Audit and Nonaudit Fees and the Market's Reaction to Earnings Announcements

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia L. Higgs ◽  
Terrance R. Skantz

Effective February 05, 2001, publicly traded companies are required to disclose audit and nonaudit fees paid to their external auditors. These fee data have been used to test whether auditor independence is impaired when the external auditor provides nonaudit services to a client, usually by examining whether certain earnings characteristics are related to nonaudit fees in ways that suggest impairment. This paper follows in that tradition by testing whether the earnings response coefficient (ERC), a proxy for earnings quality, is associated with engagement profitability. Residual fees derived from a two-stage regression model that prices audit and nonaudit services simultaneously are used to proxy for engagement profitability. If the market perceives abnormally profitable engagements as a threat to auditor independence, then we would expect the ERC to be lower for firms with positive fee residuals. The paper examines the residual fee-ERC relation for annual earnings announcements immediately before and after first-time fee disclosure. We report results for alternative measures of unexpected earnings (I/B/E/S forecast errors and deviations from a seasonal random walk), different formulations of residual fees (as a dichotomous and continuous variable) and different samples. For total fees and audit fees, there is a positive association between ERCs and the level of residual fees. For nonaudit fees, there is only one combination of unexpected earnings and residual fee formulation where we observe a significantly negative association between ERCs and residual fees. The findings for audit fees are consistent with a market that interprets abnormally high audit fees as a signal of a firm's commitment to high earnings quality. The restrictive conditions under which we find a negative association between nonaudit fees and ERCs provide limited support for the contention that perceived auditor independence is impaired by abnormally high nonaudit fees.

2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suchismita Mishra ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

In FRR No. 68, the SEC (2003b) updated the rules related to the disclosure of fees paid to the independent auditor by requiring more detailed information about nonaudit fees. The SEC (2002, 2003b) asserted that the partition of nonaudit fees into the categories of audit-related, tax, and other fees would be useful for investors in assessing the auditor's independence and in voting on ratifying the auditor. The SEC suggested that investors would view audit-related and tax services more favorably than “other” nonaudit services. In this paper we test the SEC's assertions by examining shareholder ratification votes, during 2003, at 248 of the S&P 1500 firms. Our results support the SEC's assertion that investors would view audit-related fees differently than the other two types of nonaudit fees. However, contrary to the SEC's assertion, both the tax fee ratio and the other fee ratio have a positive association with the proportion of votes against auditor ratification. The results related to tax fees provide empirical support to the PCAOB's recent initiative to examine the association between tax services and auditor independence. Our results can be useful for client managements and audit committees considering purchases of nonaudit services from auditors. Our findings also suggest that it may be useful to replicate some prior studies (that use a single measure of nonaudit fees) using the newer, more finely partitioned, fee data.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-109
Author(s):  
Silvia Putri Faridayanti ◽  
Robiyanto Robiyanto

The purpose of this study is to determine investors reactions to earnings announcements and unexpected earnings when facing stickiness cost. Sampling in this study used a purposive sampling technique with a total of 10 infrastructure companies listed on the IDX during 2015-2019. The analysis technique in this study uses panel regression analysis using EVIEWS 9. The results of this study indicate that there is no investor reaction to earnings announcements in infrastructure companies when there are low and high stickiness cost. However, when the company has a combined stickiness cost, there is an investor's reaction to the earnings announcement by seeing a positive CAR value which means good earnings quality. Unexpected Earning has no effect on companies that are facing stickiness cost, so the results of this study indicate that there is no investor reaction to unexpected earnings in infrastructure companies that have low, high, and combined stickiness cost. The conclusion of this study is that earnings information becomes less important in predicting future earnings.


2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Callaghan ◽  
Mohinder Parkash ◽  
Rajeev Singhal

SUMMARY: Researchers in the area of auditor independence have examined the relationship between auditors' opinions and auditor-provided services. While DeFond et al. (2002) and Geiger and Rama (2003) fail to find auditor impairment for distressed U.S. companies, Sharma (2001) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find a negative relationship between the likelihood of a going-concern (GC) opinion and nonaudit fees paid to auditors for bankrupt Australian companies. These conflicting results may arise from jurisdictional differences between Australia and the U.S. or differential managerial incentives and firm costs between distressed and bankrupt firms. In light of these differences, an empirical question exists as to whether the results of the Australian studies will obtain in the U.S. We examine the relationship between the propensity of auditors to render GC opinions and nonaudit fees (and other auditor fees) for a sample of bankrupt U.S. firms. We do not observe any association between GC opinions and nonaudit fees, audit fees, total fees, or the ratio of nonaudit fees to total fees.


2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

The SEC and legislators have expressed concerns that independence may be negatively impacted if auditors perform significant nonaudit services for their audit clients, and that providing lucrative nonaudit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors will “see things the client's way.” Such concerns are particularly salient in the context of issues that involve significant auditor judgment, as in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients. In this study we examine the association between the magnitude of audit and nonaudit fees and auditor report modification decisions for financially stressed manufacturing companies. In our analysis we control for financial stress, company size, reporting lag, default status, audit committee effectiveness, and management plans. The results indicate a significant positive association between the magnitude of audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion, but we find no significant association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Additional analyses also find no significant relationship between the ratio of nonaudit service fees to audit fees and reporting decisions, and indicate that our results are robust across alternative model, variable, and sample specifications. We also control for the potential endogeneity of audit opinions, audit fees, and nonaudit fees, and find the same positive association of audit fees with opinions, but no association between nonaudit fees and audit opinions. Overall, we find no evidence of a significant adverse effect of nonaudit fees on auditor reporting judgments for our sample of distressed companies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arno Forst ◽  
Barry R. Hettler

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between disproportionate insider control, enabled through dual-class share structures, and the demand for audit quality. Using a comprehensive hand-collected sample of U.S. dual-class firms, we find that, consistent with outside shareholders' increased demand for external monitoring, as well as self-bonding by entrenched insiders, disproportionate insider control is positively associated with the propensity to hire a Big 4 or industry specialist auditor, auditor independence, and audit fees. Corroborating a self-bonding explanation, additional analyses show that audit quality mitigates the negative association of disproportionate insider control and firm value. In expanded analyses, we also investigate the separate effects of insider voting and cash flow rights on the demand for audit quality in dual-class firms. Consistent with general agency theory, we find a decreased (increased) demand for audit quality from incentive-alignment (entrenchment) effects of ownership.


2005 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Yinqi Zhang

A number of recent studies examine whether the joint provision of audit and nonaudit services (NAS) impairs auditor independence, and yield mixed results. We examine whether investors perceive auditor independence as being impaired when auditors supply nonaudit services, by investigating the association between fee-based measures of nonaudit service purchases and the earnings response coefficient (ERC). We find that the nonaudit fee ratio and the level of nonaudit fees were negatively associated with ERCs in 2001. When we use unexpected fees (a measure of over- or underpayment of nonaudit fees), we find a negative association between NAS purchases and ERC, but this occurs mainly in the second and third quarters following the release of the proxy. Further investigation reveals that the quarterly differences may be driven by the increasing flow of information (i.e., the first-time disclosures of fees and media analyses of these disclosures) that became available to investors during our sample period. We speculate that, during the course of the year 2001, the increase in information allowed investors to engage in better comparative analyses of the fee disclosures. We interpret our results as indicating that investors did perceive NAS as impairing auditor independence.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 103-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su ◽  
Yinqi Zhang

SUMMARY Concerns about the impact of auditor-provided nonaudit services (NAS) on auditor independence arise because of (1) auditors' economic dependence on their clients, and (2) some specific types of NAS which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argues can harm auditor objectivity. The SEC's prohibition in 2003 of specific kinds of NAS led to a significant decline in NAS between 2000–2001 and 2004–2005. We argue that this decline in observed NAS fees can be used to identify firms that had a greater likelihood of impaired auditor independence in the pre-SOX period. Using discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings management, we find a positive association between discretionary accruals in the pre-SOX era and the subsequent reduction in NAS, but this was confined to income-decreasing accruals. Further, the association between downward earnings management and the decline in NAS was reduced in the post-SOX era.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eli Amir ◽  
Yanling Guan ◽  
Gilad Livne

SUMMARY We examine the relation between timely loss recognition and abnormal audit, non-audit, and total fees over a period of thirteen years. We use positive abnormal audit (non-audit) fees as a measure of abnormal audit effort (economic bond). We report some evidence suggesting audit effort is associated with slower loss recognition in accruals before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) became effective. We find stronger evidence that audit effort is associated with slower loss recognition post-SOX when clients raise substantial external funds or when the auditor is not an industry specialist. Using C_Score, we find a negative association between changes in abnormal audit fees and total fees, and changes in C_Score only post-SOX. We do not find abnormal non-audit fees are associated with the speed of loss recognition. Collectively, the results suggest post-SOX auditors exert more effort when losses are delayed and that non-audit services do not compromise auditor independence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1097-1114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyunmin Oh ◽  
Sambock Park ◽  
Soonwook Hong

We investigate whether auditors input additional audit hours according to the sizes of book-tax differences (hereinafter BTD) and request additional audit fees for additional audit hours. In addition, the interaction effects of corporate governance on the relationships between BTD and audit hours/audit fees are examined using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores, data from the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). We predict that since auditors have the incentive and ability to consider BTD, audit hours and audit fees will increase when BTD are larger. Empirical results of our study are as follows. First, BTD and audit hours (LnAH) show a negative (-) association that is not statistically significant. Second, audit fees (LnAF) were shown to increase along with BTD. This can be interpreted as a result of requests for additional audit fees for increased audit risks due to individual firms' BTD. Third, the interaction effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours (LnAH) showed a positive (+) association, but the association was not statistically significant. Fourth, the interaction effect of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit fees (LnAF) showed a statistically significant positive (+) association. This be understood as meaning that firms with better governance make more efforts for financial reporting in order to maintain their reliability in the market. This study contributes to the literature in several important aspects. First, it empirically demonstrates whether auditors properly reflect BTD on audit risks. Next, our study is analyzes the effects of corporate governance on the relationship between BTD and audit hours/audit fees using the total corporate governance (TCG) scores presented by the Korea Corporate Governance Service (KCGS). Finally, our findings empirically showed social proof function of accounting audits as a strategy to reduce information risks. 


GeroPsych ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-134
Author(s):  
Mechthild Niemann-Mirmehdi ◽  
Andreas Häusler ◽  
Paul Gellert ◽  
Johanna Nordheim

Abstract. To date, few studies have focused on perceived overprotection from the perspective of people with dementia (PwD). In the present examination, the association of perceived overprotection in PwD is examined as an autonomy-restricting factor and thus negative for their mental well-being. Cross-sectional data from the prospective DYADEM study of 82 patient/partner dyads (mean age = 74.26) were used to investigate the association between overprotection, perceived stress, depression, and quality of life (QoL). The analyses show that an overprotective contact style with PwD has a significant positive association with stress and depression, and has a negative association with QoL. The results emphasize the importance of avoiding an overprotective care style and supporting patient autonomy.


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