Value and idealism

2000 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gardner
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Core ◽  
General Conception ◽  
Absolute Idealism ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This paper is concerned with the attempt to base a general theory of value on an idealist metaphysics. The most explicit and fully developed instance of this approach is, of course, found in Kant, on whom I shall concentrate, though I will also suggest that the account I offer of Kant has application to the later German idealists. While the core of the paper is devoted to commentary on Kant, what I thereby wish to make plausible is the idea that Kant's endeavour to base a general conception of value on an idealist metaphysics is of contemporary, not merely historical, interest. Specifically, my suggestion will be that a correct understanding of what is demanded by our ordinary, pre-philosophical grasp of value shows there is reason to think that something along the lines of Kant's transcendental idealism (or, like absolute idealism, developed from it) is required for a fully adequate metaphysics of value. Essential to the case I will make is a distinction between Kant's moral theory and his broader account of value, my claim being that, whether or not Kantian moral theory is ultimately dependent on any metaphysics, the broader conception of value to be found in Kant cannot be detached from his doctrine of transcendental idealism.

On the Possibility of Kantian Retributivism

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 276-296
Author(s):  
DIMITRI LANDA
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Moral Autonomy ◽  
The Core ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

One of the most potent motivations for retributivist approaches to punishment has been their apparent connection to an ethical background shaped by the Kantian notion of morally autonomous and rational human agency. The present article challenges the plausibility of this connection. I argue that retributivism subverts, rather than embodies, the normative consequences of moral autonomy, justifying a social practice that conflicts with the considered judgments that the proper recognition of moral autonomy would authorize. The core of my case is the analysis of whether a punishment should be understood as a restriction of a criminal's freedom properly understood. I argue that the affirmative view faces serious difficulties that have not been, and are not likely to be, resolved by retributivist justifications that draw their support from Kantian moral theory.

Toward a More General Theory of Value. Edward H. Chamberlin

1959 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 310-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome Rothenberg
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Theory Of Value

scholarly journals Costa, cancer and coronavirus: contractualism as a guide to the ethics of lockdown

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-107103
Author(s):  
Stephen David John ◽  
Emma J Curran
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Life And Death ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Core ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Moral Distinction ◽  
Self Defence

Lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic involve placing huge burdens on some members of society for the sake of benefiting other members of society. How should we decide when these policies are permissible? Many writers propose we should address this question using cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a broadly consequentialist approach. We argue for an alternative non-consequentialist approach, grounded in contractualist moral theorising. The first section sets up key issues in the ethics of lockdown, and sketches the apparent appeal of addressing these problems in a CBA frame. The second section argues that CBA fundamentally distorts the normative landscape in two ways: first, in principle, it allows very many morally trivial preferences—say, for a coffee—might outweigh morally weighty life-and-death concerns; second, it is insensitive to the core moral distinction between victims and vectors of disease. The third section sketches our non-consequentialist alternative, grounded in Thomas Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory. On this account, the ethics of self-defence implies a strong default presumption in favour of a highly restrictive, universal lockdown policy: we then ask whether there are alternatives to such a policy which are justifiable to all affected parties, paying particular attention to the complaints of those most burdened by policy. In the fourth section, we defend our contractualist approach against the charge that it is impractical or counterintuitive, noting that actual CBAs face similar, or worse, challenges.

A Disengaged Look at Disengagement Theory

1975 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Bograd Gordon
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Lived Experiences ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Core ◽  
New Methods ◽  
Middle Range ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Disengagement Theory ◽  
Aging People ◽  
Subjective Meanings

This paper suggests that Disengagement Theory can be used as a theory of the middle-range, but not as a general theory about normal aging. This proposition is supported by an examination of key concepts, postulates and methods used to formulate the theory. By use of phenemological notions, we can see the concept of disengagement forces us to pay attention to the subjective meanings of aging people. It is necessary to disengage from the core statements of the theory and engage in a search for new methods to study the lived experiences of human beings in order to further our understandings of the processes of growing old.

Allais on Transcendental Idealism

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew F. Roche
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
The Core ◽  
Key Features

AbstractLucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant's transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in the Prolegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais's position and its benefits, not least of which is its elegant explanation of how the features of objects that appear to us are transcendentally ideal while still being ‘empirically’ real. In section 2, I contend that there are elements of Allais's account that are problematic, yet also inessential, to what I view to be the core contribution of her analysis. These elements are the views that the properties that appear to human beings are not really distinct from properties that things have ‘in themselves’ and that Kant embraced a relational account of perception. In section 3, I return to the core of Allais's reading and argue that, despite its multiple virtues, it cannot make sense of key features of Kant's idealism.

The Green’s Gambit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Hale
Keyword(s):  
Ecosystem Services ◽  
Endangered Species ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Endangered Species Act ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Kantian Moral Theory

This chapter argues that reasons are underdetermined and often left out of value-based discussions of nature. The chapter offers a rough sketch of Kantian moral theory – particularly the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative – to suggest that the primary charge of environmentalism ought to be that of encouraging deeper justification of actions. It utilizes the Endangered Species Act, the argument from ecosystem services, and the case of a stolen kidney to suggest that cost-benefit analysis and related methodologies are insufficient for addressing the broad ethical considerations of environmentalists.

Devalorization

2020 ◽  
pp. 77-99
Author(s):  
Thomas Nail
Keyword(s):  
Use Value ◽  
Primitive Accumulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Exchange Value ◽  
Mode Of Presentation ◽  
Core Concepts ◽  
Theory Of Value

This chapter shows that the process of primitive accumulation or direct appropriation is and must be internal to Marx’s theory of value. This is the case for precisely the methodological reasons Marx describes in his postface to the second edition of Capital. The core concepts in the “mode of presentation” (use-value, exchange-value, and value) describe the strictly immanent conditions or core “logic of capitalism” but are also derived from the historical “mode of inquiry.” Since primitive accumulation is part of the historical mode of inquiry, there must be a conceptual place for primitive accumulation in the mode of presentation itself. If not, then the mode of presentation is strictly speaking inadequate to the mode of inquiry—something that any dialectician, and Marx himself, must reject.

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