The Revival of German Political and Constitutional Life Under Military Government

Author(s):  
Franz Neumann

This chapter offers suggestions for the revival of German political and constitutional life under military government, with a view to providing an environment in which cooperation of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union could be maximized. It examines a number of issues, such as the dismissal or retention of an existing German government; the appointment of a temporary central German authority by military government; the political, social, and economic policies to be pursued in Germany; the time and conditions under which local and national elections are to be held; and the time and method of the disestablishment of military government. The chapter considers the legal continuity of a German government existing at the time of occupation, the policy of military government toward a German government, and the establishment of a central German administrative authority. It also discusses basic issues in German politics under military government and the problem of elections.

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 1423-1441
Author(s):  
Dong Jung Kim

Abstract Economic containment has garnered repeated attention in the discourse about the United States' response to China. Yet, the attributes of economic containment as a distinct strategy of Great Power competition remain unclear. Moreover, the conditions under which a leading power can employ economic containment against a challenging power remain theoretically unelaborated. This article first suggests that economic containment refers to the use of economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material capacity to start military aggression, rather than to influence the competitor's behaviour over a specific issue. Then, this article suggests that economic containment becomes a viable option when the leading power has the ability to inflict more losses on the challenging power through economic restrictions, and this ability is largely determined by the availability of alternative economic partners. When the leading power cannot effectively inflict more losses on the challenging power due to the presence of alternative economic partners, it is better off avoiding economic containment. The author substantiates these arguments through case-studies of the United States' responses to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The article concludes by examining the nature of the United States' recent economic restrictions against China.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson

Until the 1948–1949 Berlin blockade, the United States had not decided whether U.S. forces should remain in West Berlin after the establishment of a West German government. But after the Soviet Union closed off surface routes to West Berlin, the Truman administration embarked on a massive airlift and established a de facto commitment to preserve the western sectors' independence. The U.S. guarantee to West Berlin is difficult to explain from the standpoint of realist theories of foreign policymaking. Realism maintains that leaders should undertake commitments only if adequate power is available and that ends should be commensurate with means. West Berlin was indefensible, and its access routes could be restricted at any time. Only by analyzing the decision-making process from the standpoint of political psychology can scholars determine why U.S. policymakers acted as they did. President Harry Truman played a pivotal role in decision-making in Berlin, and he relied on his own judgment rather than policy analysis. Psychological research on intuitive judgment indicates that people sometimes make important decisions without deliberating when the problem is highly complex and the outcome uncertain—precisely the conditions Truman faced in 1948.


This chapter turns to the East German propaganda campaign against RIAS, examining the various efforts taken by the German Democratic Republic to stop its population from listening to the American-sponsored broadcaster. The Socialist Unity Party's media organs deployed a consistent arsenal of themes through anti-RIAS pamphlets and newspaper stories. These almost always depicted RIAS as a militaristic, imperialist organ that strove to keep Germany divided and hoped to provoke a war with the Soviet Union. However, the East German government went beyond simply attacking the station in the media. It also targeted individuals who listened to RIAS as a minority of unpatriotic, treasonous vagrants who were easily duped by the lies of the United States.


2009 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. HEALE

This article maps the rise and dissemination of Yellow Peril fears in the United States between about 1980 and 1993 and seeks to explain them. Anti-communism had been an animating force in Ronald Reagan's career, but shortly after he left office an opinion poll revealed that Japan had replaced the Soviet Union as the greatest perceived threat to the US. While economic anxieties contributed to the resurgence of Yellow Peril sentiments, this article emphasizes the vital parts played by other phenomena, notably Reagan's economic policies, partisan politics, a media war, and the ending of the Cold War. The Yellow Peril scare was widely criticized, and by the early 1990s the controversy had invaded popular culture. Ronald Reagan is frequently applauded for restoring American self-confidence after the “malaise” of the Carter years, but the apprehensions discussed here suggest that he enjoyed only limited success in this respect.


2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kalberg

The disagreement between Germany and the United States over thewar in Iraq was massive. During the winter of 2002, many observersspoke of a long-term rift between these longstanding allies and atotal loss of credibility on both sides. No one can doubt, regardlessof recent healing overtures,1 that the German-American partnershiphas been altered and significantly weakened. It has suffered a blowfar more damaging than those that accompanied past conflicts over,for example, Ostpolitik, the neutron bomb, the Soviet gas pipeline,the flow of high technology products to the Soviet Union, the impositionof trade sanctions in 1980 against the military government inPoland, the stationing in the late 1970s of middle-range missiles onGerman soil, and the modernization of short-range missiles in 1989.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (02) ◽  
pp. 32-49
Author(s):  
Li Yan

The rumors that Lenin was a “German spy” first appeared in Petrograd after the February revolution in Russia. During the Soviet period, the “Sisson documents” (papers) were fabricated in the United States and other Western countries, and other evidence was sought that Lenin was allegedly an “agent” of the German government. However, all the evidence presented were convincingly refuted. V. I. Lenin’s “German spy” case was discussed again during the collapse of the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia. In some Russian media, political and academic circles, this “case” was reproduced in various forms, but new materials and new evidences were not found.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
HYE-JUNG PARK

AbstractShortly after Japan's surrender to Allied forces, the Soviet Union occupied the northern part of Korea, and the United States moved into the south, where it established the US Army Military Government in Southern Korea (USAMGIK, 1945–1948). In the American zone, music played a unique role in forging US hegemony over Korea. Young American pianist Ely Haimowitz (1920–2010) was the central figure in shaping that policy. Associated with “highbrow” culture, Western orchestral music helped restore Koreans’ ethnic pride damaged by Japanese colonial rule, while countering the Soviet emphasis on indigenous music. By fostering Western orchestral music in Korea, and supporting many individual musicians, Haimowitz succeeded in gaining widespread admiration and trust among Korean musicians. Based on unique access to Haimowitz's private archival collection, as well as diverse historical records from Korea, this article develops a complex picture of Haimowitz not merely as a cold-blooded US military officer and propagandist but also as an individual musician who shared friendships with Korean musicians, suffered ethical dilemmas, and often supported Korean voices against the USAMGIK. The relationships he forged provide indispensable context in understanding USAMGIK music policy, Korean musicians’ responses to it, and the post–World War II Korean reception of Western orchestral music overall.


2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


Author(s):  
Joshua Kotin

This book is a new account of utopian writing. It examines how eight writers—Henry David Thoreau, W. E. B. Du Bois, Osip and Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, Anna Akhmatova, Wallace Stevens, Ezra Pound, and J. H. Prynne—construct utopias of one within and against modernity's two large-scale attempts to harmonize individual and collective interests: liberalism and communism. The book begins in the United States between the buildup to the Civil War and the end of Jim Crow; continues in the Soviet Union between Stalinism and the late Soviet period; and concludes in England and the United States between World War I and the end of the Cold War. In this way it captures how writers from disparate geopolitical contexts resist state and normative power to construct perfect worlds—for themselves alone. The book contributes to debates about literature and politics, presenting innovative arguments about aesthetic difficulty, personal autonomy, and complicity and dissent. It models a new approach to transnational and comparative scholarship, combining original research in English and Russian to illuminate more than a century and a half of literary and political history.


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