Who's Really in Charge? Audit Committee versus CFO Power and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2057-2085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Beck ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Economic Recession ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Do Former Audit Firm Partners on Audit Committees Procure Greater Nonaudit Services from the Auditor?

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Nonaudit Services

ABSTRACT: To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Board Risk Committees and Audit Pricing

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Hines ◽  
Adi Masli ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Gary F. Peters
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Risk Oversight

SUMMARY Conditions leading up to and surrounding the global financial crisis prompted an increasing number of firms to create board-level risk oversight committees (RCs). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010) even legislates RCs for certain large banks. Distinct from audit committees, RCs present a unique setting to extend our understanding of the relation between emerging governance mechanisms and auditing. Using a sample of 3,980 U.S.-listed banks from 2003–2011, we find that on average, the presence of RCs is associated with higher audit fees. Our results are robust to multiple specifications, including self-selection and propensity score matched samples. For a reduced sample of 458 firms that employ an RC we also examine RC characteristics. We find RC independence and audit committee overlaps are associated with lower audit fees and RC size, relative to board size, is associated with higher audit fees. Supplemental analysis provides discussion of the potential audit environment implications of mandatory versus voluntary risk management controls. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1641-1677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Following ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Using Data

ABSTRACT This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.

Auditors' Communications with Audit Committees: The Influence of the Audit Committee's Oversight Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Fiolleau ◽  
Kris Hoang ◽  
Bradley Pomeroy
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Level Of Detail ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Communication Style ◽  
Quality Audit ◽  
Resolution Process ◽  
Asking Questions

SUMMARY Policymakers have identified effective communications between the auditor and the audit committee (AC) as an indicator of a quality audit, but little is known about the factors auditors consider when deciding what to communicate about significant accounting issues. We propose auditors use the AC's oversight approach as a cue for the level of detail in their communications that is necessary to satisfy the AC's preferences for auditors' insights on issues that were resolved with management. In our experiment, auditors resolved an inventory obsolescence issue with a hypothetical CFO, and then wrote a communication about it for the AC. We manipulate the AC's preference for getting involved in the issue resolution process and its reputation for asking questions. Our results, supplemented by findings from audit partner interviews, suggest auditors tailor their communications to the AC's oversight approach, the AC's industry and accounting knowledge, and the AC chair's preferred communication style. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

scholarly journals Gender Diversity of Audit Committees and Audit Fees: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Xiang ◽  
Meng Qin ◽  
Craig A Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
State Enterprises ◽  
The Relationship

<p>This paper investigates whether women, who serve on the audit committee of the board, can have a significant impact in reducing audit fees paid by China's A-share listed companies during the period 2004 to 2007. We show that audit committees composed of both men and women pay significantly smaller audit fees. The relationship is significantly greater in non-state enterprises than that exhibited by state-owned enterprises and significantly greater in companies deemed to have weak management vis-à-vis strong management. Further analysis shows that the composition of the committee is irrelevant when management is strong, regardless of whether it provides guidance for a state-owned enterprise or a strictly public company. When management is deemed weak, however, gender diversity is associated with smaller fees.</p>

Gender diversity on audit committees and its impact on audit fees: evidence from India

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 568-586 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seema Miglani ◽  
Kamran Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Expert

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship existing between gender diverse (women directors) audit committees and audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of 200 listed Indian firms over a four-year period (2011-2014). Ordinary least squares regression is used to assess whether and how the presence of women directors on audit committees affects the fee paid to the external auditor in India. To deal with the self-selection bias, the authors use a two-stage model developed using Heckman’s (1976) method. Findings The results show a significant positive relationship between the presence of a woman financial expert on the audit committee and audit fees after controlling for a number of firm-specific and governance characteristics and potential endogeneity with the propensity-matching score analysis. From the demand-side perspective of audit pricing, the results indicate that women financial experts on audit committees increase the need for assurance provided by external auditors. Using interaction terms, the authors find that women with financial expertise on an audit committee have a stronger association with audit fees as entity becomes more complex. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that audit committees with women financial experts are likely to demand higher audit quality, ceteris paribus. Practical implications Gender of the financial expert is critical to the audit committee’s effectiveness. The findings of this study have implications for the composition of an audit committee in a firm. Originality/value This study contributes to the extant literature by examining the less-researched topic of the association between the women representation on audit committees and audit fees. It also offers further empirical evidence that will influence the debate on the importance of gender diversity in corporations.

The Association between Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters ◽  
K. Raghunandan
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Span Of Control ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
Using Data

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees, using data gathered under the recent SEC fee disclosure rules. We hypothesize that audit fees will be positively associated with audit committee independence, financial expertise, and meeting frequency. We examine a sample of 492 nonregulated, Big 5-audited firms that filed proxy statements with the SEC in the period from February 5, 2001 to June 30, 2001. We find that audit committee independence (defined as an audit committee comprised entirely of outside, independent directors) and financial expertise (defined as an audit committee containing at least one member with financial expertise) are significantly, positively associated with audit fees. This is in contrast to the findings of Carcello et al. (2002a), who find that audit committee characteristics are not significant in the presence of board-related variables. Meeting frequency (defined as an audit committee that meets at least four times annually) was not associated with higher audit fees at conventional levels. This evidence is consistent with audit committees taking actions within their span of control to ensure a higher level of audit coverage.

The Failure to Remediate Previously Disclosed Material Weaknesses in Internal Controls

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline S. Hammersley ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Jian Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Material Weaknesses

SUMMARY In this paper, we study a sample of companies that fail to remediate previously disclosed material weaknesses (MWs) in their internal control systems and, thus, disclose the same MWs in two consecutive annual reports. Their failure to remediate is surprising given that regulators, credit rating agencies, and academics contend that the remediation of MWs is important. We form a control sample of companies that initially disclosed MWs in their internal control systems, but subsequently remediated these weaknesses, and investigate the characteristics of the remediated and unremediated MWs, the characteristics of remediating versus non-remediating companies, and the consequences to non-remediating companies. Regarding the characteristics of companies failing to remediate, we find that companies are less likely to remediate previously disclosed MWs when the weaknesses are more pervasive (i.e., when they are described as at the entity level, when there are more individual weaknesses) and when their operations are more complex (i.e., they have more segments and have foreign operations). In addition, companies with smaller audit committees are less likely to remediate. Regarding the consequences, we find that companies failing to remediate MWs experience larger increases in audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignation as the number of MWs increases. We also find that non-remediating companies are more likely to receive modified audit opinions and going-concern opinions. Finally, we find that companies failing to remediate are more likely to miss filing deadlines and experience increased cost of debt capital (i.e., they receive poorer credit ratings when entity level MWs are present, and are charged higher interest rates). Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals Do Gender Diversity Recommendations in Corporate Governance Codes Matter? Evidence from Audit Committees

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigar Sultana ◽  
Steven F. Cahan ◽  
Asheq Rahman
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Corporate Governance Codes ◽  
Limited Supply ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY Motivated by two opposing views, the limited supply view and the discrimination view, we examine the impact of gender diversity guidelines on the strength of the association between the presence of female audit committee members and audit quality. The limited supply view predicts that the effect of female audit committee members on audit quality would decrease after the guidelines were issued because they increased the demand for women directors without a commensurate increase in the supply of qualified women directors. The discrimination view predicts this relation would increase after the guidelines were issued since some firms would have abandoned their suboptimal hiring practices that favored men over better qualified women, resulting in higher quality firm-director matches as opportunities for women increase. Consistent with the limited supply view, we find that the positive association between audit committee gender diversity and audit quality weakened after gender diversity guidelines were introduced in Australia. JEL Classifications: G38; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the databases cited in the text.

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