Congressional oversight and electoral accountability

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

Pengaruh Pengawasan Legislatif dan Temuan Audit terhadap Internet Financial Report Pemda Dimoderasi Sistem Pengendalian Internal

This study aims to provide empirical evidence regarding the effect of legislative oversight and audit findings on the disclosure of Internet Financial Reports (IFR) for the local governments of NTB, NTT and Bali (Bali Nusra), as well as the moderating effect of the internal control system (SPI). The total population of the study was 44 local governments consisting of provincial, district and city governments in Bali Nusra. The study was conducted during 2018-2019 with a total of 88 observations. The sampling method used non-probability sampling with saturated sampling (census). The results of the study indicate that legislative oversight has a positive and significant impact on the disclosure of the Bali Nusra Regional Government's IFR. Meanwhile, the audit findings have no significant negative effect on the disclosure of the Bali Nusra Regional Government IFR. In addition, the SPI strengthens but is not significant in moderating the effect of legislative oversight and audit findings on the disclosure of IFR for the local government of Bali Nusra. The implication of this research is to provide input to the heads of local governments as consideration for improving the implementation of IFR, as a benchmark and form of evaluation related to the implementation of IFR to increase transparency. Keywords : Legislative Oversight; Audit Findings; Internal Control System; Internet Financial Report.

NIGERIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY’S LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, THE POWERS OF SUMMONS AND APPOINTMENTS’ RATIFICATION

The legislature as First Estate of the realm represents citizens and sovereignty. It makes the law, serve as checks on the activities of the executive (oversight) and represent the citizens in constituencies. The responsibility of the Parliaments is to guarantee that accountability and transparency of government activities are maintained in order to curb misuse of public funds, corruption, while effecting good practices. It also scrutinizes the nominees for top government positions by the executive arm while it ensures that the requests sent by the executive are properly examined in order to avoid inefficiency and non-performance. However, the paper relying on secondary research method and data gathering discover that limited political will by legislators, inadequate funds, deteriorating infrastructural facilities, pressure from the Executive, predominance of inexperience legislators in the art of lawmaking and the tendency to place a higher premium of personal and pecuniary interests at the expense of public interests are antithetical to the effective legislative power of summons and appointment ratification in the National Assembly. Therefore, the paper recommended that there is a need for legislators to shun mediocrity and rise above pecuniary, sectional and party interests in favour of the protection of democracy and its practices.

The Legislative Oversight of Emergency Response in Myanmar: Strategic Considerations Based on the International Experience of Public Accounts Committees

Oversight by key government institutions can help to ensure that emergency spending is administered properly and efficiently. This discussion paper is designed to help identify an optimal balance between the need for an agile emergency response and demands for the efficient and accountable use of public funds. It examines the international literature on Public Accounts Committees (PACs) and their work in times of emergency response, and presents good practices and lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of oversight.

Pandemic Parliamentary Oversight of Delegated Legislation: Comparing the Performance of Westminster Systems

The COVID-19 pandemic is testing parliamentary systems of governance across the world, especially in relation to oversight of executive actions. Observers in multiple jurisdictions have already noted the proliferation of delegated legislation during the pandemic and the shortcomings in legislative oversight of the same. To date, however, no close analysis has been conducted of the way in which legislative oversight mechanisms have broken down during the pandemic. This paper provides such an analysis, using examples from Westminster systems adopting the ‘legislative model’ of providing extraordinary powers. Looking at individual examples from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the analysis seeks to identify and explain the failures, and relative successes, in different mechanisms for parliamentary oversight, including parliamentary scrutiny committees (pre-existing and ad-hoc), disallowance, and sunset clauses. Although primarily descriptive, the comparative approach analysis permits preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the way each jurisdiction may improve its methods of parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. These comparative lessons will be of use both during and beyond the pandemic.

The Problematic of Legislative Oversight in Nigeria: A Study of Delta State

This study examines the problem of legislative oversight in Nigeria using Delta State as a case study. Four research questions were raised to guide the study and four null hypotheses were formulated for the study. The design of the study was a descriptive survey. The population of the study comprised 600 staff in the Delta State House of Assembly. The sample of the study consisted of 245 staff drawn from nine (9) departments using stratified and simple random techniques. The instrument used for data collection was the legislative oversight questionnaire and the collated data were analyzed using mean rating and chi-square. The findings of the study revealed that there is a significant relationship between politics of trade-off and pay-off between the legislators and the executive as well as poor commitment to oversight functions by the legislators and legislative oversight in Delta State. The study equally showed that there is a significant relationship between the culture of corruption as well as perceptual legislative subservience to the executive and legislative oversight in Delta State. The study recommended that that the legislature in Nigeria, particularly in Delta State, should be truly independent rather than operate and seen as a subservient extension of the executive arm of government, a new culture that is void of the politics of trade-off and pay-off between the legislature and the executive, as well as corruption, should be established.

The Selangor State Assembly Oversight and Government Accountability (Pengawasan dan Akauntabiliti Kerajaan di Dewan Negeri Selangor)

It is imperative to ensure that every decision made by a legislative body has the best interest of the citizens at heart. The Selangor State Assembly (SSA) is the legislative body that oversees the government of Selangor, Malaysia. The SSA follows the parliamentary model of government. This paper attempts to examine the effectiveness of the SSA oversight in ensuring the Selangor state government accountability generally, and in relation to the Talam case, specifically. The concept of accountability has two facets – answerability and enforcement. Matching internal and external oversights with the different forms of accountability must have high enforcement or sanctions capacity for the oversight mechanisms to be effective. There are three areas of focus in the study: i) the mechanisms available in the SSA, ii) the effectiveness of the mechanisms used in ensuring the government accountability in Selangor and iii) the challenges in ensuring government accountability in Selangor and how they are resolved. The data of this research paper is mainly from interviews and secondary sources. The conceptual framework of legislative oversight and government accountability of Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) is used as the theoretical guideline of this study. Legislative oversight, if effectively performed, can keep government accountable; a greater accountability can lead to a reduction in the level of corruption. Reduced corruption results in improved economic development and living standards. This study reveals the extent of the SSA legislative oversight effectiveness in ensuring the Selangor state government accountability. Keywords: Selangor State Assembly, Legislative Oversights, Government Accountability, Corruption Management. Abstrak Amat penting untuk memastikan setiap keputusan yang dibuat oleh sesebuah badan legislatif adalah yang terbaik untuk kepentingan rakyat. Dewan Negeri Selangor (DNS) adalah badan legislatif yang mengawas kerajaan negeri Selangor, Malaysia. Model DNS ialah sistem kerajaan berparlimen. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk melihat keberkesanan DNS dalam memastikan akauntabiliti kerajaan Selangor amnya dan berhubung dengan kes Talam khususnya. Konsep akauntabiliti memenuhi dua aspek – kebertanggungjawaban dan penguatkuasaan. Padanan mekanisme dalaman dan luaran ke arah mencapai akauntabiliti pelbagai bentuk perlu penguatkuasaan yang luhur atau kapasiti sanksi yang mampu menjadikan mekanisme pengawasan berkesan. Tiga fokus utama kajian ini: i) Mekanisme pengawasan sedia ada di DNS, ii) Keberkesanan mekanisme yang digunakan dalam memastikan akauntabiliti kerajaan di Selangor, iii) Cabaran-cabaran dalam memastikan akauntabiliti kerajaan di Selangor dan bagaimanakah cabaran-cabaran tersebut diatasi. Data kajian ini diperolehi dari temu bual dan sumber-sumber sekunder. Kerangka konseptual oleh Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) dalam pengawasan legislatif dan akauntabiliti kerajaan digunakan sebagai panduan teori dalam kajian ini. Pengawasan legislatif, jika dilakukan secara efektif, boleh mengekalkan kerajaan yang bertanggungjawab; akauntabiliti yang lebih semarak akan memerosotkan korupsi. Pengurangan korupsi mewujudkan peningkatan pembangunan ekonomi dan taraf kehidupan. Kajian ini mendedahkan sejauh mana keberkesanan pengawasan DNS ke arah memastikan akauntabiliti kerajaan Selangor. Kata Kunci: Dewan Negeri Selangor, Pengawasan Legislatif, Akauntabiliti Kerajaan, Pengurusan Korupsi.

Effects of Party System Fluidity on Legislative Oversight and Good Governance Indicators--in the context of Sub-Saharan African Countries

While analyzing data for 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, this article explores the correlation between Legislative Oversight and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and the effects of Party System Fluidity on WGI and legislative oversight. The effects of party systems fluidity on governance indicators and legislative oversight have received little systematic scholarly attention. To fill the gap in the existing literature, the article explores how in/stability of party systems affects governance indicators and legislative oversight capacity in Sub-Saharan African countries. Analyzing the data on 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, we find that legislative oversight has a strong positive relationship with Worldwide Governance Indicators; however, instability of political party systems expressed in high party systems fluidity has a negative relationship with legislative oversight as well as all six dimensions of WGI. These findings reaffirm: "that the stability of political party systems”(Pelizzo: 2020, p. 265) is a crucial factor that is essential for the development of democratic institutions and further evolvement of mechanisms of democratic control of Parliaments over the work of national governments. The work structure is the following: firstly, it analyzes how academic scholarship defines legislative oversight and party system fluidity. The second part presents our data analysis methods. In conclusion, the paper discusses the research's key findings, namely the effects of party systems fluidity on legislative oversight and WGI in the context of Sub-Saharan African countries.

Effects of Party System Fluidity on Legislative Oversight and Good Governance Indicators in Sub-Saharan African

How fluidity of political party systems affects legislative oversight and worldwide governance indicators? Based on the analyses of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, this article seeks to explore the correlation between Legislative Oversight and Worldwide Governance Indicators as well as the effects of Party System Fluidity on WGI and legislative oversight. Needless to mention, that the effects of party systems fluidity on governance indicators and legislative oversight have received little systematic scholarly attention. To fill the gap in the existing literature, the article explores how in/stability of party systems affects governance indicators and legislative oversight capacity in Sub-Saharan African countries. Analyzing the data on 47 Sub-Saharan African countries we find that legislative oversight has a strong positive relationship with Worldwide Governance Indicators, however, instability of political party systems expressed in high party systems fluidity has a negative relationship with legislative oversight as well as all six dimensions of WGI. These findings reaffirm that the stability of political party systems is a crucial factor that is essential for the development of democratic institutions and further evolvement of mechanisms of democratic control of Parliaments over the work of national Governments. The article is structured in the following way: The first part analyzes how academic scholarship defines legislative oversight and party system fluidity. The second part presents our data analysis methods. In conclusion, the paper discusses the key findings of the research, namely the effects of party systems fluidity on legislative oversight and WGI, in the context of Sub-Saharan African countries.

Populism in Power and Democracy: Democratic Decay and Resilience in the Czech Republic (2013–2020)

Populism and technocracy reject vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. Populism and technocracy can combine to form ‘technocratic populism.’ The study assesses the extent to which democratic decay can be traced to the actions of technocratic populists as opposed to institutional factors, civil society, fragmentation and polarization. The main findings of this article are that technocratic populism has illiberal tendencies expressed best in its efforts at executive aggrandizement (cf. Bermeo, 2016). Without an effective bulwark against democratic erosion (cf. Bernhard, 2015), technocratic populism tends to undermine electoral competition (vertical accountability), judiciary independence, legislative oversight (horizontal accountability), and freedom of the press (diagonal accountability). The most effective checks on technocratic populist in power, this study finds, are the courts, free media, and civil society. This article highlights the mechanisms of democratic decay and democratic resilience beyond electoral politics. It indicates that a combination of institutional veto points and civil society agency is necessary to prevent democratic erosion (cf. Weyland, 2020). While active civil society can prevent democratic erosion, it cannot reverse it. Ultimately, the future of liberal democracy depends on the people’s willingness to defend it in the streets AND at the ballot box.