Client Importance and Earnings Management: The Moderating Role of Audit Committees

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vineeta D. Sharma ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Umapathy Ananthanarayanan
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Economic Importance ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Inside Ownership

SUMMARY This study provides empirical evidence on how the association between the economic importance of a client to the auditor and earnings management is moderated by the audit committee. We employ city office-level client importance fee-based measures, both performance-adjusted discretionary total and current accruals as proxies for earnings management, and a measure of audit committee best practices. We document a positive association between client importance and our two proxies for earnings management. This association is stronger for income-increasing earnings management. However, the association between client importance and earnings management is more pronounced when the audit committee does not meet best practices. We infer that the economic importance of a client appears to threaten auditor independence and thus the quality of financial reporting, but only when the audit committee exhibits characteristics associated with the provision of weak oversight. We also find that the association between client importance and earnings management is conditional on inside ownership, growth, leverage, and firm size, which are moderated by the audit committee. This study is the first to demonstrate that audit committees can moderate threats to auditor independence thus protecting the quality of financial reporting. The study discusses potential implications for policy making and empirical research.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

scholarly journals The Impact Of Audit Committees Personal Characteristics On Earnings Management: Evidence From China

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1331-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baolei Qi ◽  
Gaoliang Tian
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Upper Echelons Theory ◽  
Gender Education ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates the influence of audit committees personal characteristics on the firms earnings management behavior using Chinas publicly traded firms during 2004-2010. Overall, our findings suggest that audit committees several personal characteristics, such as age, gender, education level, and working experience, are associated with earnings management, which in turn may affect the quality of financial reporting. The results are robust after controlling the size, independence, meeting frequency of audit committee, and other firm specific characteristics. The results are consistent with the predictions based on the Upper Echelons Theory. The contributions to the earnings management literature and implications for regulators and investors are also discussed.

The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liesbeth Bruynseels ◽  
Eddy Cardinaels
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Negative Effect

ABSTRACT To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have “friendship” ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through “advice networks” do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

scholarly journals Corporate Social Responsibility, Audit Committee Expertise, and Financial Reporting: Empirical Evidence from Korea

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (19) ◽  
pp. 10517
Author(s):  
Haeyoung Ryu ◽  
Soo-Joon Chae ◽  
Bomi Song
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Accounting Expertise ◽  
Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) involves multiple activities and is influenced by the cultural and legal environment of the country in which a firm is located. This study examines the role of audit committees’ (AC) financial expertise in the relationship between CSR and the earnings quality of Korean firms with high levels of CSR. Using a multivariate analysis, it investigates whether the ACs that include members with accounting expertise, finance expertise, or supervisory expertise individually affect a firm’s decision making. It also examines how ACs with diverse expertise contribute toward improving the financial reporting quality of firms with high levels of CSR. The results demonstrate that when there is a certified accountant in the AC of a firm that practices CSR based on ethical motivation, the earnings management through discretionary accruals is more strictly controlled. This is more effective when the AC comprises members with accounting and non-accounting expertise. This finding implies that the AC plays a positive role in improving the accounting information quality of firms with CSR excellence. Moreover, while the role of accounting experts in the AC is important for maintaining high earnings quality, combining other types of expertise creates synergy.

scholarly journals Audit committee compensation, best practices and audit fees

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bum-Jin Park
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
High Quality ◽  
The Relationship

Background: It is extremely important that an audit committee (AC) monitors a company’s financial reporting process, and that the committee engages a high-quality auditor to carry this out effectively. Prior research on ACs has paid much attention to the relationship between AC best practices and audit fees (AF). Although compensation is a means of aligning interests between ACs and stakeholders, previous studies have neglected the complementary interaction between AC compensation and compliance with best practices on audit quality.Objectives: The purpose of this study is to investigate how compensation for ACs affects AF, and how the association is moderated by compliance with best practices to capture effective monitoring.Method: The regression models are estimated to verify how the relationship between AC compensation and AF is moderated by AC compliance with best practice. Moreover, the logistic regression models are used to investigate how the relationship between AC compensation and the opportunistic achievement of earnings goals is moderated by AC compliance with best practice.Results: The findings show a positive association between the levels of compensation AC members receive and AF, which is reinforced in firms that have ACs that comply with all best practices.Conclusion: The results suggest that highly paid ACs engage high-quality auditors to complement their function of monitoring management and AC compensation and compliance with best practices are complementary to enhance audit quality. This study thus provides the interesting insights that can be applicable to countries with requirements relating to the compensation schemes for ACs or the formation of the AC.

Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 2099-2130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Yuan Wen ◽  
Wanli Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Legal Expertise

ABSTRACT Recent trends in corporate board composition indicate an increase in the appointment of directors with legal expertise. Using two financial reporting quality measures, accruals quality and discretionary accruals, we find—for a sample of Russell 1000 firms in 2003 and 2005—that the presence (and proportion) of directors with legal backgrounds on the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. These results obtain after controlling for accounting expertise on audit committees. Also, supplementary tests indicate a positive association between changes in legal expertise and changes in financial reporting quality, suggesting that legal expertise serves as a monitor rather than as a signal of financial reporting quality. Further, the two forms of expertise interact —i.e., the presence of directors with both forms of expertise enhances financial reporting quality, beyond the contribution of the individual forms of expertise. Additional tests suggest that the positive effects of legal expertise are greater in the post-SOX period compared with a pre-SOX year.

scholarly journals Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 100-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Murya Habbash
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

scholarly journals An Investigation IFRS Adoption in Malaysia on The Relationship between The Audit Committee and Quality of Financial Statement

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-122
Author(s):  
Citrawati Jatiningrum ◽  
Fauzi Fauzi ◽  
Rita Irviani ◽  
Mujiyati Mujiyati ◽  
Shahanif Hasan
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Committee Meeting ◽  
Ifrs Adoption ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Post Period

Audit committees are one of Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms which are the significant factor in improving its role in inhibiting financial statement fraud (Choi, Jeon & Park, 2004; Habbash, 2010; Soliman & Ragab, 2014). Quality of the Financial Statement emphasised as being in compliance with accounting standards accepted in general, the disclosure scale, and reported numbers although this is not merely a task for the IFRS (Cascino & Gassen, 2010). In recent years, the issue of IFRS adoption in developed and developing countries have been a great deal of attention from many researchers. However, regarding the relationship between the Audit Committee and Quality of Financial Statement with IFRS requirements is still questioning. In fact, the results obtained from some previous researches are inconsistent. Therefore, the objectives in this study are aims to investigate whether post the mandatory IFRS adoption in Malaysia would limit earnings management practice in highlights of governance monitoring on the quality of financial reporting in this environment. This paper gives some evidence: 1) The effect of pre- and post IFRS adoption in Malaysia in the relationship between the Audit Committee and earnings management adoption. 2) examine the differences of the level earnings management on two periods of IFRS adoption in Malaysia. Quality of Financial statement in this study was measured by the level of earnings management with discretional accrual (DA) proxy. The audit committee variable measured by Audit Committee Independence (ACIND), Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACFEX), Audit Committee Meeting (ACMEET), Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) and control variable in this study using Board Size (BRDSIZE) and Firm Leverage (FRMLEV). The sample of this study including the two main time periods, there are pre-IFRS adoption and post-IFRS adoption. Using 81 listed companies in Malaysia as a sample, with 567 observations is analysed from 2009 to 2015 (7 years observations) with purposive judgement sampling selection. For seven years, a total of 567 observations is analysed. The pre- IFRS adoption period was tested from 2009 through 2011, and the post-IFRS adoption was tested from 2012 through the end of 2015. The findings in this study with multiplied regression analysis revealed that the hypothesis test in a period of pre- and post IFRS adoption ACFEX and FIRMLEV statistically were significance at 5% level. It means that Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACFEX) have a significant effect on earnings management practise. According to the result found in the post IFRS adoption period, Audit Committee Meeting (ACMEET) is significant. It means that the frequency of audit committee meetings could be decreasing the level of discretionary accrual. The evidence also unveils both of ACIND and ACSIZE at 5 % level p-value is not significant. The most important result finding on pre- and post period of IFRS adoption in Malaysia provide evidence that based on the statistically significant was upward or the relation more significantly. However, this study also reported with paired sampled test analysis there was no significant difference between the level of earnings management in pre- and post period the adoption of IFRS in Malaysia at 5% level significance.  An important contribution this study has the impact on practices and has implications useful for regulators. The study provides empirical evidence that a relationship between the audit committee and earnings management in the case of IFRS adoption. In contributing to the strength of governance quality and FRQ need to be revisited, especially after mandatory IFRS adoption. Though the audit committee and audit quality are implicitly mentioned in the CG act, it is recommended that formulates specific rules relating to the quality of Financial Reporting. In this regard, it is suggested that company reports would be presented high quality in financial reporting to provide appropriate responses to recommendations made in the reports. Finally, these findings suggest that CG practices in Malaysian that have its own peculiar characteristics compared to other emerging economies.      

Board and audit committee effectiveness in the post-ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations era

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1137-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Safari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Aggregate Effect

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the aggregate effect of board and audit committee characteristics on earnings management practices, particularly in the period following the introduction of the second edition of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. Design/methodology/approach This paper begins by embarking on an extensive review of extant empirical research on boards of directors and audit committees. Then, the paper reports on the use of a quantitative analysis approach to specify the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics (introduced by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and the level of absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Findings The findings suggest that greater compliance with board and audit committee principles is linked to lower earnings management, indicating that deliberate structuring of boards and audit committees is an effective approach for enhancing a firm’s financial reporting quality and providing support for the efficacy of the second edition of principles and recommendations related to boards and audit committees suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. Practical implications This study significantly extends the literature and has notable implications for financial reporting regulators, as the findings regarding the monitoring role of boards and audit committees should be beneficial for future revisions of corporate governance principles and recommendations. Originality/value This study focuses on the aggregate effect of board characteristics recommended by the Australian Corporate Governance Council on earnings management practices, and the results support the effectiveness of the board and audit committee characteristics recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. New directions for future improvements to the principles and recommendations are identified.

The Impact on Auditor Judgments of CEO Influence on Audit Committee Independence

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 129-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Auditor Judgments ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

SUMMARY Despite the importance of audit committee independence in ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting process, recent research suggests that even when audit committees meet regulatory independence requirements, certain factors, such as undue influence by the CEO over the selection of the audit committee, may diminish the ability of its members to be substantively independent. This study investigates whether auditors consider CEO influence over audit committee independence when making audit judgments where management's incentives to manage earnings differ. In an experiment, we find that audit partners and managers waive a larger amount of a proposed audit adjustment when management's incentives for earnings management are low than when incentives are high. However, when management incentives are high, auditors are less likely to waive as much of an adjustment when the CEO has less influence over the audit committee's independence than when the CEO's influence is greater. In all, the results support our expectations that auditors consider CEO influence on audit committee independence in the resolution of contentious accounting issues. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

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