scholarly journals Science and the Necessity of Faith: Notes on “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Min Seong Kim

Apropos Kant’s discussion of scientific practice in the section of the first Critique entitled “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic,” there has long been a tendency in Anglophone Kant scholarship to downplay the role of God or quickly brush aside the centrality of the idea in the Kantian system. As a way of setting the stage for evaluating the place of God in Kant’s philosophy, this paper, in a concise and straightforward manner, attempts to make the connection between science and the idea of God as it appears in the first Critique explicit and explain why Kant is driven to make that connection. In the first half of the paper, I summarize Kant’s discussion of scientific practice as presented in the first part of the Appendix, followed by a brief discussion of a problem his account raises. In the second half of the paper, I elaborate the connection between science and God as a response to that problem.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mieke Boon

Abstract The purpose of this article is to develop an epistemology of scientific models in scientific research practices, and to show that disciplinary perspectives have crucial role in such an epistemology. A transcendental (Kantian) approach is taken, aimed at explanations of the kinds of questions relevant to the intended epistemology, such as “How is it possible that models provide knowledge about aspects of reality?” The approach is also pragmatic in the sense that the questions and explanations must be adequate and relevant to concrete scientific practice. First it is explained why the idea of models as representations in terms of similarity or isomorphism between a model and its target is too limited as a basis for this epistemology. An important finding is that the target-phenomenon is usually not something that can be observed in a straightforward manner, but requires both characterization in terms of measurable variables and subsumption under (scientific) concepts. The loss of this basis leads to a number of issues, such as: how can models be interpreted as representations if models also include conceptually meaningful linguistic content; how can researchers identify non-observable real-world target-phenomena that are then represented in the model; how do models enable inferential reasoning in performing epistemic tasks by researchers; and, how to justify scientific models. My proposal is to deal with these issues by analyzing how models are constructed, rather than by looking at ready-made models. Based on this analysis, I claim that the identification of phenomena and the construction of scientific models is guided and also confined by the disciplinary perspective within which researchers in a scientific discipline have learned to work. I propose a Kuhnian framework by which the disciplinary perspective can be systematically articulated. Finally, I argue that harmful forms of subjectivism, due to the loss of the belief that models objectively represent aspects of reality, can be overcome by making the disciplinary perspective(s) in a research project explicit, thereby enabling its critical assessment, for which the proposed Kuhnian framework provides a tool.


2017 ◽  
Vol 122 (4) ◽  
pp. 1079-1104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry M. Cowles

Abstract This is an essay on the origin of theories. It argues that methodology can do more than shape scientific theories—sometimes, vocabularies of method become such theories. The origin of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is a case in point: Darwin’s well-known attention to methodological matters not only framed but bled into his theory of nature. A careful student of contemporary methodology, Darwin sought guidance for using a controversial tool in the scientific world in which he came of age: the hypothesis. In the process of reading the works of John Herschel and William Whewell, Darwin turned nature itself into a man of science. The hypotheses and testing of scientific practice were mirrored in the variations and selection of the natural world. Though unintentional, Darwin’s naturalization of a vocabulary of method helped pave the way for applications of evolutionary theory to the study of the human mind and, completing the circle, to the philosophy of science. Considering the role of vocabularies of method in the origin of theories suggests new directions for the study of cognitive history and the power of language to transform the historical imagination.


Author(s):  
Otávio Bueno ◽  
Steven French

What has been called ‘the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’ sets a challenge for philosophers. Some have responded to that challenge by arguing that mathematics is essentially anthropocentric in character whereas others have pointed to the range of structures that mathematics offers. Here a middle way is offered that focuses on the moves that have to be made in both the mathematics and the relevant physics in order to bring the two into appropriate relation. This relation can be captured via the inferential conception of the applicability of mathematics which is formulated in terms of immersion inference and interpretation. In particular the roles of idealizations and of surplus structure in science and mathematics respectively are brought to the fore and captured via an approach to models and theories that emphasizes the partiality of the available information: the partial structures approach. The discussion as a whole is grounded in a number of case studies drawn from the history of quantum physics and extended to contest recent claims that the explanatory role of certain mathematical structures in scientific practice supports a realist attitude towards them. The overall conclusion is that the effectiveness of mathematics does not seem unreasonable at all once close attention is paid to how it is actually applied in practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 636-658
Author(s):  
Valentina Marcheselli

All life on Earth shares the same ancestor, the most primitive form of life that arose, in still unknown circumstances, more than 3.5 billion years ago. At least this is what is commonly assumed. Astrobiologists have revisited this assumption and advanced the hypothesis of the existence of a “shadow biosphere” on Earth: a parallel tree of life whose instances, being different at the molecular level to the kind of life we are used to, would remain hidden from view. In this paper, I take the emergence of the so-called shadow biosphere hypothesis and the controversial discovery of GFAJ-1, a microbe thriving in the arsenic-rich waters of Mono Lake, as an entry point to look into the strategic role of non-knowledge claims. I juxtapose the Latourian black-box, that is, those undiscussed technoscientific artifacts that are taken for granted in scientific practice, with the shadowy nature of non-knowledge claims in order to pay closer attention to the contingent, active, performative, and always social nature of the making of what is unknown. I conclude this paper by claiming that in the negotiation of what is unknown, emerging disciplines position themselves within the larger scientific community.


Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan

Textbooks and other popular venues commonly present science as a progressive “brick-by-brick” accumulation of knowledge and facts. Despite its hallowed history and familiar ring, this depiction is nowadays rejected by most specialists. Then why are books and articles, written by these same experts, actively promoting such a distorted characterization? The short answer is that no better alternative is available. There currently are two competing models of the scientific enterprise: reductionism and antireductionism. Neither provides an accurate depiction of the productive interaction between knowledge and ignorance, supplanting the old metaphor of the “wall” of knowledge. This book explores an original conception of the nature and advancement of science. The proposed shift brings attention to a prominent, albeit often neglected, construct—the black box—which underlies a well-oiled technique for incorporating a productive role of ignorance and failure into the acquisition of empirical knowledge. What is a black box? How does it work? How is it constructed? How does one determine what to include and what to leave out? What role do boxes play in contemporary scientific practice? By detailing some fascinating episodes in the history of biology, psychology, and economics, Nathan revisits foundational questions about causation, explanation, emergence, and progress, showing how the insights of both reductionism and antireductionism can be reconciled into a fresh and exciting approach to science.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Esteban Lara ◽  
Benedikt Holtmann ◽  
Eduardo S. A. Santos ◽  
Shinichi Nakagawa

A recent comparative study found that when resources are limited, parents primarily allocate food to superior nestlings, whereas when resources are abundant, parents evenly allocate food to all nestlings, putting forward what we refer to as the resource availability hypothesis (RAH). This ecological perspective adds valuable insights to the two classical hypotheses, sexual conflict and parent–offspring conflict, that explain the diversity of feeding patterns observed in nature. We investigated the parental allocation decisions between monogamous pairs and polyandrous trios of dunnocks. We first assessed whether the number of spots on the tongues of nestlings signals condition to the breeding parents. We then explored the RAH in an intra-specific context. We found evidence to suggest that the number of nestling tongue spots signals condition to breeding parents. We also found that monogamous and polyandrous females and polyandrous males prioritized nestlings in better condition, yet monogamous males fed nestlings evenly. This finding is consistent with the RAH in our population if monogamous males secure more resources due to their superior quality, thus resulting in the even feeding of nestlings. Another explanation for the observed parental feeding decisions that is indirectly associated with the RAH is sexual conflict (the uncertainty of paternity). Finally, we found that an assumption regarding feeding patterns in dunnocks that was established in another population was not fulfilled here; thus, it is worth noting that testing assumptions is a vital step towards assessing the generality of former findings, paving the way to credible scientific practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-191
Author(s):  
Massimo Campanini

The article carries on the project of a ‘Philosophical Qur'anology’, referring to the possibility of approaching the Qur'an as a philosophical book. Here I will focus on the concept of bayān, exploring the role of language in understanding more thoroughly the Qur'anic idea of God in relation with philosophical topics as ontology and epistemology. My idea is to read Qur'anic obviousness through the pair-couple of ẓāhir and bāṭin in order to make meaning ( maʿnā) manifest (in the sense of the Latin verb: ostendere) in the immediateness of its evidence. The proposed approach is grounded in Ẓāhirī rules of interpretation, which claim to be wholeheartedly faithful to the apparent meaning of the text, but through the a-letheia (‘disclosure’, in Heidegger's terms) of the manifested and the clear truthfulness ( haqīqa) of the content. Taking the thought of Ibn Ḥazm as a starting point, the article will explore Averroes' method through the lenses of the Moroccan philosopher Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī. I will try to show that bayān does mean first of all that a text is clear in the language wherein it has been revealed or however expressed. As the source of all revealed lights is the Arabic language, the Arabic Qur'an is in itself clear and explains itself. The evidence of the Qur'an is the emergence of meaning from the clarity of the text. To provide an illustrative example, al-Ghazzālī's interpretation of the Light Verse will be shortly addressed.


Author(s):  
Mark Weinstein

The Centrality of the periodic table to chemistry is beyond dispute. What seems just as obvious to me is that the table should be seen to play an equally central role in the philosophical understanding of scientific inquiry. This may be a minority opinion; if we look at philosophical discussions of scientific issues broadly, such a view seems unsupported by philosophical practice. Philosophers have been exercised by the problematic aspects of science: revolutions rather than normal scientific practice; aspects of science that are conceptually problematic, for example, quantum mechanics; areas of science that include explanatory accounts that deviate from standard models, for example, evolutionary theory; or aspects of science that raise moral or social issues, such as the biomedical sciences. Chemistry, with a long track record of unsurprising growth, with myriad of applications taken for granted, and with a strongly supported and unifying theory may seem to be just too boring to exercise philosophers interested in resolving puzzles, developing surprising theories, and engendering novel insights. But as I will attempt to show, the most normal of normal sciences, physical chemistry with the periodic table at its core, offers a view of science relevant to central philosophical concerns. In what follows I will offer an overview of three philosophical areas for which the periodic table is salient, while indicating a logical image of a scientific structure of the sort that the table exemplifies. I look first at methodology, and in particular the role of counterevidence in evaluating generalizations. Second I look at how the table permits a reinterpretation of foundational epistemological notions of truth. Finally, I will look at ontology, how the table supports our commitment to the fundamental nature of reality. The basis of my analysis is a model of emerging truth (MET). This metamathematical model is available in a number of publications and I will include only its most basic elements in a technical appendix. In place of the formal construction I will offer the philosophical intuitions it encodes, intuitions that draw upon the structure of chemistry with the periodic table at its core.


2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (8) ◽  
pp. 1812-1837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vasudevan

The author builds on recent geographical approaches to the investigation of scientific experimentation. While a number of studies have explored the various sites of scientific practice and the role of space in the constitution of experimental matters of fact, far less attention has been directed toward the cultural geographies of experimental science and the extrascientific zones in which modes of experimental practice were themselves developed and contested. Drawing on the reception of professional psychiatry in interwar Berlin (1919–1933), the author traces an alternative set of ‘experimental systems’ which seized on and countered the credibility of psychiatric expertise. The focus is on a series of modernist experiments in interwar Germany which actively reconfigured psychiatric science as a series of critical aesthetic interventions themselves tasked with performing ‘scientific experiments’. The paper is triangulated around three case studies, which chart the multiple traffickings between psychiatric experimentation and modernist art. The first revisits the traumatic reenactments of Berlin Dada in the broader context of mechanized war, rationalized work, and metropolitan life. The second explores the psychotechnical techniques that were crucial to the operations of Brechtian epic theatre, and the third case study explores the relationship between clinical therapy and modernist fiction as it came to characterize the work of Alfred Döblin during the 1920s. The paper concludes with further reflections on the significance of the ‘modern experimental turn’.


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