The Role of Firm Status in Appointments of Accounting Financial Experts to Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Erkens ◽  
Sarah E. Bonner
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Elite Education ◽  
Social Club ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Status ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACT: Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999–2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them. We find that typical AFEs (CFOs and retired audit partners) have lower director status (board seats, trusteeships, social club memberships, and elite education) than other types of directors, and that this status gap is greater for higher status firms (larger, better connected, and more admired firms). Moreover, we find that higher status firms are less likely to appoint AFEs, suggesting that status-related concerns reduce the demand for accounting financial expertise on audit committees. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1641-1677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Following ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Using Data

ABSTRACT This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

scholarly journals Corporate Social Responsibility, Audit Committee Expertise, and Financial Reporting: Empirical Evidence from Korea

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10517
Author(s):  
Haeyoung Ryu ◽  
Soo-Joon Chae ◽  
Bomi Song
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) involves multiple activities and is influenced by the cultural and legal environment of the country in which a firm is located. This study examines the role of audit committees’ (AC) financial expertise in the relationship between CSR and the earnings quality of Korean firms with high levels of CSR. Using a multivariate analysis, it investigates whether the ACs that include members with accounting expertise, finance expertise, or supervisory expertise individually affect a firm’s decision making. It also examines how ACs with diverse expertise contribute toward improving the financial reporting quality of firms with high levels of CSR. The results demonstrate that when there is a certified accountant in the AC of a firm that practices CSR based on ethical motivation, the earnings management through discretionary accruals is more strictly controlled. This is more effective when the AC comprises members with accounting and non-accounting expertise. This finding implies that the AC plays a positive role in improving the accounting information quality of firms with CSR excellence. Moreover, while the role of accounting experts in the AC is important for maintaining high earnings quality, combining other types of expertise creates synergy.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

Audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting timeliness

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Atef Oussii ◽  
Neila Boulila Taktak
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is any relationship between the effectiveness of an audit committee and the financial reporting timeliness of Tunisian listed companies as proxied by external audit delay (AD). Analysis focuses on five audit committee characteristics: authority, financial expertise, independence, size and diligence. Design/methodology/approach Empirical tests address 162 firm-year observations drawn from Tunisian listed companies during 2011-2013. Findings Multivariate analyses indicate that audit committees with members who have financial expertise are significantly associated with shorter AD. Thus, the results suggest that audit committee financial expertise contributes to the improvement of financial statements’ timeliness. Research limitations/implications The audit committee attributes examined in this study were based on DeZoort et al. (2002) framework. There could be other aspects of audit committee effectiveness such as audit committee tenure and audit committee chair characteristics, which were not addressed in the present study. Thus, future research may consider and examine these other components of audit committee effectiveness. Practical implications Findings have managerial implications. Companies can re-look into how to further improve audit committee composition in order to enhance the timeliness of financial reporting. The issues of audit committee effectiveness and timely reporting also affect regulators and policy makers since they need to play a role in the establishment of effective audit committees and the improvement of financial reporting timeliness. Originality/value This study is one of few that have examined the impact of audit committee effectiveness on ADs in an emerging market country. Findings lend credence to the belief that audit committee members’ financial expertise enhances the quality of financial reporting by firms in a North African market criticized for the lack of maturity of its corporate governance system (Klibi, 2015; Fitch Ratings, 2009).

scholarly journals Investigating risk disclosures in Italian integrated reports

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1149-1178 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Guthrie ◽  
Francesca Manes Rossi ◽  
Rebecca Levy Orelli ◽  
Giuseppe Nicolò
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Alternative Form ◽  
Risk Disclosure ◽  
Integrated Reporting ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Risk Disclosures ◽  
Do So

Purpose The paper identifies the types of risks disclosed by Italian organisations using integrated reporting (IR). This paper aims to understand the level and features of risk disclosure with the adoption of IR. Design/methodology/approach The authors use risk classifications already provided in the literature to develop a content analysis of Italian organisations’ integrated reports published. Findings The content analysis reveals that most of the Italian organisations incorporate many types of risk disclosure into their integrated reports. Organisations use this alternative form of reporting to communicate risk differently from how they disclose risks in traditional annual financial reporting. That is, the study finds that the organisations use their integrated reports to disclose a broader group of risks, related to the environment and society, and do so using narrative and visual representation. Originality/value The paper contributes to a narrow stream of research investigating risk disclosure provided through IR, contributing to the understanding of the role of IR in representing an organisational risk.

Why do Restatements Decrease in a Clawback Environment? An Investigation into Financial Reporting Executives' Decision-Making during the Restatement Process

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (6) ◽  
pp. 2515-2536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Pyzoha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Archival Studies ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Auditor Quality

ABSTRACT Prior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the author upon request.

scholarly journals Audit committee quality and audit report lag: the role of mandatory adoption of IFRS in Saudi companies

Accounting ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167-178
Author(s):  
Mahfod Mobarak Aldoseri ◽  
Nasr Taha Hassan ◽  
Magdy Melegy Abd El Hakim Melegy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Mandatory Adoption ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Weak Influence

This paper aims to examine the effect of audit committee characteristics on audit report lag, and also explores whether this effect will vary between before and after mandatory adoption of IFRS in Saudi listed companies. Based on a Saudi sample of 388 firm-year observations from 2015 to 2018, the Poisson regression analysis shows that among audit committee characteristics, only audit committee financial experience significantly influences the timing of financial reporting. The result indicates a weak influence of audit committees on timeliness of financial reporting, which is consistent with the results of most of previous studies. On the other hand, the results show a strong impact of the adoption of IFRS on the context of that relationship, where the results show the impact of IFRS on audit report lag, audit committee quality and the association between them.

The Effect of Employee Treatment Policies on Internal Control Weaknesses and Financial Restatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1167-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Guo ◽  
Pinghsun Huang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Nan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Employee Benefits ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Treatment Policies ◽  
Employee Treatment

ABSTRACT This study investigates the role of employment policies in reducing internal control ineffectiveness and financial restatements. We provide new evidence that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of ineffective internal control. We also find that employee-friendly policies significantly reduce the propensity for employee-related material weaknesses. These results suggest that greater employee benefits facilitate the acquisition, development, and motivation of the workforce and ameliorate the loss of valuable human capital, thereby mitigating employee failures to implement internal control tasks properly. Moreover, we document novel results that financial restatements, especially those caused by unintentional errors, are less likely to arise in firms that invest more in employee benefits. Collectively, our emphasis on the effect of employee treatment policies on the integrity of internal control and financial reporting distinguishes our paper from previous studies that focus on the role of top executives in accounting practices. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

Die öffentliche Funktion des Prüfungsausschusses

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Schaffer
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
State Supervision ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Supervisory Boards

The audit committee of public interest entities performs a public function through its auditing of financial reporting, which can be broadly broken down into three facets: (i) its role of relieving the burden on the state by supplementing or replacing government supervision, (ii) its role as guarantor of the capital market’s confidence and (iii) its role as guarantor of an audit and thus as the ‘guarantor of the guarantor’. This public function is emphasised by the recent introduction of hitherto non-systemic state supervision of supervisory boards and audit committees. This supervision is, however, to be viewed critically as it could result in the beginnings of ‘stock authorities’. This study examines how the aforementioned public function radiates to the other supervisory bodies in companies, namely the auditor and the supervisory board. It also examines the dangers which European strengthening of audit committees pose to corporate governance based on the dualistic system and to the balance of power in public limited companies.

scholarly journals Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murya Habbash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

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