Risky Business: Assessing the Generalizability of the PCAOB's Risk-Based Inspection Reports for Annually Inspected Audit Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-138
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Selection Model ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Relevant Feedback ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Incremental Information ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Risky Business

SUMMARY Existing research has found that the PCAOB inspection results of small (triennially inspected) audit firms provide incremental information about audit quality, but research has not documented a similar finding for large (annually inspected) firms. I examine the generalizability of annually inspected firms' inspection findings to audit quality by investigating the association between account-specific findings and account-specific audit quality while controlling for the PCAOB's risk-based program. First, I create a selection model to approximate the risk-based inspection process. I then use its outputs to control for selection risk while examining the association between revenue-specific deficiencies and the audit quality of revenues. I find that after controlling for selection risk, revenue-specific deficiencies are generalizable to the audit quality of revenues for clients that are more likely to be inspected. These results provide some evidence that the PCAOB's inspection program is meeting its objective of providing relevant feedback to stakeholders about audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources described in this text.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals Determinants of Audit Quality in Indonesia Supreme Audit Institution: A Conceptual Study

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2(I)) ◽  
pp. 38-41
Author(s):  
Khoirul Aswar ◽  
Fahmi Givari Akbar ◽  
Noegrahini Lastiningsih
Keyword(s):  
Attribution Theory ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Public Institution ◽  
Audit Process ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
Audit Failure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms

This research is based on the problem of poor audit practices by the Big Four audit firms and the mid-tier audit firms in UK in 2018/2019 cycle, which is indicated as audit failure. This resulted in sanctions and fines that increased significantly from the previous year. Problems related to audit quality are also experienced by government internal auditors in Indonesia. This is due to several factors such as the quality of government internal auditor resources that are still below the lowest service standards as a public institution, lack of available apparatus and low competency, and limited budget. The purposes of this study are to determine the extent of audit quality produced by government internal auditors at the Principal Inspectorate of Indonesia’s Supreme Audit Institution. Based on attribution theory, this study has several objectives, namely to determine the effect of competence, independence, and motivation on audit quality. Therefore, the contribution of this research can be the object of consideration and evaluation for Indonesia’s Supreme Audit Institution auditors regarding the audit process and audit results in the public or government sector, an information for Principal Inspectorate of Indonesia’s Supreme Audit Institution as an effort to maintain and improve the quality of government internal audits, and an information for the public in overseeing the audit quality of the management and responsibility of state finances.

Further Evidence on the Effect of Regulation on the Exit of Small Auditors from the Audit Market and Resulting Audit Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-115
Author(s):  
Neil L. Fargher ◽  
Alicia Jiang ◽  
Yangxin Yu
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Following the introduction of SOX in 2002 and the introduction of PCAOB inspections starting from 2003, DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that a large number of small auditors exited the SEC client audit market during the 2002–2004 period and that these exiting auditors were of lower quality relative to non-exiting auditors. This paper seeks to verify whether SOX and the introduction of PCAOB inspections improved audit quality through incentivizing small auditors providing lower audit quality to exit the market. Using client discretionary accruals and the likelihood of the clients restating financial statements as proxies for audit quality, we do not find that the small auditors that exited the market for SEC client audits were of lower quality than successor small audit firms that did not exit the market. JEL Classifications: G18; L51. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

scholarly journals The Influence of Institutional Regulatory Pressure on Nonprofit Hospital Audit Quality

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Michele M. McGowan ◽  
Siew H. Chan ◽  
Yuliya V. Yurova ◽  
Chunhui Liu ◽  
Raymond M. K. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Nonprofit Hospitals ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Interest Groups ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Nonprofit Hospital

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether the influence of institutional regulatory pressures emanating from the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and subsequent nonprofit legislation and disclosure requirements improves nonprofit hospital audit quality. Drawing on institutional theory, we argue that increased regulatory attention can shift the audit firm's judgment regarding the choice and inference of previously acceptable audit procedures and heighten the importance of reputational capital as an incentive for audit firms to improve audit quality. We examine two measures of audit quality: internal control deficiencies and discretionary accruals. The results reveal that the audit quality of nonprofit hospitals improves, suggesting that audit firms have responded to regulatory pressures and enhanced their audit and engagement practices for the benefit of nonprofit hospitals and stakeholders. The findings provide regulators and public interest groups with evidence that desired nonprofit oversight and accountability may have already been attained via improved audit quality. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

The Contagion Effect of Low-Quality Audits

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Paul N. Michas
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Control Sample ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Contagion Effect ◽  
Quality Audit ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Abnormal Accruals ◽  
Over Time

ABSTRACT We investigate if the existence of low-quality audits in an auditor office indicates the presence of a “contagion effect” on the quality of other (concurrent) audits conducted by the office. A low-quality audit is defined as the presence of one or more clients with overstated earnings that were subsequently corrected by a downward restatement. We document that the quality of audited earnings (abnormal accruals) is lower for clients in these office-years (when the misreporting occurred) compared to a control sample of office-years with no restatements. This effect lasts for up to five subsequent years, indicating that audit firms do not immediately rectify the problems that caused contagion. We also find that an office-year with client misreporting is likely to have subsequent (new) client restatements over the next five fiscal years. Overall, the evidence suggests that certain auditor offices have systematic audit-quality problems and that these problems persist over time. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

The Impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, the PCAOB Inspection Regime, and the Great Recession on Audit Fees and Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2098220
Author(s):  
Elizabeth S. Johnson ◽  
Kenneth J. Reichelt ◽  
Jared S. Soileau
Keyword(s):  
Great Recession ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Audit Approach ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the coinciding effects of the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5), the change in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) inspection regime, and the Great Recession on the audit fees and audit quality of accelerated filers. AS5 took effect in November 2007 and promulgated a top-down, risk-based audit approach to SOX 404(b) audits of accelerated filers. Concurrently, the PCAOB adopted a stricter approach to its inspections of audit firms, which encouraged them to improve audit quality and reduce audit fees. Moreover, the Great Recession pressured audit firms to reduce fees. We find that, following the three events, audit fees decreased and quality increased for accelerated filers. We also find that audit fees and audit quality increased for non-accelerated filers, although these filers were not directly affected by AS5.

An Empirical Investigation of IPO Underpricing and the Change to the LLP Organization of Audit Firms

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Muzatko ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone ◽  
Brian W. Mayhew ◽  
Larry E. Rittenberg
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Offering

This paper examines the relationship between the 1994 change in audit firm legal structure from general partnerships to limited liability partnerships (LLPs) on underpricing in the initial public offering (IPO) market. The change in legal structure of audit firms reduces an audit firm's wealth at risk from litigation damages and reduces the incentives for intrafirm monitoring by partners within an audit firm. Prior research suggests that underpricing protects underwriters from litigation damages, and that the level of underpricing varies inversely with both the amount of implicit insurance provided by the audit firm and the quality of the audit services provided. We hypothesize the change in audit firm legal structure reduced the assets available from audit firms in IPO-related litigation and indirectly reduced audit quality by lowering intrafirm monitoring. As a result, underwriters have incentives as a joint and several defendant with the audit firms to increase IPO underpricing, particularly for high-litigation-risk IPOs, following audit firms' shifts to LLP status. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis.

An Examination of Partner Perceptions of Partner Rotation: Direct and Indirect Consequences to Audit Quality

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian E. Daugherty ◽  
Denise Dickins ◽  
Richard C. Hatfield ◽  
Julia L. Higgs
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Survey Instrument ◽  
Unintended Consequence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Partner Perceptions ◽  
New Industry

SUMMARY Using structured interviews and surveys of practicing audit partners, this study examines their perceptions with regard to mandatory partner rotation and cooling-off periods, and how recently enacted, more stringent rules, may negatively impact auditors' quality of life to the detriment of audit quality. Results suggest rotation, in general, increases partners' workloads and the likelihood of relocation. Additionally, results suggest that in response to accelerated rotation (and an extended cooling-off period), partners would rather learn a new industry than relocate. Importantly, partners perceive audit quality suffers from retraining, but not from relocating. Thus these results suggest an indirect, negative impact, and unintended consequence, of accelerated rotation/extended cooling-off periods on audit quality. Data Availability: The survey instrument is available upon request. Individual audit partner responses are confidential.

scholarly journals Audit Quality and Disclosures of Less-Experienced Participating Audit Firms in PCAOB Filings

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. P1-P8
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Subsequent Increase ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Quarterly Earnings ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Universe

SUMMARY In “Who Did the Audit? Audit Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings” (Dee, Lulseged, and Zhang 2015), we examine quality for issuer audits disclosed as involving less-experienced “participating auditors.” We find that market prices of these issuers reacted negatively at the time of disclosure, and investors' valuations of their post-disclosure quarterly earnings declined; investors have greater uncertainty in the numbers reported. In addition, the quality of the reported earnings is lower. However, we do not see a subsequent increase in audit fees, which suggests clients do not increase demands for higher quality to counteract the uncertainty in investors' perceptions of audit quality. Since our sample is limited to less-experienced participating auditors, the results are not readily generalizable to the universe of participating auditors. Future research using Form AP data can explore if our findings are generalizable to issuer audits involving the wider population of participating auditors.

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

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