a memória pode nos dar um diferente modo de análise da moral enquanto construída no presente-vivido. Nosso objetivo é então apontar para uma dimensão moral para o processo de apresentação-representação que acontece na consciência e estabelecê-lo como um caminho para nossa representação consciente, entendendo que nosso modo de compreensão tem tanto uma dimensão intencionalmente ativa quanto passiva que é frequentemente pouco desenvolvida em estudos sobre nossos estabelecimento de convicções morais e políticas. Palavras chaves: Tempo, Memória, Representação, Percepção, Ética La (re)presentación moral: un ensayo sobre la noción de tiempo de Merleau-Ponty en la Fenomenología de la Percepción Resumen: El propósito de este ensayo es instigar la idea de memoria en Merleau-Ponty, sugiriendo una posible interpretación del tiempo y la memoria dentro del análisis genético-fenomenológico de Merleau-Ponty. En última instancia, nuestra hipótesis es que la comprensión de Merleau-Ponty del problema de la representación y la percepción, particularmente el problema de la retención, sienta una base ética para la percepción. Sugeriremos que el enfoque fenomenológico de la memoria puede darnos un modo diferente de análisis moral a medida que se integra en el presente. Nuestro objetivo es, entonces, señalar una dimensión moral al proceso de presentación-representación que tiene lugar en la conciencia y establecerlo como un camino hacia nuestra representación consciente, entendiendo que nuestro modo de comprensión tiene una dimensión intencionalmente activa y pasiva que a menudo se entiende mal. desarrollado en estudios de nuestro establecimiento de creencias morales y políticas. Palavras clave: Tiempo, Memoria, Representación, Percepción, Ética Data de registro: 03/09/2019 Data de aceite: 22/07/2020

The Temporality of Maximal Grip: On Pragmatists’ Readings of Merleau-Ponty

In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy.

El lenguaje y la ficción encarnada. Un acercamiento fenomenológico a Cuento amarillo.

This article is a literary approach that seeks to answer the question about the phenomenological relationship between body-language and the storyteller Cuento amarillo. For this, he uses the Merleau-Ponty phenomenology as a theoretical base in two base works, The Prose of the World and The Phenomenology of Perception, from which he seeks to explore how the concepts of body, language and fiction are operating within the narrative with the purpose is to glimpse the textual guidelines that make up the characters of this literary work and within phenomenology itself and therefore create a new proposal towards the body with a view to a theoretical discussion with language.