Vagueness and the Law

Author(s):  
Scott Soames

This chapter combines recent work on vagueness in the philosophy of language with recent work in the philosophy of law on the value of vagueness in certain legal situations. The question at issue is whether leading philosophical theories of what vagueness is can account for the positive utility of certain kinds of legal vagueness. The two theories put to the test are (i) epistemicism, according to which vagueness is a matter of irremediable ignorance of the sharp borderlines separating cases in which (totally defined) vague predicates apply from those in which their negations do; and (ii) the theory according to which vague predicates are (a) only partially defined, leaving a range of borderline cases in which there is no fact of the matter regarding the application or nonapplication of the predicates, and (b) context sensitive, which results in constantly shifting lines separating the defined from the undefined cases.

Author(s):  
Tyler Lohse

This essay comments on the nature of the language of the law and legal interpretation by exam- ining their effects on their recipients. Two forms of philosophy of law are examined, legal positiv- ism and teleological interpretive theory, which are then applied to their specific manifestations in literature and case law, both relating to antebellum slave law. In these cases, the slave sustains civil death under the law, permissible by means of these legal interpretive strategies.


Cultura ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-28
Author(s):  
Luis CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

Marxist Philosophy as an explanation of social reality has, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, been largely neglected. However, some philosophers have contended that it may still be relevant to explain today’s social reality. In this article, I wish to demonstrate precisely that Marxist philosophy can be relevant to understand social reality. To carry out this task, I show that Marxist philosophy of law can offer a sound explanation of Animal law in South Africa. My argument is that South African law is a superstructure that reinforces the power of the animal farming industry in South Africa. That is, the hidden purpose of the law is to benefit the industry. In order to argue for this, I present two sets of arguments. The first set argues that the law facilitates the functioning of the animal farming industry. In the second set of arguments I contend that the law socialises individuals into approving the methods of slaughtering by the animal farming industry.


2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Cresswell

This article provides a critical viewpoint on Loughran’s recent work in Medicine, Science and the Law on the causes of the rise in the police’s use of section 136 (s136) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Loughran M. Detention under section 136: why is it increasing? Med Sci Law 2018; 58: 268–274). The rate of this rise seems significant: by 2014, it was five times more likely that a person in England would be detained in a hospital under s136 than it was in 2000, and the trend has continued to the present day. This viewpoint considers the significance of the s136 rise from the theoretical perspective of causal analysis.


Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-38
Author(s):  
Alex Davies

ABSTRACTAccording to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe what we're told, is not widespread. Peet doesn't identify any problem with his own argument though he does attempt to limit its sceptical potential by identifying special contexts in which TBVs stand a chance of success. A more general defence of TBVs can be provided by showing Peet's argument to be unsound. I argue that Peet's argument is unsound because it requires us to wrongly suppose that speakers do far less labour than their audiences in context-sensitive linguistic communication. I aim to show why – in the context of the epistemology of testimony and the philosophy of language – it's important to recognize the labour that speakers can do, and so can be held responsible for not doing, in episodes of context-sensitive linguistic communication.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Henrique Garbellini Carnio

<p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente artigo tem como base a conferência dada por Rudolf von Jhering em 12 de março de 1884 para a Sociedade Jurídica de Viena, intitulada "Sobre o nascimento do sentimento jurídico". O objetivo é demonstrar algumas reflexões surpreendentes e pouco conhecidas deste importante jurista, enfatizando, em especial, a importância que ele atribui ao devir histórico na formação do sentimento jurídico, apostando que o sentido do direito é modelado pela história e não proveniente das leis naturais eternas. Jhering, propondo uma tarefa genealógica, defende de forma contundente um historicismo ético e jurídico que o distancia de um relativismo absoluto como o das clássicas posições jusnaturalistas, completamente ahistóricas, que se revela extremamente interessante para as reflexões atuais sobre a filosofia do direito.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chave:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; sentimento jurídico; historicismo ético-político.</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> This article is based on a lecture given by Rudolf von Jhering on March 12, 1884 for the Law Society of Vienna, entitled "About the birth of the legal feeling." The objective is to demonstrate some surprising and little-known reflections of this important jurist, emphasizing, in particular, the importance he attaches to the historical development in the formation of the legal feeling, betting that the sense of law is shaped by history and not from the eternal natural laws. Jhering proposing a genealogical task, forcefully defends an ethical and legal historicism that distances him of the absolute relativism as the way of classic natural law positions, completely ahistorical, that reveals itself highly interesting for the current reflections on the philosophy of law.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; legal feeling; ethical and political historicism.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (35) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Marţian Iovan

Abstract The author analyzes in this paper principles and ides of philosophy of law issued by Mircea Djuvara, which preserve their contemporaneity, being useful for the perfecting of the state institutions and of the democracy not only at national level, but also at European Union one. His ideas and logical demonstration on the rational fundamentals of law, the autonomy of the moral and legal conscience, the specificity of truth and of juridical knowledge, the philosophical substantiation of power and Constitution, the principles of the democracy and the connections between the political power and the law are just few of the original elements due to which Djuvara became an acknowledged and respected personality not only in Romania, but also in the experts clubs of the Europe between the two World Wars.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-200
Author(s):  
Sheila Fakhria

The school of law are determined by law and the period of time so that by jurists make legal interpretation based on the time and place. So at this time jurists are always reviewing the law that is based on the presence or emergence of various schools in the philosophy of law shows the struggle of ideas will not cease in the field of law. Similarly, the existence of Islamic law in a society that seeks to be grouped according typology of existing law schools in the philosophy of law.


Just Words ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 124-155
Author(s):  
Mary Kate McGowan

This chapter uses the framework of covert exercitives to explore potential harms of actions involving certain types of pornography. The sorts of pornography of interest are clarified and the pornographic is shown to be context sensitive. This chapter focuses on the harms of subordination and silencing. Langton’s account of the subordinating force of pornography is critically assessed. An alternative model, relying on the covert exercitive, is presented and its advantages are illustrated using real world examples from the law. Various kinds of silencing are identified, the speech act of refusal is clarified, and both causal and constitutive connections between actions involving pornography, on the one hand, and the harms of subordination and silencing, on the other, are here discussed.


Antichthon ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 63-73
Author(s):  
R.A. Bauman

Luigi Labruna makes a number of proposals, in his recent Vim fieri veto: alle radici di una ideologia, of considerable importance to both the legal and the political history of the later Republic. The basic theme of the work is the possessory interdict uti possidetis, but in furtherance of his avowed purpose of illuminating the juridical, political, economic and social background to this early possessory remedy the author moves freely and knowledgeably in a number of fields. It is well that it should be so. The delimitation of the boundaries of Roman private law in a purely juridical setting is and will always be an indispensable and rewarding discipline, but it is more and more coming to be realized that the law of a given society needs also to be seen in a wider ambit, not only for the better understanding of the law but also for the better understanding of the society. His successful application of this wider approach to the rather austere problems of the possessory interdicts marks Labruna’s work out as one of considerable significance and merit.


Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document