Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1641-1677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Following ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Using Data

ABSTRACT This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

The Association between Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters ◽  
K. Raghunandan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Span Of Control ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
Using Data

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees, using data gathered under the recent SEC fee disclosure rules. We hypothesize that audit fees will be positively associated with audit committee independence, financial expertise, and meeting frequency. We examine a sample of 492 nonregulated, Big 5-audited firms that filed proxy statements with the SEC in the period from February 5, 2001 to June 30, 2001. We find that audit committee independence (defined as an audit committee comprised entirely of outside, independent directors) and financial expertise (defined as an audit committee containing at least one member with financial expertise) are significantly, positively associated with audit fees. This is in contrast to the findings of Carcello et al. (2002a), who find that audit committee characteristics are not significant in the presence of board-related variables. Meeting frequency (defined as an audit committee that meets at least four times annually) was not associated with higher audit fees at conventional levels. This evidence is consistent with audit committees taking actions within their span of control to ensure a higher level of audit coverage.

Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2057-2085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Beck ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

The Role of Firm Status in Appointments of Accounting Financial Experts to Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Erkens ◽  
Sarah E. Bonner
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Elite Education ◽  
Social Club ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Status ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACT: Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999–2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them. We find that typical AFEs (CFOs and retired audit partners) have lower director status (board seats, trusteeships, social club memberships, and elite education) than other types of directors, and that this status gap is greater for higher status firms (larger, better connected, and more admired firms). Moreover, we find that higher status firms are less likely to appoint AFEs, suggesting that status-related concerns reduce the demand for accounting financial expertise on audit committees. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

The impact of audit committee effectiveness on audit fees and non-audit service fees

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 174-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Rajbans Kaur Shingara Singh ◽  
Mahmoud Al-Akra
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Regulatory Requirements ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of audit committee effectiveness on audit fees and non-audit service (NAS) fees in a less regulatory environment. Design/methodology/approach The authors construct a composite audit committee effectiveness measure incorporating audit committee independence, diligence, size, financial expertise and the chairperson’s accounting expertise. Findings The authors find that audit committee effectiveness has a positive significant impact on both audit fees and NAS fees. This suggests that effective audit committees can hold auditors accountable resulting in better audit quality and consequently higher audit fees. Originality/value The link between more effective audit committees with higher NAS purchases can be explained in light of the difference in regulatory requirements providing audit committees with decision rights on the use of NASs, therefore approving more NAS and increasing NASF. Additional tests and robustness analyses confirm the results.

scholarly journals Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earnings Management Among Publicly Listed Firms in Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Collins Kapkiyai ◽  
Josephat Cheboi ◽  
Joyce Komen
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Financial Scandals ◽  
Practical Implications

Objective: The paper sought to investigate the role of an effective audit committee in controlling earnings management practices. Design / Methodology: A panel data sourced from the audited financial reports of firms listed at the Kenyan Nairobi Securities Exchange for the periods between 2004 and 2017 were analyzed using a panel regression model. Findings: Audit committee effectiveness proved an important monitoring mechanism for earnings management. The independence, Meeting frequency, and financial expertise of the audit committee evidenced a negative and significant effect on earnings management. Practical Implications: Firms need to ensure that their audit committees operate effectively. This is achieved through enhancing their independence, ensuring optimal meeting frequency, and a higher number of members with financial expertise for fewer earnings management. Originality: The paper suggests the ways through which audit committee effectiveness can be enhanced to reduce earnings management amid rampant global financial scandals.

The role of audit committee attributes in corporate sustainability reporting

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amina Buallay ◽  
Jasim Al-Ajmi
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Corporate Sustainability ◽  
Sustainability Reporting ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Sustainability Disclosure ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which sustainability reporting by banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is affected by the attributes of audit committees. Design/methodology/approach The research is positivist and quantitative, based on a cross-sectional and time series analysis of 59 banks from 2013 to 2017. A multivariate model is used to investigate the impact of selected audit committee attributes (financial expertise, size, members’ independence and meeting frequency) on sustainability reporting. The model is built on agency, legitimacy, resources and stakeholders theories. Findings In contrast to the hypothesis, the authors report a negative association between financial expertise and sustainability reporting. Members’ independence and meeting frequency play a positive role in determining the extent of disclosure. The control variables (bank size, age and auditor type) are positively associated with corporate sustainability reporting. Research limitations/implications The main limitations of this study are related to the chosen attributes of audit committee and do not consider the board’s attributes. However, the authors believe these limitations do not affect the findings. Future research that includes more attributes when they became available will offer more insights into the role of audit committees on sustainability disclosure of financial institutions. Overcoming these limitations may make the results more generalizable. Practical implications The results of this study have important implications for regulators, bank management, investors and creditors. For regulators, in the countries of the GCC and in countries like them, the findings reveal the importance of disclosure requirements. The development of disclosure requirements is likely to improve corporate sustainability reporting and reduce variations in the extent of disclosure among banks. Banks could use these results to improve their reporting to outsiders. For creditors and investors, the study improves their awareness of the importance of corporate social responsibility, corporate governance and environmental information on credit and investment decisions and encourages banks to improve their disclosures of non-financial information. Originality/value This research makes a contribution to the scarce literature on sustainability reporting by banks, especially in an environment where capital markets lack active institutional investors, where regulators play the dominant role in determining the extent of disclosure and where banks are the main source of external finance for the corporate sector.

The consequences of audit committee quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Chun Lin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Estimation Procedure ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Auditor Switches ◽  
Stage Estimation

Purpose This study aims to examine the consequences when audit committees have different economic incentives (i.e. incentive-based compensation) to switch auditors. Design/methodology/approach The author focuses on companies experiencing an auditor switching event (client-initiated dismissals) and uses Heckman’s (1997) two-stage estimation procedure to control endogenous bias. Audit committee quality is measured by the level of incentive-based compensation. Accrual quality and abnormal audit fees are examined over the periods of auditor switches. Findings Using 1,087 US companies between 2006 and 2014, the author found that audit committees’ incentive-based compensation is negatively (positively) associated with accruals quality (abnormal audit fees) only when companies switch from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors or switch within non-Big 4 auditors. For companies that switch from non-Big 4 to Big 4 auditors, she found no evidence. Research limitations/implications This study provides a detailed discussion of the consequences of audit committee quality. The findings also contribute to the literature by concluding that economic incentives are associated with ineffective oversight, particularly after auditor switches. Practical implications Sarbanes–Oxley Act and its associated regulations significantly expanded the oversight role of audit committees. However, regulators bypassed restrictions on audit committee compensation. Accordingly, the author suggests that regulators focus on the issue of economic incentives to improve audit committee quality. Originality/value Minimal research has been conducted on the role of audit committees when companies switch to a new external auditor. The author shows that when companies switch auditors, incentive-based compensation significantly affects the monitoring quality of audit committees.

scholarly journals The Role of Audit Committees in Limiting Earnings Management: An Empirical Study of Saudi Corporations

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Fahad Al Naim ◽  
Thamir Al Barrak
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Size Number ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Jones Model ◽  
The Impact

This study aims to measure the impact that audit committees have on earnings management for companies listed on Tadawul Stock Exchange. The sample includes firms in the basic materials sector for the years 2017 and 2018. The modified Jones model is used to investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, financial expertise, size, number of meetings, and percentage of shares owned) on earnings management. The results show that the greater the audit committee’s independence, percentage of shares owned, and number of meetings held contribute to limited earnings management. However, no evidence is found to support that financial experience or audit committee size have an impact on earnings management.

scholarly journals The Effects of Politically Connected Audit Committees on Audit Fees: Evidence in Malaysia

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Archival Data ◽  
External Resources ◽  
Financial Expertise

This study aims to contribute to an understanding of politically connected audit committees on audit fees in an emerging market, using the case of Malaysia. Malaysia offers an interesting and important setting as Malaysian companies are highly concentrated and politically sensitive. In particular, the study seeks to examine the level of political connections represented in the audit committees associated with the level of audit fees incurred by Malaysian public listed companies. For the purpose of this study, a quantitative approach (archival data analysis) has been adopted. Three hypotheses are tested: (1) There is a positive relationship between the proportion of audit committee members who are senior government officers (SGO) and audit fees; (2) There is a positive relationship between the proportions of audit committee members who are politicians and audit fees; (3) There is a positive relationship between audit committee characteristics (independence, size, meeting and financial expertise) and audit fees. The results of the study indicate that politically connected audit committees (identified by members who are either senior government officers or politicians) have a significant association with the incidence of higher audit fees. This suggests that politically connected audit committees are able to capitalize on their connections to influence companies and create direct demand for the auditors to increase their audit effort, as measured by audit fees. One of the issues that emerge from these findings is that companies highly value political connections to obtain external resources given the uncertainties in the business environment. Also, the findings highlight the need for stronger corporate governance to mitigate the higher inherent audit risks in politically connected companies.

scholarly journals Determinants of Audit Committees Effectiveness in Enhancing Compliance With Regulations: Evidence From Saudi Context

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 438
Author(s):  
Ali A. Alnodel
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Resource Dependence Theory ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Dependence Theory ◽  
Governance Practices

This paper aims to investigate how effective audit committees are in ensuring compliance with regulations in the Saudi context. Particularly, it examines whether there is an association between the value of fines imposed by the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the size, frequency of meeting, and the financial expertise of the audit committee. Other variables have also been incorporated to control for possible effects, particularly size, leverage, ROA, age of the company, and year of fines. Data has been collected from the archives of CMA and from the annual reports of listed companies from 2014 to 2016. In total, 360 year-observations relating to 120 non-financial listed companies were analyzed among which 95 fines and actions imposed by CMA. The results suggest that the size and financial expertise of the audit committee and the leverage of the company and years of fines have significant association with the value of the fines imposed by CMA. In contrast, the regression analysis does not show significant association between the frequency of meeting of the audit committee and other controlled variables on the value of the fines imposed by CMA. These results suggest that the availability of resources to the audit committee, as suggested by the resource dependence theory, has a significant impact on its effectiveness. Regulators and companies could benefit from these findings to enhance compliance with regulations and to improve the role of audit committees. Moreover, these findings could be valuable to strengthen corporate governance practices in similar emerging markets.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document