The Interplay of Client Management and the Audit Committee on Auditor Performance

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. P11-P17
Author(s):  
J. Owen Brown ◽  
Velina K. Popova
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Evidence Evaluation ◽  
Auditor Judgments ◽  
Client Management

SUMMARY This article summarizes “The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee Communication on Auditor Judgment” (Brown and Popova 2016), which investigates the influence that client management and the audit committee have on auditor judgments and behavior. We find that additional, informal audit committee communication with the auditor, as directed under the recently issued Auditing Standard No. 16, Communications with Audit Committees, has a significant and positive impact on auditors' evidence evaluation and related judgments under certain conditions. Specifically, when client management has greater incentives to try to unduly influence the auditor, this additional communication has a significant, positive impact on auditors' evidence evaluation and related judgments. However, when client management is perceived as having lower incentives, management becomes more persuasive than the audit committee and is able to influence the auditors into accepting an aggressive, management-preferred accounting outcome. We discuss the implications of our findings for auditors, companies, and regulators who are interested in the role of corporate governance and, more specifically, the interrelationships required among management, the auditor, and the audit committee for enhancing financial reporting quality.

The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee Communication on Auditor Judgment

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Owen Brown ◽  
Velina K. Popova
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Source Credibility ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Credibility Theory ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Evidence Evaluation ◽  
Source Credibility Theory ◽  
Auditor Judgments

ABSTRACT This study investigates the interplay of management and the audit committee on auditor judgments and evidence documentation. In a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, 58 experienced auditors were tasked with evaluating an inventory obsolescence issue when management's incentives to influence the auditor were either higher or lower. The auditors were also either provided or not provided with additional communicated expectations from the audit committee that opposed management's aggressive reporting preference. Drawing on research on competing preferences and source credibility theory, we predict and find that when management's incentives are higher, additional audit committee communication has a significant and positive impact on auditors' evidence evaluation and related judgments. However, we find no effect of added audit committee influence when management incentives are lower. These findings highlight the importance of examining the interrelationships among the various actors contributing to corporate governance and also inform standard setters about the benefits of increased communication between audit committees and auditors.

The Impact on Auditor Judgments of CEO Influence on Audit Committee Independence

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 129-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Management Incentives ◽  
Auditor Judgments ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

SUMMARY Despite the importance of audit committee independence in ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting process, recent research suggests that even when audit committees meet regulatory independence requirements, certain factors, such as undue influence by the CEO over the selection of the audit committee, may diminish the ability of its members to be substantively independent. This study investigates whether auditors consider CEO influence over audit committee independence when making audit judgments where management's incentives to manage earnings differ. In an experiment, we find that audit partners and managers waive a larger amount of a proposed audit adjustment when management's incentives for earnings management are low than when incentives are high. However, when management incentives are high, auditors are less likely to waive as much of an adjustment when the CEO has less influence over the audit committee's independence than when the CEO's influence is greater. In all, the results support our expectations that auditors consider CEO influence on audit committee independence in the resolution of contentious accounting issues. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Did the 1999 NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Standard Changes on Audit Committee Composition Benefit Investors?

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Independent Audit

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

Audit committee ownership and audit report lag: evidence from Australia

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-125
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Mabel D’Costa
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Using Data

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether audit committee ownership affects audit report lag. Independent audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, to ensure that financial statements are both credible and released to external stakeholders in a timely manner. To date, however, the extent to which audit committee ownership strengthens or compromises member independence, and hence, influences audit report lag, has remained unexplored. Design/methodology/approach This paper hypothesizes that audit committee ownership is associated with audit report lag. Further, the author hypothesize that both the financial reporting quality and the going concern opinions of a firm mediate the effect of audit committee ownership on audit report lag. Findings Using data from Australian listed companies, the author find that audit committee ownership increases audit report lag. The author further document that financial reporting quality and modified audit opinions rendered by external auditors mediate this positive relationship. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns emanating from firms’ deliberate decisions to grant shares to the audit committee members. Originality/value The study contributes to both the audit report timeliness and the corporate governance literatures, by documenting an adverse effect of audit committee ownership.

Auditor Communications with the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors: Policy Recommendations and Opportunities for Future Research

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Communication Process ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Future Research

To contribute to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) project on auditor communications with audit committees and boards of directors, we present in this paper a review of relevant academic literature. We also identify promising future research opportunities for the academic community. We specifically focus on how the communication process may affect overall financial reporting quality, internal controls, control environments, and external auditors' performance, as well as matters that potentially impact financial reporting and should interest the PCAOB (e.g., in the area of management discussion and analysis). We specifically link the findings from academic research to the discussion questions posed by the PCAOB in its 2004 briefing paper. Several potential implications of the findings should also interest standard-setters and regulators addressing issues related to corporate governance and financial reporting quality.

Academic Research on Communications Among External Auditors, the Audit Committee, and the Board: Implications and Recommendations for Practice

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. A1-A8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Cohen ◽  
Lisa Milici Gaynor ◽  
Ganesh Krishnamoorthy ◽  
Arnold M. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Recommendations For Practice

SUMMARY: This article provides a summary of the academic research findings on the attributes of effective audit committees and potential threats to financial reporting quality that should lead to heightened auditor and audit committee sensitivity. The practice implications of this research are then discussed in terms of appropriate communications among auditors, audit committees, and boards of directors.

Legal Expertise on Corporate Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (6) ◽  
pp. 2099-2130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jayanthi Krishnan ◽  
Yuan Wen ◽  
Wanli Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Legal Expertise

ABSTRACT Recent trends in corporate board composition indicate an increase in the appointment of directors with legal expertise. Using two financial reporting quality measures, accruals quality and discretionary accruals, we find—for a sample of Russell 1000 firms in 2003 and 2005—that the presence (and proportion) of directors with legal backgrounds on the audit committee is associated with higher financial reporting quality. These results obtain after controlling for accounting expertise on audit committees. Also, supplementary tests indicate a positive association between changes in legal expertise and changes in financial reporting quality, suggesting that legal expertise serves as a monitor rather than as a signal of financial reporting quality. Further, the two forms of expertise interact —i.e., the presence of directors with both forms of expertise enhances financial reporting quality, beyond the contribution of the individual forms of expertise. Additional tests suggest that the positive effects of legal expertise are greater in the post-SOX period compared with a pre-SOX year.

Busyness, Expertise, and Financial Reporting Quality of Audit Committee Chairs and Financial Experts

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul N. Tanyi ◽  
David B. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Committee Chairman ◽  
Committee Chair ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Reporting Process

SUMMARY We investigate how the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by the audit committee chairman and the audit committee financial experts affects their ability to oversee a company's financial reporting process. We argue that these two audit committee roles are vital to the functioning of the audit committee and that their over commitment affects audit committee oversight and the firm's financial reporting quality. We observe a significant negative association between financial reporting quality and the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by the audit committee chairman. We also find a significant negative association between financial reporting quality and the number of audit committee chair positions and other audit committee financial expertise positions held by audit committee financial experts. Firms with busy audit committee chairs or busy financial experts have significantly higher levels of abnormal accruals, and are more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, which is consistent with the busyness hypothesis. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend to nonaudit committee chairs and nonaudit committee financial experts. We interpret these results to indicate that the busyness of the audit committee chair and financial expert weakens the monitoring and oversight role that audit committees play in the financial reporting process.

Board and audit committee effectiveness in the post-ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations era

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1137-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Safari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Aggregate Effect

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the aggregate effect of board and audit committee characteristics on earnings management practices, particularly in the period following the introduction of the second edition of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. Design/methodology/approach This paper begins by embarking on an extensive review of extant empirical research on boards of directors and audit committees. Then, the paper reports on the use of a quantitative analysis approach to specify the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics (introduced by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and the level of absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Findings The findings suggest that greater compliance with board and audit committee principles is linked to lower earnings management, indicating that deliberate structuring of boards and audit committees is an effective approach for enhancing a firm’s financial reporting quality and providing support for the efficacy of the second edition of principles and recommendations related to boards and audit committees suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. Practical implications This study significantly extends the literature and has notable implications for financial reporting regulators, as the findings regarding the monitoring role of boards and audit committees should be beneficial for future revisions of corporate governance principles and recommendations. Originality/value This study focuses on the aggregate effect of board characteristics recommended by the Australian Corporate Governance Council on earnings management practices, and the results support the effectiveness of the board and audit committee characteristics recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. New directions for future improvements to the principles and recommendations are identified.

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