Pakistan

Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

This chapter describes and tests the sources of Pakistan's nuclear postures. It shows that the country's choices, and the timing of its shift from a catalytic to an asymmetric escalation posture, are best captured by optimization theory, illustrating how exogenous changes to a state's security environment and alliance options can trigger a shift in nuclear postures. Born into and out of war, Pakistan has always perceived an existential threat from its larger neighbor India. Since 1971, Pakistan has been on a desperate quest to acquire and operationalize a nuclear weapons capability to deter Indian conventional power. As its uranium enrichment program was reaching critical thresholds to enable the weaponization of the program, Pakistan relied on a catalytic nuclear posture which used the credible threat of nuclear escalation to compel its then-patron, the United States, to intercede on its behalf in crises with India.

Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This book examines the historical development and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Drawing on hundreds of declassified documents, the first part of the book shows how the anticipation of nuclear domino effects in the 1960s and 1970s led the United States to strengthen its nonproliferation policy, moving from a selective approach—which was relatively permissive toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons—and toward a more universal policy that opposed proliferation across the board. Most notably, Washington spearheaded the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and adopted sanctions legislation in the late 1970s that credibly threatened to cut off support to countries seeking nuclear weapons. The second part of the book analyzes how effective these policies have been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Statistical analysis suggests that a credible threat of sanctions has deterred countries dependent on the United States from even starting nuclear weapons programs over the last several decades. Meanwhile, in-depth case studies of French, Taiwanese, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear activities illustrate the conditions under which sanctions succeed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs. The findings hold important implications for international security and nonproliferation policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Mohamad Amine El Khalfi

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the result of diplomatic negotiations reached by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran in 2015 regarding the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The emergence of this agreement was due to Iran's actions abusing its nuclear development to serve as a weapon of mass destruction in 2011. In response to this, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Iran in the hope of weakening Iran's position so that it does not have the ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. In fact, these sanctions succeeded in weakening the Iranian economy but were not politically effective enough because the Iranian government remained strong, this led to Iran being still involved in various conflicts in the region and still insisting on developing its uranium enrichment. Iran's tough stance made Western countries choose to bring Iran into the negotiations by making offers that could attract Iran's attention. During the Obama administration, the United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the talks. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This chapter reviews existing theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy and proposes two theories to explain how US nonproliferation policy has evolved over time and how effective it has been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It argues that tests by new nuclear states can spur stronger nonproliferation policies by increasing expectations of nuclear domino effects, causing greater government attention to nonproliferation, and providing a political opening for nonproliferation advocates. In terms of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, it emphasizes the importance of a credible threat of sanctions, which can deter states from seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons if they are highly dependent on the United States. For states with low dependence on the United States, multilateral sanctions are crucial to ending ongoing nuclear weapons programs.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-55
Author(s):  
Anya Loukianova Fink ◽  
Olga Oliker

At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This chapter analyzes US nonproliferation policy toward Taiwan, which began pursuing nuclear weapons in the wake of China’s 1964 nuclear test. Having started its nuclear program prior to the development of a US nonproliferation sanctions policy, Taiwan underestimated the risk of sanctions. It subsequently halted its nuclear weapons program due to its high dependence on the United States when faced with a credible threat of sanctions in the late 1970s, which included US threats to cut off military aid, economic aid, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and broader political support.


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.


1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 836-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect, having been ratified by 47 states including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty legally bars these three nuclear powers from transferring atomic weapons to nonnuclear states and formally pledges those nonnuclear states signing the treaty to refrain from developing such weapons or acquiring them from other powers. It thus caps a long effort by the United States to inhibit—so long as it could not preclude—the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the potential instabilities associated with that spread.


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