Theorizing the Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
Over Time

This chapter reviews existing theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation policy and proposes two theories to explain how US nonproliferation policy has evolved over time and how effective it has been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It argues that tests by new nuclear states can spur stronger nonproliferation policies by increasing expectations of nuclear domino effects, causing greater government attention to nonproliferation, and providing a political opening for nonproliferation advocates. In terms of the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, it emphasizes the importance of a credible threat of sanctions, which can deter states from seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons if they are highly dependent on the United States. For states with low dependence on the United States, multilateral sanctions are crucial to ending ongoing nuclear weapons programs.

The Iranian Nuclear Program (1974–2015)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Iranian Revolution ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Comprehensive Plan ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter analyzes US efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1970s until the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Iran initially began exploring nuclear weapons when it was an American client in the 1970s, prior to the development of a US sanctions policy. Once the United States strengthened its nonproliferation policy, a credible threat of sanctions helped convince Iran to scale back its nuclear plans. After the Iranian Revolution led to a complete break in relations with the United States, Iran again began seeking nuclear weapons, undeterred by the threat of sanctions due to its low dependence on the United States. After two decades of unilateral US pressure failed to alter Iran’s plans, stringent multilateral sanctions led Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program.

Stopping the Bomb

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Historical Development ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Selective Approach ◽  
Credible Threat ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S

This book examines the historical development and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Drawing on hundreds of declassified documents, the first part of the book shows how the anticipation of nuclear domino effects in the 1960s and 1970s led the United States to strengthen its nonproliferation policy, moving from a selective approach—which was relatively permissive toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons—and toward a more universal policy that opposed proliferation across the board. Most notably, Washington spearheaded the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and adopted sanctions legislation in the late 1970s that credibly threatened to cut off support to countries seeking nuclear weapons. The second part of the book analyzes how effective these policies have been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Statistical analysis suggests that a credible threat of sanctions has deterred countries dependent on the United States from even starting nuclear weapons programs over the last several decades. Meanwhile, in-depth case studies of French, Taiwanese, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear activities illustrate the conditions under which sanctions succeed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs. The findings hold important implications for international security and nonproliferation policy.

The future unlike the past: nuclear proliferation and American security policy

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Future ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.

Japan, 1952–1980

2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
The Military

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.

Pakistan

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Optimization Theory ◽  
The United States ◽  
Uranium Enrichment ◽  
Critical Thresholds ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Enrichment Program ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter describes and tests the sources of Pakistan's nuclear postures. It shows that the country's choices, and the timing of its shift from a catalytic to an asymmetric escalation posture, are best captured by optimization theory, illustrating how exogenous changes to a state's security environment and alliance options can trigger a shift in nuclear postures. Born into and out of war, Pakistan has always perceived an existential threat from its larger neighbor India. Since 1971, Pakistan has been on a desperate quest to acquire and operationalize a nuclear weapons capability to deter Indian conventional power. As its uranium enrichment program was reaching critical thresholds to enable the weaponization of the program, Pakistan relied on a catalytic nuclear posture which used the credible threat of nuclear escalation to compel its then-patron, the United States, to intercede on its behalf in crises with India.

How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation

2018 ◽  
pp. 10-28
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Argument

This chapter develops the main theoretical argument of the book—specifically, that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation. It begins by defining treaty allies and nuclear proliferation-related behavior before assessing existing understandings regarding how alliances affect nuclear proliferation incentives. It proceeds to elaborate a theory that argues that in-theater conventional forces are crucial for making American extended nuclear guarantees; that the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than assumed; and that the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States, if utilized, works better to reverse or to halt any ally’s nuclear bid than anything else. This chapter also outlines the research strategy and alternative arguments.

Concern over Pakistan’s nuclear programme will grow

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Short Range ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Content Type

Subject Pakistan's nuclear programme and links to North Korea. Significance Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj on September 18 implied that Pakistan had a role in North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, calling for an investigation into countries with links to Pyongyang’s programme. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi on September 20 revealed that his country had developed short-range nuclear weapons. Impacts Washington will raise the pressure on Islamabad to curb the militants it believes are active on Pakistani soil. India would reject any further calls from the United States to withdraw its embassy from North Korea. North Korea will continue to develop its nuclear programme.

Arms Control and the Developing Countries

1965 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lincoln P. Bloomfield ◽  
Amelia C. Leiss
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Chemical Separation ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Separation Plant ◽  
High Level

The detonation of Peking's first atomic devices in recent months has X provoked renewed widespread discussion of the dangers of the further spread of nuclear weaponry. Speculation has flourished about who would be next—Sweden? Japan? Israel? Or perhaps India, which has become the first nonnuclear country to build a chemical separation plant? Cost estimates put nuclear weapons within reach of the poorest nations within a few years. Governments have issued solemn pronouncements about the need to design further international agreements to prevent nuclear proliferation. The President of the United States made use of a high-level committee to advise him how to deal with the problem.

Atomic Ambiguity: Event Data Evidence on Nuclear Latency and International Cooperation

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Mattiacci ◽  
Rupal N. Mehta ◽  
Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Security ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Event Data ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Concerted Effort ◽  
The Impact

How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.

The Taiwanese Nuclear Program (1967–1977)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Nuclear Program ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
Economic Aid ◽  
Credible Threat

This chapter analyzes US nonproliferation policy toward Taiwan, which began pursuing nuclear weapons in the wake of China’s 1964 nuclear test. Having started its nuclear program prior to the development of a US nonproliferation sanctions policy, Taiwan underestimated the risk of sanctions. It subsequently halted its nuclear weapons program due to its high dependence on the United States when faced with a credible threat of sanctions in the late 1970s, which included US threats to cut off military aid, economic aid, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and broader political support.

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