Committee Goals and Oversight Strategies

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Committee Assignment ◽  
Armed Services Committee ◽  
Partisan Conflict ◽  
Armed Services

This chapter examines how the distinctive goals of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees led to strategic choices about how much attention to devote to oversight of national security, particularly in comparison to budget activity. It explains why divided government was not a consistent motivator for national security oversight and how indicators of long-term committee goals influenced both committees' stance toward the executive branch. It argues that the Armed Services Committee muted partisan conflict and deemphasized oversight in order to attend to funding the Defense Department, whereas the Foreign Relations Committee was a more active overseer of foreign affairs during periods of divided government. The differences between the two committees reveal how selection biases built into the committee assignment process affected the rule of law in national security and shed light on the inconsistent findings in the scholarly literature with respect to divided government.

Guarding the Guardians through Oversight

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Public Hearings ◽  
Armed Services Committee ◽  
Armed Services ◽  
Legislative Influence ◽  
Abu Ghraib Prison ◽  
Previous Scholarship

This chapter reviews previous scholarship about congressional scrutiny of the executive branch and about general patterns of legislative influence on foreign policy decisions. In the spring of 2004, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed public hearings regarding the conduct and objectives of the Iraq War. A month later, Senator John Warner, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, scheduled two days of hearings to investigate abuse of detainees at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib Prison. The chapter examines the hearing activity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees from 1947 to 2008 to assess the overall trends in oversight and identify similarities and differences in their behavior. It also considers what scholars know about congressional involvement in U.S. foreign policy, what they have concluded about oversight of national security more generally, and why these perspectives do not appear to fit together.

Reforming National Security Oversight in the Senate

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Public Deliberation ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The Self ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Armed Services ◽  
Practical Recommendations ◽  
Over Time

This chapter challenges the efficacy of reform proposals currently circulating in Washington and makes practical recommendations for improving the capacity of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees in terms of oversight of national security. These recommendations look beyond consultation about the initiation of conflicts to generate a more robust review of the implementation of administration policies over time. The focus is on the underlying incentives that drive committee inquiries into the performance of the Department of Defense and the State Department, with an eye to the self-correcting mechanisms at the heart of the Constitution that balance relations between the branches. The chapter argues that well-functioning committees that promote the rule of law in foreign affairs through regular, predictable, and public deliberation make a revised war powers act unnecessary; in the absence of such regular order, new rules for consultation seem likely to fail.

Committee Motivations for Oversight

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Total Frequency ◽  
Public Hearings ◽  
Armed Services Committee ◽  
Armed Services ◽  
External Stimuli

This chapter examines the conditions that motivate legislators to ask questions regarding the country's foreign policy. The Vietnam War represents the nadir of congressional influence over foreign policy in the eyes of many political observers. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee became the locus of congressional pressure for winding down the war, while the Senate Armed Services Committee provided a platform for hawks seeking to ramp up the use of force. The chapter develops theoretical expectations, which address three different committee phenomena relevant to oversight of national security: sources of change in the total frequency of public hearings, biases within committees regarding the frequency and venues of oversight hearings as a result of external stimuli, and influences on the content of routine and event-driven review.

Concepts of Foreign Policy

Worldview ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
United States Foreign Policy ◽  
Armed Services Committee ◽  
Armed Services

There are a number of reasons to believe that fundamental changes are necessary in United States foreign policy, and some of these reasons have been developed in recent statements by Senator William J. Fulbright (Arkansas) of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Russell (Georgia) of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Frank Church (Idaho), Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) and others. In such a reconsideration, the basic objectives, the means for achieving them, and the limitations of American capability should be considered.

Legislatures and Foreign Relations

1917 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denys P. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The State ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Treaty Ratification ◽  
Legislative Control ◽  
Complete Independence ◽  
The Government ◽  
International Phenomenon ◽  
Complete Dependence

In a previous paper foreign relations as a phase of governmental activity were considered chiefly as an international phenomenon. Such relations were there discussed largely in their political bearing and some attempt was made to deduce from practice the considerations which affect foreign offices and the conditions encountered by diplomatic personnel. The problems of secrecy in negotiations and of secret treaties were examined and an effort made to indicate how much knowledge of both may be justifiably concealed. The present paper is a study of legislative control over foreign relations.Systems of legislative handling of foreign relations may be distinguished as of three types, which we may designate as the continental, the executive, and the American. The American type is characterized by an imposed agreement between the executive and legislative departments of government before treaties can become binding upon the state. The continental type is characterized by a less complete dependence of the executive upon the legislative department in respect to treaty ratification. The executive type is characterized by an almost complete independence of the executive respecting treaty ratification.All systems recognize definitely that the conduct of foreign relations is an executive function. None denies the patent facts that it is the place of the executive to speak and act for the state, and that, in all matters not definable as legislation, the minister can definitely bind the state. Innumerable decisions under all systems are reached by the department of foreign affairs without any but the executive branch of the government knowing anything of them until they are recorded facts.

The Role of Congress in the History of US Foreign Relations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clay Silver Katsky
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Legislative Authority ◽  
The Republic

While presidents have historically been the driving force behind foreign policy decision-making, Congress has used its constitutional authority to influence the process. The nation’s founders designed a system of checks and balances aimed at establishing a degree of equilibrium in foreign affairs powers. Though the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the country’s chief diplomat, Congress holds responsibility for declaring war and can also exert influence over foreign relations through its powers over taxation and appropriation, while the Senate possesses authority to approve or reject international agreements. This separation of powers compels the executive branch to work with Congress to achieve foreign policy goals, but it also sets up conflict over what policies best serve national interests and the appropriate balance between executive and legislative authority. Since the founding of the Republic, presidential power over foreign relations has accreted in fits and starts at the legislature’s expense. When core American interests have come under threat, legislators have undermined or surrendered their power by accepting presidents’ claims that defense of national interests required strong executive action. This trend peaked during the Cold War, when invocations of national security enabled the executive to amass unprecedented control over America’s foreign affairs.

Return to the Rule of Law in International Affairs

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
International Affairs ◽  
Major Barrier ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Legislative Oversight ◽  
Armed Services

This chapter examines normative political issues regarding the importance of legislative oversight in fostering the rule of law and public deliberation about foreign policy. Some observers of U.S. foreign policy argue that lawmakers ask too many questions and damage the nation's interests abroad with untimely inquiries. The performance of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees thus raises broader issues about whether public accountability in international affairs is desirable or even possible in the twenty-first century. The chapter first provides an overview of the paradox of public opinion and oversight of national security before suggesting that a major barrier to a more constructive role for lawmakers in international affairs is not the Constitution, but the large number serving today who have very limited legislative experience. It also discusses the risks to the presidency that result from asserting executive supremacy over national security.

Police Patrols and Fire Alarms in U.S. Foreign Policy

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Fire Alarm ◽  
Police Patrol ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Public Hearings ◽  
Event Driven ◽  
Armed Services

This chapter examines partisan calculations about party reputations as influences on routine and event-driven public hearings, using the classic typology of police patrols and fire alarms. It considers committee choices regarding the content of national security oversight hearings by comparing routine inquiries to reviews of major crises and scandals. The chapter uses the unique characteristics of fine-grained coding of hearings to develop measures for police patrol and fire alarm oversight of national security. It also discusses expectations about committee behavior as well as the distribution of patrols and alarms for the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, particularly as they relate to changes in military casualties from 1947 to 2008. Finally, it explores crisis oversight as a form of committee review that is particularly important to democratic accountability.

Institutional Change and Senate Committee Hearings

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Panama Canal ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Senate Committee ◽  
Public Hearings ◽  
Long Term Changes ◽  
Armed Services

This chapter examines long-term institutional changes in the Senate committee system that devalued committee work and negatively affected the total hearing activity of Armed Services and Foreign Relations. It begins with a review of expectations and measures regarding the influence of the shifting institutional context on Senate committee hearings in general and on Armed Services and Foreign Relations sessions in particular. It then analyzes the effects of various long-term changes on the frequency of public hearings first by Senate committees in the aggregate and then by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees. It also considers the influences on the frequency of executive hearing days by the two national security committees. Finally, it looks at the Panama Canal to illustrate the confluence of trends that created a watershed moment for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Watchdogs on the Hill

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda L. Fowler
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
War Powers ◽  
Humanitarian Mission ◽  
Noticeable Reduction ◽  
Armed Services ◽  
The Hill

An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. This book evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The book finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that U.S. foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the book notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. It attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. The book's detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. It argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. It investigates America's oversight of national security and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.

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